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Abstract
Today, many publishers (e.g., websites, mobile application developers) commonly use
third-party analytics services and social widgets. Unfortunately, this scheme allows
these third parties to track individual users across the web, creating privacy concerns
and leading to reactions to prevent tracking via blocking, legislation and standards.
While improving user privacy, these efforts do not consider the functionality third-party
tracking enables publishers to use: to obtain aggregate statistics about their users and
increase their exposure to other users via online social networks. Simply preventing
third-party tracking without replacing the functionality it provides cannot be a viable
solution; leaving publishers without essential services will hurt the sustainability of the
entire ecosystem.
In this thesis, we present alternative approaches to bridge this gap between privacy
for users and functionality for publishers and other entities. We first propose a general
and interaction-based third-party cookie policy that prevents third-party tracking via
cookies, yet enables social networking features for users when wanted, and does not
interfere with non-tracking services for analytics and advertisements. We then present
a system that enables publishers to obtain rich web analytics information (e.g., user
demographics, other sites visited) without tracking the users across the web. While this
system requires no new organizational players and is practical to deploy, it necessitates
the publishers to pre-define answer values for the queries, which may not be feasible for
many analytics scenarios (e.g., search phrases used, free-text photo labels). Our second
system complements the first system by enabling publishers to discover previously
unknown string values to be used as potential answers in a privacy-preserving fashion
and with low computation overhead for clients as well as servers. These systems suggest
that it is possible to provide non-tracking services with (at least) the same functionality
as today’s tracking services.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 An Evolving Web
Ever since the beginning of the web, statistics about visitors or web analytics have been
important. Website publishers use web analytics information to analyze their traffic
and optimize their sites’ content accordingly. To achieve this goal, numerous analytics
software programs have been developed and have been at the disposal of publishers
since the early days [7, 28, 40, 41, 67]. By running these programs, publishers can obtain
statistics about users on their site, such as their page views, clickstreams, browsers,
operating systems and plugins as well as the visit frequency of returning visitors.
In recent years, the prevalence of mobile devices and the number of users accessing
the web using these devices have increased drastically. While the traditional web
analytics software can still be used for website visits with a browser running on a mobile
device, such devices are often used to access content and services of publishers with
stand-alone applications. As a result, the number of services that target specifically these
mobile applications and the analytics information has dramatically increased. Some
1
examples of these services are Flurry, Bango Dashboard, Localytics, Countly, Mobclix
and Google mobile analytics [8, 13, 21, 35, 37, 38].1
Another important aspect the publishers have almost always been interested in is
the interaction with their visitors. From simple guestbooks, where visitors could leave a
short message for the publishers, to forums and comments, where visitors could interact
with the publishers as well as other visitors, such interactive features have always
been an integral part of websites. Using the analytics tools described above, publishers
can track popular pages on their own sites via user interaction (e.g., comments, page
visits), and use this information to suggest new and interesting content. Perhaps, the
continuation of these features is the increasing prevalence of social widgets present on
web pages today [69, 144], which not only enable publishers and visitors to interact with
each other, but also allow visitors to share their interaction with other users.
1.2 Essential Web Services & Third-party Tracking
Today, however, publishers often outsource the above services to a third-party service
provider. This outsourcing is convenient for publishers, because they only have to install
a small piece of code (i.e., a JavaScript code snippet) provided by the service provider.
More importantly, this arrangement fills a gap in the existing first-party approaches
for web analytics or social interactions with users: First-party analytics solutions do
not provide potentially useful information, such as demographics of visitors (e.g., age,
gender, education level) or other sites visited by them. Similarly, interaction between
publishers and visitors through comments and page visits is usually limited to existing
visitors, and does not cover potential new users.
To obtain extended web analytics (e.g., user demographics, other sites visited), web
1There is no fundamental reason why software developers for regular desktop computers cannot use
such data aggregators to obtain analytics information.
2
Figure 1.1: Third-party tracking by data aggregators, online social networks and adver-
tisement networks.
publishers often use data aggregators such as comScore, Google or Quantcast [6, 62].
Such a data aggregator collects data from visitors of many publishers. This information
enables a data aggregator to infer extended web analytics information that goes beyond
traditional web analytics and includes user demographics. The aggregator then provides
the publishers with the analytics information of their sites in aggregate form. These
aggregators may also provide behavioral advertisements that are tailored to a user’s
interests based on her browsing history.
For interactions with visitors, publishers often use online social network (OSN) ser-
vices and employ social widgets from OSN providers, such as Facebook and Twitter.
These widgets help publishers to increase user engagement on their sites. Addition-
ally, these widgets increase the exposure of the site to more potential visitors, because
the interaction with social widgets propagate this action to more users via the OSN’s
structure.
3
This arrangement benefits not only the website publishers, application developers
and other analysts, but also the data aggregators and OSN providers: Every time a
user visits a publisher website, the data aggregator or the OSN provider learns about
this visit due to the loading of the third-party resource embedded on the publisher
website (e.g., a JavaScript code snippet, social widget) and can track the user across
the web (Figure 1.1). As a result, these entities obtain vast amounts of information
about users’ browsing behavior across the web and use this information via targeted
advertisements [16]. Compiling extended web analytics benefits the data aggregators
because they can sell this information to advertisers and publishers alike. Learning the
interactions with different publishers, the OSN providers get more detailed information
about a user’s behavior, which then can be combined with the information the user has
provided while using the OSN.
This arrangement, however, comes with a price for user privacy and raises concerns
about users being tracked while accessing publisher content. Such tracking enables
these third-party service providers to compile detailed behavior of individual users
with the sensitive information they obtain, and infer individual–not just aggregate–user
demographics [144]. Thus, these third parties are given a lot of information about users’
actions on the web and have to be trusted that they will not abuse it. This trust has been
violated in the past [33, 47, 49].
Tracking affects not only users, but also the data aggregators and OSN providers
themselves, who are often criticized for privacy violations due to tracking. In response to
these criticisms, researchers and industry have proposed methods to detect and prevent
tracking, including voluntary regulations by the industry to provide opt-out mechanisms
[10,11,50,66], the Do-Not-Track (DNT) initiative in the W3C and US FTC [55], and many
client-side tools, either to implement DNT [24, 52, 57], or to outright prevent tracking
using blacklists, which also include social widgets [15, 22, 23, 29, 55, 68, 70, 144].
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While these methods protect privacy, they significantly reduce the benefits of analytics
and social widgets by limiting the information publishers can learn about their visitors
and by limiting the interaction between the visitors and the publisher, respectively.
To the extent that these efforts take hold, the ability for data aggregators to provide
extended analytics to publishers will be degraded, and OSN providers will no longer
be able to provide an appealing service for publishers to interact with their visitors and
attract new users.
1.3 Thesis Research & Contributions: Non-tracking Web Sys-
tems
In today’s systems, user privacy suffers while publishers, aggregators and OSN
providers mostly benefit from third-party tracking. In a web, where third-party tracking
is prevented via the use of client-side tools, publishers’ ability to learn statistics about
their users to provide them with better and more content, to monetize that content
via advertisements and to increase the exposure of their sites to more users will be
hampered. We think that users and publishers both are crucial parts of the current web,
and failure to satisfy one side’s needs will lead to an unsustainable web ecosystem.
In this thesis, we take the stance that just preventing third-party tracking of users
without considering the functionality it serves to web publishers and other entities is
not a viable solution. To this end, our research is concerned with the design, analysis
and implementation of practical systems with the goal of preserving the functionality of
today’s systems as much as possible, but do so without tracking users. More specifically,
we want to provide a method for enabling social interactions on websites in an on-
demand fashion and a system that provides extended web analytics in aggregate form
to publishers and data aggregators without violating individual user privacy. Overall,
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this thesis makes the following contributions:
A General and Interaction-based Third-Party Cookie Policy: We present a new third-
party cookie policy for modern browsers and explore its implications. In this new
policy, third-party cookies are only sent to the third-party domain when (and if) the user
interacts with the third-party content.
We consider this interaction as the user’s intent to engage with the third-party
content, and thus, willingness to let the third-party know about the current page the user
is visiting (i.e., on the first-party domain). This approach prevents undesired third-party
tracking with cookies, but enables interactive features such as social widgets on-demand.
As a result, the user is given more control. While other approaches such as anti-tracking
browser add-ons and other tools are similar in this regard, our policy is general and
does not require a curated blacklist that can be difficult to maintain.
Furthermore, the blacklisting tools above often consider non-tracking services for
analytics and advertisement services harmful and block them. As a result, publishers
who opt to be more privacy-friendly in their practices get penalized: their ability to
obtain statistics about their users and to monetize their content through advertisements
is hurt. In comparison, our policy does not interfere with non-tracking services for
analytics and advertisements.
Non-tracking Web Analytics: We describe the design, analysis and implementation of
the first web analytics system that can provide publishers with better extended web
analytics (e.g., user demographics) while eliminating the need for third-party tracking
and providing users with privacy protections (e.g., anonymity, unlinkability). While
doing so, our system does not introduce a new organizational component into the
ecosystem, which makes it practical and easier to adopt.
The approach we are taking is to store user data on the user device under the user’s
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control with the help of a client software (e.g., browser). This data is queried directly by
the publishers, who distribute queries to the browsers when the users visit the publisher
website. After the clients execute the queries, they encrypt the answers with the data
aggregator’s public key. The publishers then relay the encrypted answers to the data
aggregator, who decrypts them, compiles the final result and shares it with the publisher.
During this process, both entities add differentially-private noise.
Keeping the user data on the user device enables us to get a more complete picture
of user’s browsing activities as well as to have more accurate demographic informa-
tion. Combined with the direct measurement of this information and the addition of
differentially-private noise, this approach enables our system to provide more accu-
rate and more types of extended web analytics than today’s systems without violating
individual user privacy.
Privacy-preserving String Discovery for Non-tracking Analytics: While the above
system is effective at eliminating the need for third-party tracking for analytics purposes,
it achieves this goal with one caveat: the system depends on the existence of pre-defined
string values as potential answers for queries distributed by the publishers. As a result,
publishers would have to enumerate a list of such values depending on the queries they
would like to distribute.
This requirement may not be an issue for certain types of queries, in which the
potential answer values are of small types, such as gender, education level and age.
On the other hand, queries about websites visited, search phrases used or free-text
tags assigned to photos may become a problem. In these cases, the anticipation and
enumeration of potential answer values may be difficult or impossible, limiting the
applicability and effectiveness of the analytics system.
We describe the design, analysis and feasibility study of a privacy-preserving string
discovery system that enables analysts to discover previously unknown string values.
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Our system is complementary to the above non-tracking analytics system as well as
other similar systems [97, 98, 117, 128].
Similar to the above systems, the user strings are stored on the user device with
a client software. During the discovery, the clients send their encrypted strings for
aggregation by an aggregator and two proxies. The encrypted strings are then counted
blindly, such that the string values are not revealed during the counting. Afterwards,
noise is added to the counts. String values whose noisy counts pass a discovery threshold
are then revealed.
The user devices running the client software may have limited power and bandwidth
resources (e.g., mobile devices). To support even such clients, we employ low-cost
primitives (e.g., XOR-encryption). Our novel blind comparison method enables our
system to count encrypted strings without decrypting them. Besides the reduced client
overhead, these low-cost primitives also reduce the computation overhead on the server
components, with the caveat of increased but still cheap bandwidth overhead. In other
words, our system trades off cheap server bandwidth for drastically reduced client and
server computation overhead.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose, prototype and evaluate
a new, general and interaction-based cookie policy that prevents third-party tracking
without penalizing common web services such as social networking. In Chapter 3, we
present the design and analysis of a novel system that eliminates the need for third-
party tracking on the web and provides publisher websites as well as data aggregators
with better extended web analytics. In Chapter 4, we describe the design, analysis and
evaluation of a privacy-preserving string discovery system that complements ours (and
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similar) non-tracking analytics systems by providing them with potential answer values
for their queries. We discuss related work in Chapter 5 and conclude in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
A General and Interaction-based
Third-party Cookie Policy
In this chapter, we propose and explore a new and general third-party cookie policy
that considers user interaction. This policy gives users more control regarding tracking,
does not require a curated and maintenance-requiring blacklist, and does not hamper
functionality of essential web services. A preliminary version of this work without the
evaluation was published in the IEEE Workshop on Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP)
in 2015 [82].
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section motivates the need for a new
and general cookie policy that considers user interaction when dealing with third-party
content. Section 2.2 presents our main contributions in devising such a policy. We list
our goals and our assumptions in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Section 2.5 explains
our design and how it achieves our goals. We describe our implementation in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 presents the evaluation of our implementation’s functionality and efficiency
using several thousands of pages from top 10K most popular sites from Quantcast. We
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discuss our policy’s implications in Section 2.8 and conclude in Section 2.9.
2.1 Introduction
Tracking on the web by third-party service providers such as data aggregators and online
social network (OSN) providers raises concerns about user privacy. Existing cookie
policies in modern browsers offer a partial solution to this problem. A user can select
a cookie policy, in which the browser will not allow any third-party cookies to be set.
While effective at preventing tracking for behavioral advertisements, this policy causes
issues when the third party is an OSN provider. For example, Mozilla Firefox’s “never
accept third party cookies” policy breaks the functionality of social widgets on publisher
sites and does not allow a user to interact with them, even when the user is logged in to
the OSN that provided the widgets. Google Chrome and Apple Safari behave the same
way.
Another privacy option in Firefox aims to solve exactly this problem, such that
cookies from third parties will be accepted if the user has visited the third party site as a
first party in the past.1 For example, if the user is logged in to Facebook, all Facebook
Like buttons on other publishers will function properly. This option, however, allows the
OSN provider to act as a tracker and learn about the user’s visit to the publisher, even if
the user did not interact with the social widget [100, 144]. Tools, such as Priv3 [43, 100]
and ShareMeNot [53, 144], aim to prevent this tracking by OSN providers.
Following these tools, other popular client-side privacy tools like Ghostery [23] and
Disconnect [14] started preventing social widgets from being loaded, in addition to the
trackers by data aggregators. Using a blacklist of aggregators, behavioral advertisers
and OSN providers, these tools scan the loading page and prevent blacklisted elements
1Similar to Safari’s “block cookies from third parties and advertisers”.
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from being loaded.
This blacklist-based approach has several limitations. First of all, the blacklist needs
to be maintained and then distributed to clients in a timely fashion; otherwise, the
benefits of using such a tool are greatly reduced. These tools try to find an optimum
update schedule for their tracker libraries. For example, Ghostery regularly (e.g., every
few weeks) updates its library of trackers while Disconnect checks for updates every
day. Other less popular tools like Priv3 and ShareMeNot support only a handful of
third parties, and depend on their developers to keep up with new social widgets. This
maintenance of the blacklist can be cumbersome and error-prone: there is no guarantee
that all third-party trackers will always be included in the blacklist.
In addition, these blacklists are very broad: They include first-party analytics tools,
such as Piwik, Open Web Analytics and Mint Analytics [36,40,41], preventing publishers
from learning about their visitors’ behavior on their own sites. These blacklists can
and do also include non-behavioral advertising that, by definition, does not require
the tracking of users across the web (e.g., Project Wonderful). As a result, publishers
who choose more privacy-friendly solutions for analytics and advertisements by not
using third-party tracking are being unnecessarily penalized. While such non-tracking
services can be removed from the blacklist, the maintenance issue is only amplified: the
tool provider now has to categorize and determine which solutions are acceptable.
Finally, such a blacklist may be bypassed by third parties, simply with a configuration
trick at their servers. For example, Apache2 directive ‘AliasMatch’ [39] enables a third
party to serve the blacklisted element (i.e., JavaScript file, social widget) via customizable
URLs, such that each publisher uses a different source, yet the third party serves the
same file. This trick would force the tools to blacklist entire domains, which can become
problematic if legitimate files not related to tracking are also served (e.g., libraries,
images, OSN site).
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2.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we propose and explore a new third-party cookie policy. The main idea
is to send the associated cookies of third-party domains in a page only after the user has
interacted with the third-party content.
Imagine the user is visiting a page on siteA (the first-party domain), which embeds
a resource from siteT (the third-party domain). siteT then sets a cookie value to the
user’s browser to indicate that the user visited siteA. Later, when the user visits another
page on siteB that also embeds a resource from siteT , siteT would normally receive the
cookies it set before, and thus, learn that this user has visited both sites, siteA and siteB.
With our policy, the browser would not send any cookies associated with siteT while
loading the third-party resource on siteB. While this idea is simple, it is effective to
prevent third-party tracking with cookies: if siteT does not receive its cookies during the
second load of the resource, it will not know that this user has been to siteA.
Simply preventing third-party tracking, however, is not a viable option. In today’s
web, the resource in the above example might be a social widget that allows the user to
share web content with her friends. Our goal is to design a general solution that will not
only prevent third-party tracking, but do so without penalizing essential web services
such as social networking, advertisements and analytics.
To support such cases, we augment our policy such that these third-party resources
are reloaded after user interaction, but this time while sending the associated third-party
cookies. As a result, the functionality of social widgets is preserved both for publishers
and users, and enabled on-demand for users.
While the reload-upon-interaction idea is not new and have been used in multiple
client-side tools, all these tools require a blacklist. In comparison, our policy is general
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and is applied to any third-party content. This generalization coupled with user-specified
whitelists gives users more flexibility as well as more control regarding the amount of
tracking they would want and when it can occur.
2.3 Goals
We advocate that the users should be the final decision makers with regards to tracking
by third parties, be they data aggregators or OSNs. Specifically, we would like our
policy to enable interactive features (i.e., social widgets) in an on-demand fashion. Like
previous approaches [43, 100, 144], we think that user interaction is necessary to achieve
balance for privacy and functionality for a social web.
At the same time, we would like to devise a general cookie policy to prevent third-
party tracking by not only OSNs but also data aggregators and advertisers. This policy
should not depend on a blacklist unlike the above tools; thus, it should not require the
cooperation of a developer to maintain and distribute such a blacklist to protect user
privacy.
Finally, our policy should not interfere with non-tracking services for analytics and
advertisements, and penalize publishers using such arguably more privacy-friendly
services. We recognize the fact that for a sustainable web, publishers need statistical
data about their users to improve their services as well as advertisements to financially
support their operations.
2.4 Assumptions
When a user visits a web page, we consider the domain serving the page as the first party.
All other domains are considered third-party domains. Although it is possible that some
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third-party domains belong to the same entity that owns the first party domain, we do
not consider these cases. A method to dynamically determine if two domains belong to
the same entity is orthogonal to our policy and is outside our scope.
We consider any content that is not loaded from the first party domain as third
party content. Such content can include social widgets from OSN providers as well as
advertisements.
We assume that the cookie preferences reflect the users’ intentions and that the third
parties are not going to try to bypass them. In a recent example, Doubleclick was caught
deliberately circumventing Safari’s default policy, and got sued by the Federal Trade
Commission [25]. We assume such attempts are frowned upon, if not illegal, and the
attempting party risks its reputation. We think that the data aggregators providing
voluntary opt-out mechanisms already show their good faith in this regard, and that
this assumption is reasonable.
More specifically, we leave methods to circumvent user cookie preferences outside
our scope. One such method is fingerprinting, in which a third party creates a unique
signature of a user’s browser by combining various pieces of information in the browser
environment, such as plugins, fonts and resolution. This fingerprint is then used to track
the user across websites [106,131] without storing any cookies on the user’s device. With
the prevalence of such practices increasing [76, 77, 137], potential defenses are already
being researched [111, 136].
Another method outside our scope is ‘cookie synching’ [12, 56]. In cookie synching,
publishers share first-party cookie values of their users with third parties, by embedding
a resource request to the third party with the first-party cookie values as parameters,
enabling the third parties to set their own cookies. As a result, they can establish a
mapping between the received cookie values and the cookie values they set, such that
the user’s browsing behavior can be correlated.
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Finally, we assume that mashups, sites with data and code from multiple publishers,
are interactive. If not, we assume that they will continue to function without the third
parties receiving user-specific data (i.e., cookies). For example, most mashups using the
Google Maps API still function if the user is not logged in to Google. If the mashup is
interactive, our policy will reload the third-party content with associated cookies. As a
result, the mashup should continue to function as expected.
2.5 Design
To achieve our goals, we propose the following policy: Any content from a third party
domain (e.g., social widgets, advertisements) should be loaded without sending the
associated (third-party) cookies. This content will be reloaded with the associated
cookies, when (and if) the user interacts with it.
2.5.1 Detecting Third-party Requests & Removing Cookies
When a page is being loaded, the policy will check the HTTP GET requests for the
resources embedded in the page. These resources can include images, scripts, embedded
videos and iframes as well as resources embedded in iframes. Requests to the first-party
domain are let through unchanged with their cookies. Requests for a resource from
a third-party domain are only let through after removing the cookie values. These
cookies are still present in the browser (i.e., they are not deleted), and used when the
user interacts with the third-party content.
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2.5.2 Click as User Interaction and Reload-on-click
We define user interaction as the mouse click to a page element. A click covers a
big portion of user interactions with content, such as following a link, clicking an
advertisement or bringing an element into focus. Previous tools also use a click as an
indication of user intent to interact with social widgets [23, 43, 53].
Although other events such as key presses or hovering over an element can also
constitute user interaction, such events can be more complex than a user click. For
example, in the presence of multiple page elements that register key press event listeners,
it is not exactly clear how to determine the interacted element without requiring extra
effort by the user (e.g., a click). Similarly, hovering might not be easily distinguished
from movement among page elements or the user being idle. On the other hand, a user
click clearly defines the interacted element. We leave covering these other cases to future
work.
Previous work, Priv3 [43, 100], showed that reloading social widgets after the user
click is effective for enabling social features on a website without compromising user
privacy for functionality. For example, when the user wants to click the Facebook Like
button on a page, it is reloaded by sending the user’s Facebook cookies. In our design,
we inherit this selective reload functionality. However, our work enhances this approach
with two new mechanisms, which are described next.
2.5.3 Two-click Control for Social Widgets
After the third-party content is initially loaded without sending the user’s cookies, we
use a two-click control. The first click enables the third-party content by reloading it with
the user’s cookies. The second click registers the original action. For example, when the
Facebook Like button is reloaded after the (first) user click, it shows information about
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the friends of the user who also liked that page. If the user wants to like the page, the
second click will register the action. In this case, Facebook knows about the user’s visit
to that page only after the first click (i.e., activation of the widget) if the user chooses to
click the widget. If not, it would not recognize this user as a logged-in user.
Enabling widgets in this manner still provides functionality, but at the same time,
allows OSN users not interested in using the social widgets to have more control over
when OSNs can learn about their browsing. Recently, the Belgian privacy commission
took Facebook to court for the tracking of non-users as well as logged-out users by
placing cookies not necessarily related to the login status of the user to Facebook [9, 17].
With our two-click control, such tracking by Facebook would not be possible.
It may be possible to combine the two clicks into one action, such that the activation
of the widget by reloading it with cookies (i.e., first click) and the widget action (i.e.,
second click) can be triggered with a single user click.2 However, we decided to use the
two-click scheme, because it gives the user additional control regarding the functionality
of the social widget: it is possible for the user to be interested only in the personalized
content the OSN provides, without the user activating the social sharing feature. For
example, the user may want to enable the ‘Like’ button to see which friends of her have
liked a page (i.e., first click), but the user may not want to like the page (i.e., second
click). With a single-click scheme, this scenario would not be possible.
The statistics about the number of loads of a widget compiled by the OSN provider
may be inflated because of the reload. Strictly speaking, these statistics would be com-
piled using third-party tracking by the OSN provider: the statistics would not contain
just the number of loads of a widget, but also the user as well as the page embedding the
widget. Our policy is aimed to prevent this kind of behavior. Nevertheless, it is possible
to augment our policy’s reload functionality with extra information to indicate that the
2In fact, previous work, Priv3 [43, 100], uses this method.
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new request is a reload (and not a new load) of the widget, such that OSN providers can
correct their statistics about the number of loads. This augmentation does not give more
information to the OSN provider about the user, because the reload already happens
with user cookies after the user’s interaction with the third-party widget.
2.5.4 Generalization
In contrast to previous approaches [14, 23, 43, 53], our policy does not require a blacklist:
it is applied to any third party content. Detecting such content is a straightforward task
similar to the same origin policy already employed by browsers.
Besides social widgets, our policy is also effective in preventing other third party
tracking via cookies: the user cannot interact with ‘invisible’ elements (e.g., pixel tags,
invisible iframes) that are used for behavioral advertising and data aggregation purposes.
As a result, cookies associated with these third parties will never be sent, preventing
them from tracking the user across the web. These elements do not need to be detected
at runtime or enumerated in advance as in a blacklist, because the policy applies to any
third-party content.
Finally, our policy does not interfere with first-party analytics tools, because these
tools use cookies that belong to the first-party domain whose requests are not modi-
fied. Similarly, this policy does not interfere with non-tracking (i.e., non-behavioral)
advertisement systems, which by definition do not use any tracking cookies to load
advertisements.
2.5.5 Social Widgets versus Advertisements
Third-party content such as social widgets and advertisements are loaded in a container,
usually an iframe. The JavaScript in an iframe is prevented by the browser from accessing
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and manipulating the embedding page’s document object model (DOM) tree. This
model enables publishers to include content from third-party providers without having
to worry about whether they are going to affect the embedding page’s content.
The lack of a blacklist forced us to develop a heuristic to distinguish between adver-
tisements and social widgets. A click for an advertisement needs to be passed unchanged,
whereas a click for a social widget requires a reload. For this purpose, we make the
following observation and validate it later in Section 2.7.
Social widgets are usually loaded in a single, non-nested iframe. For example,
Facebook’s Like button, Twitter’s Tweet button and Google+’s +1 button as well as
commenting platforms such as Disqus are usually loaded in a single iframe. The user
click on this iframe simply triggers the reload of the iframe. Note that this approach is
different from other client-side tools, such as Ghostery, which require the user to reload
the entire page rather than a single element after the user interaction.
On the other hand, third-party advertisements are usually present in nested iframes:
the advertisement is usually present in an iframe that is contained within another iframe.
In these cases, the user click is just passed through without any changes and without
reloading any of the iframes.
In our design, we use the following heuristic. We first check the target node of the
user click and obtain the hyperlink. If there is no such node or no hyperlink is present,
we consider the source of the iframe as the target. If the link belongs to a third party
domain who had no cookies filtered with our policy, we let the click through. If the link
belongs to a third party domain whose cookies our policy filtered, we check whether the
target node is present in a single or nested iframe. If the target is in a single iframe, the
iframe is reloaded with the corresponding cookies. If it is in a nested iframe, the click
is passed through. As a result, clicks to social widgets should trigger a reload whereas
clicks to advertisements should pass unchanged.
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2.5.6 Third-party Cookie Access
Strictly speaking, our policy does not prevent third parties from setting cookies on the
user’s browser. One caveat of this approach is that they can receive these cookies later,
if the user visits the third party site as a first party. This issue opens the possibility of
the third party accumulating the browsing history of the user by setting its cookies and
hoping the user visits its website. Although the probability of a user visiting a tracker’s
website may be low, this issue becomes more important if the third party is an OSN.
Previous work, Priv3 [43, 100], prevents third-party scripts from accessing cookie
values until the user interaction. As a result, third parties cannot use JavaScript to
compile a list of visited pages in the cookie values to receive them later. In our design,
we also use this approach. This problem might also be solved by refusing new third-party
cookies, but we leave it to future work.
2.5.7 Limitations
Our biggest limitation is that our heuristic may fail to distinguish a social widget
and an advertisement loaded in a single (i.e., non-nested) iframe. A user click on the
advertisement may trigger a reload, if the target node is a third party whose cookies
our policy has filtered. This reload may have an adverse effect such as creating an extra
impression that otherwise would not have occurred. More importantly, the click on the
advertisement may not register creating an undesired behavior. We further investigate
how prevalent this issue is in Section 2.7.
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2.6 Implementation
We implemented a proof-of-concept of our proposed policy as browser extensions. Our
implementation, Priv3+, available for Firefox [44] and Chrome [45]. To date, it has been
downloaded about 28K times and has about 4K daily users.
Priv3+ inherits the selective reload functionality and the third-party cookie access
mechanism from previous work, Priv3 [43,100], but implements the following additional
features. First, Priv3+ generalizes the idea of removing third-party party cookies from
all third-party resource requests and stores the corresponding page elements to reload
them after user interaction. Second, it implements the two-click control, such that the
first click on a widget first enables it and reloads third-party content with user cookies,
and the second click registers the original action if the user chooses to do so.
Furthermore, Priv3+ shows information about the third-party domains and how
many resources were loaded from each third party domain. It implements the whitelist-
ing functionality and presents a basic graphical user interface to enable the user to add
exceptions to the policy, such that certain third-party domains will be allowed to receive
their cookie values on certain publisher websites without user interaction (Figure 2.1).
Priv3+ can highlight different types of third-party content. For example, Figure
2.2 shows dashed lines around the Tweet button, the comments by Disqus and the
advertisements: Green indicates exceptions (i.e., the Tweet button). Red indicates third
party resources in a single iframe (i.e., the Disqus comments). Orange indicates third
party resources in nested iframes (i.e., the advertisement in the upper left). Yellow
indicates a potential third party element whose source attribute was not present (i.e., the
advertisement in the bottom left). Finally, Priv3+ shows a tooltip information about the
request to load the third party content: whether the third party’s cookies were removed
during the request, or the third party did not have any cookies during the request.
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Figure 2.1: Priv3+ options in Mozilla Firefox. Priv3+ shows information about the third
party domains present on this page. The user can choose to add exceptions to the policy
as well as highlight different types of third party content.
Figure 2.2: Priv3+ options in Google Chrome. Priv3+ shows information about the third
party domains present on this page. The user can choose to add exceptions to the policy
as well as highlight different types of third party content. twitter.com is excepted by the
user (i.e., green), the Disqus comments are present in a single iframe (i.e., red) and the
advertisement in the upper left corner is present in nested iframes (i.e., orange). The
advertisement in the bottom left is highlighted as a potential third party element (i.e.,
yellow) because the iframe did not have any source attribute.
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2.7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our policy using large-scale web crawls.
We first evaluate the effectiveness of our heuristic to distinguish social widgets and
advertisements. We then report on the performance overhead of our policy.
2.7.1 Methodology
We created a new user profile in Firefox with the default cookie policy settings (i.e.,
“accept all cookies”) and installed a simple Firefox add-on we created. This add-on
automatically records the URL of the page and the page load time as well as the rendered
page’s DOM tree at the point when the JavaScript window.onLoad event is fired. Before
we record the DOM tree, we wait an additional 3 seconds to allow some time for further
resources to load, for instance, via asynchronous XMLHttpRequests.
For our crawls, we used popular websites from Quantcast [51]. We visited the sites
and recorded the pages with our add-on. We allowed each site about 45 seconds to finish
loading before moving to the next one. We then randomly extracted up to 10 links from
each successfully loaded site. Table 2.1 summarizes our crawls and resulting datasets.
To simulate a user logged in to an OSN, we created user accounts on the following
social network services: Google+, Facebook, Twitter, Disqus and Pinterest. Before we
conducted a crawl, we manually logged in to these services and ensured that the cookie
values persist (i.e., ‘Remember me’ option is selected).
2.7.2 Efficacy of the Heuristic
Our heuristic distinguishes social widgets from advertisements by checking whether
the interacted element is in a single iframe. If so, the iframe is reloaded with appropri-
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Table 2.1: Crawls & datasets for our evaluation.
Crawl name Crawl 1 (prelim.) Crawl 2 Crawl 3
Quantcast snapshot Nov 2014 Mar 2015 Mar 2015
Dates Mar 7-9, 2015 May 15-Jun 15 2015 Jun 16-28, 2015
# sites 1K 10K 10K
# successfully loaded sites 959 8916 8731
# links extracted 8986 85049 72855
ate cookies. Unfortunately, this approach can become problematic if advertisements
are also loaded in single iframes (rather than nested iframes), because a reload of an
advertisement can cause an additional impression and double-billing for the advertiser.
Similarly, if a social widget is loaded in nested iframes, our heuristic would fail to
recognize it and would not reload it. Fortunately, the effect would not be as bad as
reloading advertisements, because the click will be just passed to the social widget,
which may ask the user to login again. Nevertheless, if this case happens frequently, it
can frustrate the user.
Here, we evaluate how prevalent these potentially problematic cases are today. For
this purpose, we modified a popular Firefox add-on for developers, Firebug [19], and
augmented it to record the encountered iframes on a page, including single and nested
ones, along with their parent elements. For each element, we recorded their element
attributes. For single iframes, we also recorded whether the iframe contained any
hyperlinks that the user can click on. We then randomly selected 20K pages from our
most recent crawl (i.e., Crawl 3). After manually logging into the OSN services, we
visited the pages with the default policy of “accept all cookies”. A total of 19462 pages
were loaded successfully, so that we could record their iframes.
During our evaluation, we consider two additional properties of the iframes loaded
on a page: visibility and reloadabilty.
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Visibility. We first check whether the iframe is visible. If the iframe is not visible to the
user, then the user cannot interact with such an iframe. As a result, our heuristic would
never have to handle these cases.
We use three checks to determine the visibility of an iframe. First, we check the
iframe’s CSS style as well as the width and height attributes. For the CSS style, we look
for ‘display: none;’ and ‘visibility: hidden’ property values. For the width and height
values, we investigate the CSS style as well as the element attributes. If the width and
height values are both set to be 0 or 1 pixels, or 0% of the respective dimension of the
window, we consider the element to be invisible to the user.
Second, we check the position of the iframe. Specifically, we look for CSS attributes
that indicate that the position of the iframe should be out of the current window bound-
aries. For this purpose, we conservatively look for ‘position: absolute’ property along
with a negative pixel value for ‘top’, ‘bottom’, ‘left’ and ‘right’ positioning parameters
(e.g., “position: absolute; top: -1000px”). Additionally, we use the stacking order of the
elements via the ‘z-index’ property and consider a negative value as an indication that
the iframe should be behind other elements, and thus, invisible.
Finally, we check the visibility of the iframe’s parents in the DOM tree because an
invisible parent will also cause the iframe to be invisible. We again check the same CSS
properties and element attributes for each parent and mark the iframe invisible if any
of the parents is invisible. For parent elements, we conservatively consider only the
dimensions and display properties of the element (and not its position values).
Reloadability. After determining the iframe’s visibility, we consider whether it can
be reloaded by our heuristic if the user were to interact with it. If the iframe is not
reloadable, then there is no point of considering this iframe within the context of our
heuristic.
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Table 2.2: Number of iframes recorded in successfully loaded 19462 pages in our random
sample.
Type Single Nested
Invisible 57204 64613
Visible, Unreloadable 2121 6452
Visible, Reloadable, First-party 4073 12529
Visible, Reloadable, Third-party 19947 16647
Total 83345 100241
For this purpose, we check the source attribute (i.e., ‘src’) of the iframe. It is possible
that the iframe does not have one, perhaps because it was generated via JavaScript. It is
also possible that the source attribute contains some JavaScript code that executes when
the iframe is first loaded by the browser. These cases are not considered by our heuristic
and thus, are filtered from our results.
2.7.2.1 Advertisements in Single Iframes
We first investigate the single iframes that are directly included in the pages. In other
words, these single iframes do not contain other iframes and are not contained within
other iframes. Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of the iframes we recorded in our crawl.
There were a total of 83345 single iframes. A big majority of these single iframes were
invisible to the user. About 24% of them were visible, reloadable and belonging to a
third-party domain. We consider these iframes for the evaluation of our heuristic.
We extract the source attributes of the iframes and match them to well-known social
widgets. Any other third-party domain is conservatively considered an advertisement
domain. These cases would constitute a false positive for our heuristic, because our
heuristic would classify this iframe as a social widget and reload it instead of passing
the click unchanged.
Table 2.3 shows the top 30 third-party domains ranked by the number of iframes. As
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Table 2.3: Distribution by domain and category of single, third-party iframes that were
visible and reloadable. Only top 30 domains with the most number of iframes are
shown. The remaining sites (shown as ‘Other domains’) are conservatively assumed to
be advertisement iframes.
Domain Count (Percentage) Category Has cookies?
facebook.com 6921 (34.70%) Social Yes
twitter.com 3129 (15.69%) Social Yes
google.com 2752 (13.80%) Social Yes
doubleclick.net 1876 (9.41%) Advertisement Yes
youtube.com 1250 (6.27%) Video/Social Yes
disqus.com 505 (2.53%) Social Yes
exoclick.com 483 (2.42%) Advertisement Yes
stumbleupon.com 185 (0.93%) Social Yes
blogger.com 135 (0.67%) Social Yes
amazon-adsystem.com 122 (0.61%) Advertisement Yes
googleapis.com 114 (0.68%) Advertisement No
addthis.com 107 (0.54%) Social Yes
reddit.com 50 (0.25%) Social Yes
adnxs.com 49 (0.25%) Advertisement Yes
sitescoutadserver.com 38 (0.19%) Advertisement Yes
lockerdome.com 38 (0.19%) Social Yes
juicyads.com 37 (0.19%) Advertisement Yes
2mdn.net 37 (0.19%) Advertisement No
yimg.com 37 (0.19%) Advertisement Yes
shopifyapps.com 37 (0.19%) Advertisement Yes
eblastengine.com 34 (0.17%) Advertisement No
springboardplatform.com 32 (0.16%) Advertisement Yes
adblade.com 30 (0.15%) Advertisement Yes
wistia.net 26 (0.13%) Video Yes
zedo.com 24 (0.12%) Advertisement Yes
redditstatic.com 24 (0.12%) Social Yes
tumblr.com 23 (0.12%) Social Yes
tout.com 23 (0.12%) Video Yes
youtube-nocookie.com 21 (0.11%) Video/Social No
myvoicenation.com 21 (0.11%) Social Yes
Other domains (465) 1894 (9.50%) Advertisement* Yes (299), 157 (No)
All domains 19947 (100%) - -
28
one can see, the majority of the single iframes belongs to social widgets by Facebook,
Twitter and Google+. These widgets constitute about 65.83% of the single iframes. A
further 12.07% belong to video sites that allow embedding of videos (e.g., Youtube),
commenting platforms (e.g., Disqus), blog sites with social interactions (e.g., Blogger,
Stumbleupon) and smaller social networks (e.g., Addthis, LockerDome).
The biggest false positive with 9.41% is the doubleclick.net iframes. Upon further
inspection, we find out that 1646 (87.74%) of these 1876 iframes are called ‘view-through
conversion’ iframes. When we manually visited some of the pages that included these
iframes, we noticed that all of these iframes are transparent, such that they take the
embedding page’s background color. Furthermore, these iframes did not contain any
links nor any content, and were located at the bottom of the viewed page. Even though
our heuristic would reload these iframes if clicked by the user, the likelihood of the
user click seems quite low. A further 122 (6.50%) did not contain any links. Most
advertisements contain either an image or some descriptive text about the advertisement,
which links to the landing page of the advertiser. As a result, the likelihood that these
iframes were used to show an advertisement seems low, which in turn reduces the
likelihood of the user interacting with this iframe. Out of the remaining 108 iframes, 40
of these iframes by doubleclick.net were present only in parked domains, which showed
only advertisements.
The second biggest false positive with 2.42% is iframes by exoclick.com. When
inspected, we found that these iframes only existed in adult sites. There were 59 such
domains and 145 pages on these domains. We also checked the other iframe domains
that were present in these same pages. Out of 590 single (visible and reloadable) iframes
found, there were a total of 47 social widgets belonging to Google+ (20), Twitter (15) and
Facebook (12). The rest of the iframes belonged to other adult sites.3
3There were no social widgets present in the (visible and reloadable) 427 nested iframes.
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For the remaining single iframes (shown as ‘Other’ domains in Table 2.3), we assume
conservatively that they all belong to the advertisement category. The total number for
advertisement iframes, including the 108 doubleclick.net and 483 exoclick.com iframes,
is 3076. This number corresponds to a false positive rate of 15.42%, in which our heuristic
would recognize an advertisement as a social widget and reload it.
During our inspection, we notice that some of these third parties do not set any
cookies. To understand how frequent this case is, we check the cookie database of the
Firefox profile. We find that 307 single iframes were from domains that did not contain
any links and did not have any cookies. Such domains can be content distribution
network sites or cloud operators, which are only used to serve advertisement files such
as banners, images and JavaScript libraries. Examples include ‘googleapis.com’, and
‘2mdn.net’. In these cases, our heuristic would not reload the iframe: The click would
not find a target link, and thus, use the iframe’s source. Because the iframe domain
did not have any cookies, the click would be passed without reloading the iframe.
Compensating for these cases, our heuristic’s false positive rate drops to 13.88%.
In iframes that contained links, it is also possible that the target link belongs to a
domain that did not set any cookies. In these cases, the iframe will not be reloaded either.
We find that the number of links belonging to domains with cookies and without cookies
are almost equal, constituting 41.03% and 41.28% of the links, respectively.4 As a result,
it is still possible that our heuristic would pass the click without reloading the iframe.
2.7.2.2 Social Widgets in Multiple Iframes
Next, we check the nested iframes. A nested iframe is an iframe that either contains a
child iframe or that is contained by another iframe. Table 2.2 shows the total numbers of
nested iframes. Again, a big majority of these iframes are invisible to the user. There
4The rest were either first party links or non-href (e.g., ’javascript:’ links).
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were 16647 nested iframes that can be considered for our heuristic’s evaluation.
For our evaluation, we investigate the source attributes of these iframes. If any of
these sources belong to a social widget, we consider that as a failure of our heuristic.
Table 2.4 shows the top 30 third-party domains ranked by the number of iframes. As
one can see, the significant majority of these third parties belong to the advertisement
category. For these iframes, our heuristic would correctly pass the click without reloading
the iframes.
Table 2.5 shows the number of nested iframes containing a social widget. There were
a total of 679 iframes constituting about 4.07% of the total. These cases are false negatives
for our heuristic, because it would fail to recognize these widgets. When the click is
passed through, the widget might ask the user to log in again instead of being reloaded
with cookies.
2.7.2.3 Distribution of Social Widgets
We then investigate the distribution of social widgets. Table 2.6 shows the numbers
(and percentages) of social widgets present in single or nested iframes. Again, the
majority of social widgets were present in single iframes (i.e., 93.79%), including widgets
belonging to bigger online social network domains, such as facebook.com, twitter.com
and google.com.
2.7.2.4 Distribution of Advertisements
We also investigate the distribution of advertisement iframes. We conservatively consider
every domain that is not present in Table 2.6 as an advertisement domain. We again
remove the false positives associated with doubleclick.net (i.e., 1646 ‘view-through
conversion’ iframes and 122 iframes with no links) that have been explained in Section
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Table 2.4: Distribution by domain and category of nested, third-party iframes that were
visible and reloadable. Only top 30 domains with the most number of iframes are shown.
Domain Count (Percentage) Category Has cookies?
doubleclick.net 7162 (43.02%) Advertisement Yes
googlesyndication.com 2141 (12.86%) Advertisement Yes
adnxs.com 1023 (6.15%) Advertisement Yes
criteo.com 672 (4.04%) Advertisement Yes
2mdn.net 389 (2.34%) Advertisement No
exoclick.com 302 (1.81%) Advertisement Yes
brandwire.tv 274 (1.65%) Advertisement Yes
yummly.com 177 (1.06%) Social Yes
vimeocdn.com 172 (1.03%) Video No
mediaplex.com 151 (0.91%) Advertisement Yes
vimeo.com 147 (0.88%) Video Yes
google.com 144 (0.87%) Social Yes
amazon-adsystem.com 136 (0.82%) Advertisement Yes
teleskipp.de 134 (0.80%) Video No
veruta.com 124 (0.75%) Advertisement Yes
optmd.com 99 (0.59%) Advertisement Yes
adspirit.de 91 (0.55%) Advertisement Yes
rfihub.com 80 (0.48%) Unknown Yes
facebook.com 79 (0.47%) Social Yes
ad4mat.de 72 (0.43%) Advertisement No
truste.com 66 (0.40%) Advertisement Yes
w55c.net 65 (0.40%) Advertisement Yes
ero-advertising.com 62 (0.37%) Advertisement Yes
youtube.com 62 (0.37%) Video/Social Yes
instagram.com 56 (0.34%) Social Yes
solocpm.com 55 (0.33%) Advertisement Yes
tacdn.com 51 (0.31%) Unknown Yes
pubmatic.com 51 (0.31%) Advertisement/Analytics Yes
ibm.com 48 (0.29%) Unknown Yes
ato.mx 48 (0.29%) Advertisement Yes
Other domains 2514 (15.10%) Mixed Yes (295), No (128)
All domains 16647 (100%) - -
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Table 2.5: Number of nested iframes belonging to an online social network widget (i.e.,
false negatives).
Domain Count (Percentage)
yummly.com 177 (1.06%)
google.com 144 (0.87%)
facebook.com 79 (0.47%)
youtube.com 62 (0.37%)
instagram.com 56 (0.34%)
lockerdome.com 47 (0.28%)
blogger.com 46 (0.28%)
linkedin.com 29 (0.17%)
disqus.com 19 (0.11%)
twitter.com 13 (0.08%)
massrel.io 7 (0.04%)
Total 679 (4.07%)
2.7.2.1. Table 2.7 shows the number (and percentages) of these advertisements present in
single or nested iframes. As one can see, the majority of advertisements (90.49%) were
served in nested iframes.
2.7.2.5 Summary
We can summarize our results as follows. The majority of advertisements are placed in
nested iframes. Similarly, the majority of social widgets are present in single iframes.
We find that the practice of placing advertisements in single iframes and social widgets
in nested iframes is not prevalent in the Internet today. We conclude that our heuristic
would work as desired. Section 2.8.1 discusses the robustness of our heuristic to changes.
2.7.3 Performance Overhead
To have a better understanding of our policy’s performance, we recorded the page load
times of existing cookie policies as well as our policy. To do so, we created three more
Firefox profiles, in addition to the default policy of “accept all cookies” we used to
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Table 2.6: Distribution of iframes from social widget domains.
Total # iframes # single iframes # nested iframes
Domain from domain (Percentage) (Percentage)
facebook.com 7000 6921 (98.87%) 79 (1.13%)
twitter.com 3142 3129 (99.59%) 13 (0.41%)
google.com 2896 2752 (95.03%) 144 (4.97%)
youtube.com 1312 1250 (95.27%) 62 (4.73%)
disqus.com 524 505 (96.37%) 19 (3.63%)
stumbleupon.com 185 185 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
blogger.com 181 135 (74.59%) 46 (25.41%)
yummly.com 177 0 (0.0%) 177 (100.0%)
vimeocdn.com 174 2 (1.15%) 172 (98.85%)
vimeo.com 148 1 (0.68%) 147 (99.32%)
addthis.com 108 107 (99.07%) 1 (0.93%)
lockerdome.com 85 38 (44.71%) 47 (55.30%)
instagram.com 56 0 (0.0%) 56 (100.0%)
reddit.com 50 50 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
wistia.net 33 26 (78.79%) 7 (21.21%)
linkedin.com 29 0 (0.0%) 29 (100.0%)
redditstatic.com 24 24 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
tout.com 23 23 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
tumblr.com 23 23 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
youtube-nocookie.com 21 21 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
massrel.io 7 0 (0.0%) 7 (100.0%)
All domains 16198 15192 (93.79%) 1006 (6.21%)
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Table 2.7: Distribution of iframes from advertisement domains. These domains are the
remaining domains after the social widget domains (shown in Table 2.6) are removed
from the list of all domains with nested iframes. Only top 30 domains with the most
number of iframes are shown.
Total # iframes # single iframes # nested iframe
Domain from domain (Percentage) (Percentage)
doubleclick.net 7270 108 (1.49%) 7162 (98.51%)
googlesyndication.com 2147 6 (0.28%) 2141 (99.72%)
adnxs.com 1072 49 (4.57%) 1023 (95.43%)
exoclick.com 785 483 (61.53%) 302 (38.47%)
criteo.com 673 1 (0.15%) 672 (99.85%)
2mdn.net 426 37 (8.69%) 389 (91.31%)
brandwire.tv 274 0 (0.0%) 274 (100.0%)
amazon-adsystem.com 258 122 (47.29%) 136 (52.71%)
mediaplex.com 164 13 (7.93%) 151 (92.07%)
teleskipp.de 134 0 (0.0%) 134 (100.0%)
googleapis.com 128 114 (89.06%) 14 (10.94%)
veruta.com 124 0 (0.0%) 124 (100.0%)
optmd.com 105 6 (5.71%) 99 (94.29%)
adspirit.de 91 0 (0.0%) 91 (100.0%)
rfihub.com 85 5 (5.88%) 80 (94.12%)
ad4mat.de 72 0 (0.0%) 72 (100.0%)
ero-advertising.com 72 10 (13.89%) 62 (86.11%)
truste.com 66 0 (0.0%) 66 (100.0%)
w55c.net 65 0 (0.0%) 65 (100.0%)
everesttech.net 57 16 (28.07%) 41 (71.93%)
solocpm.com 55 0 (0.0%) 55 (100.0%)
tacdn.com 51 0 (0.0%) 51 (100.0%)
pubmatic.com 51 0 (0.0%) 51 (100.0%)
cloudfront.net 49 17 (34.69%) 32 (65.31%)
ibm.com 48 0 (0.0%) 48 (100.0%)
ato.mx 48 0 (0.0%) 48 (100.0%)
adxpansion.com 47 0 (0.0%) 47 (100.0%)
yimg.com 46 37 (80.43%) 9 (19.57%)
adblade.com 45 30 (66.67%) 15 (33.33%)
springboardplatform.com 42 32 (76.19%) 10 (23.81%)
Other domains 2699 554 (20.53%) 2145 (79.47%)
All domains 17249 1640 (9.51%) 15609 (90.49%)
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Table 2.8: Number of successfully loaded links.
Crawl 1 Crawl 2 Crawl 3
Accept all cookies 8654 81466 69798
Accept third party
cookies from visited 8519 81798 69912
Never accept
third party cookies 7975 81888 69913
Our policy (Priv3+) 8538 81859 69953
Loaded by all 7257 73835 63567
collect the links. Two of these profiles correspond to each of the remaining cookie policy
settings, namely “accept third party cookies from visited” and “never accept third party
cookies”. Similar to the “accept all cookies” profile, we installed PageRecorder add-on
for these profiles. For the last Firefox profile, we modified our Priv3+ add-on to augment
it with the same functionality to record the URL of the page and the page load times.
We again waited 45 seconds for a page to successfully load. Nevertheless, some pages
were not successfully loaded within the allowed time. Furthermore, due to fluctuations
in network and server conditions, not all pages were loaded successfully with all of
our Firefox profiles. For example, it is possible that the profile with “accept all cookies”
policy was able to load a page successfully, but the profile “accept all cookies from
visited” was not. Nevertheless, there was a substantial number of links that were loaded
successfully by all four profiles. Table 2.8 shows the number of successfully loaded links.
Table 2.9 shows the average page load times as well as the relative overhead. We
consider the profile with the “accept all cookies” policy as the baseline. As one can see,
our policy does not have a significant performance impact on page load times.
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Table 2.9: Performance overhead of cookie policies for links successfully loaded by all
four profiles.
Crawl 1 Crawl 2 Crawl 3
Accept all cookies 4617.66ms (-) 3343.37ms (-) 3040.97ms (-)
Accept third party
cookies from visited 4501.28ms (1.32%) 3329.86ms (-0.40%) 3140.19ms (3.26%)
Never accept
third party cookies 4519.64ms (1.73%) 3313.97ms (-0.88%) 3136.72ms (3.15%)
Our policy (Priv3+) 4617.66ms (3.94%) 3445.91ms (3.07%) 3106.58ms (2.16%)
2.8 Discussion
2.8.1 Robustness of the Heuristic
A natural question to ask at this point is whether our heuristic is robust to changes in
the way social widgets and advertisements are used on web pages. The following two
cases are possible.
In the first case, the OSN providers would start embedding their social widgets in
nested iframes to evade our heuristic. With our heuristic, these social widgets will never
be reloaded with user cookies when interacted with; the click will be just passed through.
As a result, the social widget will have to prompt the user to login again, inconveniencing
the user. Making it more difficult for the users to interact with social widgets only hurts
an OSN provider’s ability to obtain user behavior and provide a better user experience
as well as monetize its services. For this reason, there is no incentive for OSN providers
to provide their social widgets in nested iframes.
In the second case, the advertisements would be placed in single iframes to make
our heuristic fail to detect them. With our heuristic, clicks to an advertisement will not
be passed through, but the advertisement iframe will be reloaded. This action does
not benefit the advertisement network nor the advertiser for three reasons: First, the
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advertiser would be losing a potential customer, resulting also in reduced revenue for
the advertisement network. Second, the reloading would cause additional impressions
and charges for the advertiser, in which case the advertisement network would have
to resolve this issue with additional cost. Finally, although reloading with cookies
would send the user cookies to the advertisement network or advertiser, any attempt
to track the users will not be successful: when the user visits another page containing
advertisements from this advertisement network or advertiser, those advertisements will
also be loaded without sending user cookies. For these reasons, there is no incentive for
the advertisement networks or the advertisers to place advertisements in single iframes.
These two cases suggest a lack of incentives for the OSN providers and advertisement
networks to evade our heuristic. In fact, there are incentives for them to place the social
widgets in single iframes and advertisements in nested iframes, respectively, such that
they can benefit from any user interaction with third-party content present in these
iframes as much as possible. Consequently, our heuristic will have fewer false positives
and false negatives.
2.8.2 Reloading Advertisement Iframes with Cookies
One can argue that a clicked advertisement shows the user’s intention to interact with
the advertiser, and thus, the advertisement iframe can be reloaded. This approach would
also alleviate the problems associated with the accuracy of our heuristics. Although
this action sounds plausible, this approach has the following problems: First, it is not
clear which iframe to reload because there may be multiple, nested iframes. Reloading
the parent may generate a different child iframe containing another advertisement less
relevant to the user. Similarly, reloading the child iframe may not end up producing
a more relevant advertisement. Even if this decision can be made, some iframes do
not have their ‘src’ property set preventing the reload. Most importantly, reloading
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such iframes may have adverse effects for the advertisers, triggering new auctions and
double-charging for impressions and clicks. For these reasons, we pass the click to an
advertisement unchanged.
2.8.3 Evercookies
Evercookies use storage vectors (e.g., Flash cookie store) [76], which are not deleted when
the browser cookies are cleared. Trackers exploit these storage vectors to respawn old
cookie values to achieve a longer persisting tracking period. Our policy would prevent
these respawned cookies to be sent to third parties unless there is user interaction.
2.8.4 Cookie Synching
Our policy partially prevents cookie synching that uses previously set third-party cookies.
The prevention of third-party scripts to access cookie values (Section 2.5.6) may also
prevent other methods like using first-party cookie values as parameters for third-party
resources.
2.8.5 Behavioral Advertisements & Extended Web Analytics
Our policy prevents third-party tracking used for behavioral advertisements, which may
be deemed necessary for a sustainable web. A byproduct of this tracking is extended
web analytics, in which the aggregators can provide visitor demographics. There have
been multiple efforts to provide behavioral advertising that is privacy-preserving and
comparable to today’s systems [115,143,151]. Similarly, previous research, as well as our
system described in the next chapter, shows how the same aggregate information can be
obtained without violating user privacy [97, 98]. We think these efforts as well as our
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policy are steps in the right direction to provide essential services for a sustainable web
without compromising user privacy.
2.9 Conclusion & Future Work
We proposed and explored a general and interaction-based third-party cookie policy.
With our policy, third party content is loaded without sending associated third-party
cookies, effectively preventing tracking by OSNs, data aggregators and behavioral
advertisers. This policy strikes a balance between functionality of social networking and
privacy by requiring user interaction to reload the social widgets with cookies when
the user wants. Our policy is general and does not depend on a blacklist, automatically
solving problems associated with maintenance, distribution and circumvention of the
blacklist. Finally, it supports non-tracking analytics and advertisement services, and
does not penalize publishers who use these more privacy-friendly tools.
We have evaluated our policy on web pages from popular websites. According to
our findings, our policy would work well in distinguishing social widgets and advertise-
ments, such that social widgets can be activated on-demand, with low false positives and
false negatives. While doing so, our policy does not impose a significant performance
overhead on page load times. Furthermore, our heuristic is robust to changes in the way
social widgets and advertisements are loaded, because there are no incentives for OSN
providers and advertisers to cheat our heuristic.
In the future, we hope to gather more users and obtain their feedback. Such feedback
will help us better understand how users perceive and treat different types of third-party
content. Ideally, we would like our policy to be implemented and supported in major
browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Apple Safari. In the long run, we
hope that third-party service providers for advertisements, analytics and social widgets
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will learn to respect user privacy by not requiring cookie values until the user interacts
with the third-party content.
As discussed in Section 2.8.5, our policy affects analytics services that depend on
third-party tracking. In the next chapter, we describe a web analytics system that can
provide (at least) the same amount of aggregate analytics information about visitors to
publishers without tracking users.
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Chapter 3
Non-tracking Web Analytics
In this chapter, we present the design, implementation and analysis of a practical,
privacy-preserving and non-tracking web analytics system. Our system enables a
website publisher to directly query its users for extended web analytics information by
acting as an anonymizing proxy between the clients and the data aggregator. As a result,
no new system components are introduced into the ecosystem, making the system
more easily adoptable. The users also benefit from this arrangement, because they
are given anonymity and unlinkability properties via differential privacy mechanisms
while providing potentially sensitive data for analytics. This work was published in the
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
in 2012 [81].
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the privacy problem
by third-party tracking in the web analytics ecosystem and motivates the need for a non-
tracking alternative. Section 3.2 presents our contributions to provide this alternative
approach. In Section 3.3, we describe the components existing in today’s systems as
well as in our system. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 list our functionality as well as privacy goals
and our assumptions, respectively. Section 3.6 presents an overview of our system.
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In Section 3.7, we describe our system in detail. Section 3.8 presents an informal but
detailed analysis of our system. Our implementation and evaluation are presented in
Section 3.9. We conclude in Section 3.10.
3.1 Introduction
Website publishers use web analytics information to analyze their traffic and optimize
their site’s content accordingly. Publishers can obtain analytics data by running their
own web analytics software programs [7, 40, 41]. These analytics programs provide
publishers with statistics about users on their site, such as page views, clickstreams,
browsers, operating systems, plugins as well as frequency of returning visitors. However,
they do not provide other potentially useful information, such as user demographics.
For this reason, publishers often outsource the collection of web analytics to a third
party data aggregator, such as comScore, Quantcast or StatCounter [6, 62]. A data
aggregator collects data from users visiting a publisher’s website and presents these data
in aggregate form to the publisher. Besides being convenient for publishers, because
they only have to embed a small piece of code (i.e., a JavaScript code snippet), this
outsourcing allows publishers to learn statistical information they could not otherwise
learn from their own web server logs, such as the demographics of their users and
other websites their users visit. A data aggregator can infer this extended web analytics
information because it collects user data across many publisher websites. Compiling
extended web analytics via these collected data also benefits the data aggregator because
it can sell this information to advertisers and publishers alike.
Although this scheme is beneficial for the publishers and the data aggregators, it
raises concerns about users being tracked while browsing the web. This tracking enables
a data aggregator to compile detailed behavior of individual users, and infer individual
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user demographics [144]. Thus, data aggregators are given a lot of information about
users’ actions on the web and have to be trusted that they will not abuse it. This trust
has been violated in the past [33, 47, 49].
Tracking affects not only users, but also the data aggregators themselves, who are
often criticized for this behavior. These criticisms have led to industry self-regulation
to provide opt-out mechanisms [10, 11, 50, 66], the Do-Not-Track (DNT) initiative in the
W3C, and many client-side tools, either to implement DNT [24, 52, 57], or to prevent
tracking outright [15, 23, 29, 70]. To the extent that these efforts take hold, the ability for
data aggregators to provide extended analytics to publishers will be degraded.
In addition, even with tracking, inferring accurate user demographics is a difficult
task that may produce inconsistent results. In 2012, we found examples of such inconsis-
tencies among the biggest data aggregators, Quantcast and Doubleclick. According to
Quantcast, 24% of rottentomatoes.com’s visitors in US were between 18 and 24, and 20%
were between 35 and 44. On the other hand, according to Doubleclick, these numbers
were 10% and 36%, respectively. Similar inconsistencies also existed for other sites.
Doubleclick has since discontinued their reporting of audiences for advertisement pur-
poses, whereas Quantcast stopped publishing audience data for sites that do not utilize
Quantcast for advertisement/analytics purposes.
In a more recent comparison between Alexa and Quantcast, we found the following
inconsistencies: grindtv.com, an extreme sports and entertainment site, is using Quant-
cast. Quantcast’s measurement states that 67% of the visitors are male [27]. On the other
hand, Alexa estimates that male and female visitors are almost equally distributed [26].
Similarly, usnews.com, another Quantcast using site, is reported to have a gender distri-
bution at 55% females and 45% males [65], whereas Alexa estimates that the males are
greatly under-represented on this site [64].
These examples show that tracking users and inferring results from collected infor-
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mation may not be the best method for obtaining accurate extended web analytics (i.e.,
user demographics). An alternative (e.g., direct querying of user data) might be better
suited for this purpose, provided that user privacy is protected via anonymity.
3.2 Contributions
To address the above issues, we present the design and implementation of a practi-
cal, privacy-preserving and non-tracking web analytics system. In our system, user
information is stored in a database on the user device (client). We exploit the direct
communication that naturally takes place between the publisher and the users during a
page visit by having the publisher distribute database queries to clients, and by having
the publisher act as an anonymizing proxy for the (encrypted) answers from the clients
to the data aggregator. The aggregator aggregates the anonymous answers, and pro-
vides the aggregate results to the publisher. Both the publisher and the aggregator add
differentially-private noise before passing data on to each other.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the problem of collecting
extended web analytics information without tracking users. We describe and analyze
a novel design that provides the first practical solution to this problem. Our solution
eliminates the need for third-party tracking for extended web analytics purposes, does
not require new organizational players, and is practical to deploy.
Keeping user data at the client device and utilizing the publisher as a proxy between
the clients and the aggregator, our system allows publishers to directly query extended
web analytics rather than rely on inferred data. Combined with the differentially-private
noise mechanisms, our protocol enables aggregation of users’ private information, such
as demographics and websites visited, without violating individual user privacy (see
3.4.2 for details) under a set of realistic threat assumptions. As a result, the system can
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provide better analytics than current services, in terms accuracy and variety.
While the decision to use the publisher as a proxy is good for deployability, it creates
new technical challenges because publishers can be malicious. In particular, they might
try to exploit their position in the middle by manipulating which clients receive and
answer queries, and to overcome the noise added by the aggregator using repeated
queries. Our system has mechanisms to raise the bar for such publishers and render
these attempts more difficult.
We implemented and evaluated our system to gauge its feasibility. We report on
performance benchmarks and describe our deployment across several hundred users.
3.3 Definitions & Components
We define extended web analytics as any additional information that the publisher
cannot obtain by investigating her own web server logs. Extended web analytics may
contain demographics (e.g., age, gender, education level, income, marital status) and web
browsing habits (e.g., other websites a user visits, search phrases used on search engines,
products viewed on shopping sites) as well as any other information regarding the user’s
environment (e.g., CPU load while viewing certain pages, applications installed).
There are three entities in today’s tracking web analytics systems: the publisher, the
data aggregator, and the client. Publishers create websites. Data aggregators provide
publishers with aggregation service for web analytics. Users use their clients (e.g., the
browser) to access and consume the content that publishers host.
Figure 3.1 shows the interactions between these entities today. When clients visit the
publisher’s website (step 0), they also send analytics data to the data aggregator via the
code snippet installed on the publisher’s website (step 1). After collecting information
from individual clients, the data aggregator aggregates analytics information (step 2),
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Figure 3.1: Operation of today’s tracking web analytics systems.
during which the aggregator infers extended web analytics information. The aggregator
then shares aggregate result with the publisher (step 3).
Our system consists of the same components. However, as we describe later, our
protocol eliminates the need for tracking to obtain extended web analytics.
3.4 Goals
3.4.1 Functionality Goals
We would like our system to provide publishers and data aggregators with at least
the same aggregate information they obtain in today’s systems. More specifically,
publishers should get more accurate and more types of web analytics information than
they do today if possible. Data aggregators should also obtain web analytics information
for all of their partner publishers like they do today, as an incentive for performing
aggregation. Note that today most data aggregators provide behavioral advertising,
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for which they require individual user information, and not aggregate data. Given that
other research shows how to accomplish behavioral advertising without exposing user
information [115, 151], we assume that the data aggregator requires only aggregate data.
We would also like to avoid requiring new players like proxies. While potentially
useful for the operation of the system, additional players can also hinder adoption and
practicality.
Ideally, we would want our system be more efficient than today’s systems, it might
not also be possible given our other functionality and privacy goals. As a result, our
system should scale at least adequately.
Finally, the system should not allow clients or publishers to manipulate results
beyond what is possible today (i.e., via botnets).
3.4.2 Privacy Goals
Our main user privacy goal is to eliminate third-party tracking of users across the web.
To this end, we want to provide the visitors with anonymity from the data aggregator.
Today, unless a visitor uses a proxy, she is exposed to the aggregator via her network
address.
The network address is, however, not the only identifier the aggregator can use
to track a visitor across the web. Unique pieces of information about a visitor, either
individually or as a combination, can enable the aggregator to identify a user. Although
the visitor may have anonymity through other means (e.g., proxy), it may still be possible
for the aggregator to anonymously profile a visitor. To mitigate this problem, our system
should ensure that the information obtained by the aggregator is unlinkable.
Our system should also give users information about their privacy loss with respect
to each publisher and each data aggregator. Such information is available within the
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formal guarantees of differential privacy (DP) [104]. Besides DP’s privacy loss concept,
its noise mechanism also helps us to achieve our unlinkability goal.
Privacy Non-goals. While each client in our system knows about its privacy loss, it
should be noted that such knowledge at the client is of limited value. DP is very conser-
vative, because it assumes that the attacker may have arbitrary auxiliary information it
can use to discover information about users in the database. When the attacker does not
have this auxiliary information, which is the common case, DP’s measure of privacy loss
is overly pessimistic. Although a client in our system could, in theory, refuse to answer
queries if a privacy budget is exceeded, doing so is not practical in our setting, because a
query may be legitimately repeated from time to time (e.g., to measure changes in the
user base). Furthermore, DP’s privacy loss measure assumes a static database, whereas
in our setting, the “database” is dynamic: the user population for a given publisher
changes almost constantly, and some individual user data may change as time passes.
For these reasons, it is unrealistic, and in our setting, unnecessary to set a hard limit
on user privacy loss (i.e., budget). In this regard, we do not aim to provide users with
formal DP guarantees. Nevertheless, we find DP to be a valuable mechanism, in part
because it provides a worst-case measure of privacy loss, but primarily because the
noise added to answers substantially raises the bar for the attacker, while still providing
adequate accuracy for aggregate results.
3.5 Assumptions
3.5.1 Client
We assume that the users trust the client software, in terms of the data it stores locally
and its operation, just as they trust their browser software today. While it is possible
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for a browser to be infected by malware, such malware is in a position to violate user
privacy in many ways beyond our system; thus, we do not protect against this threat.
By contrast, we assume that the clients may be malicious towards the publisher and
the data aggregator. A malicious client may attempt to distort aggregate results, similar
to the situation today where a client may, for instance, participate in click fraud. It may
also try to violate the privacy of other users, possibly colluding with the publisher.
3.5.2 Data Aggregator
We assume that the data aggregator is honest-but-curious (HbC); in other words, that it
obeys the prescribed operation, but may try to exploit any information learned in the
process. As an HbC player, we assume that the data aggregator does not collude with
the publishers. In principle, a malicious publisher could of course simply choose to
work with a malicious data aggregator. We assume a setup whereby aggregators state
their non-collusion in a privacy statement, making them legally liable and subject to
punishment (e.g., by the FTC). An aggregator that is also a publisher would have to
internally separate information.
We justify such an HbC aggregator on the assumption that the client software plays
an overseer role, and allows only HbC aggregators to participate. For instance, the
browser could refuse inclusion to any aggregator that does not provide such a privacy
statement, or appears untrustworthy for any other reason. Today, browsers already play
a similar role in a number of respects, such as by selecting default certificate authorities
and search engines, and in some cases, by warning users of potentially harmful websites.
In today’s industry setting where major data aggregators can generally be expected to
operate within the legal framework of their own stated privacy policies, we think that
this assumption is reasonable.
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As stated earlier in our goals, we assume that the data aggregator requires only
aggregate data in the context of web analytics. We leave behavioral advertising outside
our scope and refer the readers to other research [115, 151].
3.5.3 Publisher
We assume that the publisher is selfishly malicious both towards the users and the data
aggregator, meaning that the publisher will try to only benefit itself. As a potentially
malicious player, the publisher may try to violate the privacy of users with correct
clients. In particular, because the publisher distributes queries and collects answers,
it is in a position to selectively query clients, drop selected client answers, and add
answers beyond those required for DP noise. This position leads, for instance, to an
attack whereby the publisher isolates a single client by dropping all answers except for
those of the single client, and providing fake answers instead of the dropped answers.
With repeated queries to such an isolated client, the publisher may overcome the added
DP noise. The publisher may also be motivated to falsify the results it gives to the data
aggregator, for instance, to appear more popular or more attractive to advertisers. Our
design has mechanisms to mitigate the effect of these behaviors. Note, however, that we
assume that the publisher correctly adds DP noise to answers, because withholding noise
does not benefit the publisher, and the minor reduction in overhead gained (Section 3.9)
is not adequate incentive.
Publishers today can directly measure user activity on their websites (e.g., pages
visited, links clicked). In addition, websites can often legitimately obtain additional in-
formation directly from users, such as personally identifiable information (PII), shopping
activity, friends and hobbies. Information obtained directly from users by publishers is
considered outside our scope.
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3.5.4 Incentives
The incentives for the publisher and the aggregator are that they can obtain more
accurate web analytics, because we directly measure attributes rather than infer them.
Furthermore, they can get more types of web analytics that are not available today, such
as how many pages users visit in a certain period or search engines used by the users of a
publisher (Section 3.9). We do not think that users are incentivized. Although publishers
could offer incentives to users (e.g., better content for participating users) to create an
incremental deployment environment, we think that the browser is a better option for
deployment. These entities (i.e., publishers, aggregators, and browsers) should also be
motivated to provide better privacy to users. Even though we do not know for certain
whether our stated incentives are adequate, we think that they are at least feasible.
3.6 System Overview
Our system comprises the same three entities that exist today: the client, the publisher,
and the data aggregator (Figure 3.2). The publisher plays an expanded role: it distributes
queries to clients, and it proxies client-aggregator communication. This role requires the
publisher, or its hosting center, to install new software. While this requirement reduces
ease-of-use compared to today, we think it is reasonable: many publishers already run
their own analytics software [6, 7, 40, 41, 62] and hosting companies already offer servers
with web analytics software pre-installed [18, 31, 42].
The client gathers and stores user information in a local database. Using this local
database, the client requests and answers publisher queries when the user visits pub-
lisher sites. While the operation of the client is automatic, the user can always stop the
client from gathering information or answering publisher queries.
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The information collected and stored by the client can consist of extended web
analytics (e.g., demographics, browsing behavior). We envision that the client scrapes
most of this information from web pages the user visits (with informed user consent),
such as online social networks, shopping websites and search engines, or the client can
infer some information, like income. This scraping functionality can be supported by the
browser. A recent and similar example is the Firefox User Personalization project [20,63].
The browser may also implement basic messaging, encryption and database mechanisms,
and provide a sandboxed plugin environment for clients from different aggregators. The
user can also provide some information directly.
To distribute queries to clients, publishers post queries at well-known URLs on their
websites. When clients visit a website (step 0 in Figure 3.2), they download and read the
queries (step 1).
Queries may be formulated by both the publisher and the data aggregator. While
the queries themselves may be quite complex (i.e., SQL), the answers are limited to ‘yes’
and ‘no’ values. For instance, for the age distribution of users, the query effectively
asks clients to evaluate ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for each age range of interest (e.g., <18, 18-34, 35-50,
>50). This answering mechanism is achieved by defining buckets, such that each bucket
corresponds to a potential answer value, and by mapping the query result to these
buckets. Ultimately, the aggregator generates a per-bucket histogram of user counts.
One benefit of using such bucket definitions is to limit the distortion a malicious client
can impose on the aggregate result.
Each generated answer is separately encrypted with the public key of the data
aggregator (step 2). Queries may have thousands of defined buckets, most of which
have ‘no’ answers; for instance, one for each website a user may visit, or for each interest
a user may have. To reduce the number of cryptographic operations, ‘no’ answers are
omitted at the client. Instead, clients generate a specified number of answers which are
53
Figure 3.2: Query workflow of our system.
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either ‘yes’ or ‘null’. For example, a query may specify that every client produces exactly
20 answers for the websites a user has visited in the last week, regardless of the actual
number of visited websites. If a client has not visited 20 different websites, it generates
‘null’ answers for the difference. If it has visited more than 20 websites, then it cannot
report on every website visited.
After collecting the encrypted answers from clients (step 3), the publisher generates
DP noise separately for each bucket. Knowing these bucket definitions enables the
publisher to generate the noise in the form of additional answers. It then mixes the real
and noise answers (step 4), and forwards all answers to the data aggregator (step 5).
The data aggregator decrypts the answers, computes the histogram of bucket counts,
and adds DP noise to each count (step 6). After signing the result, it transmits the counts
to the publisher (step 7). The publisher then subtracts the noise it originally added (i.e.,
the number of additional answers for each bucket) to obtain its own final counts (step 8).
In the end, the publisher and the data aggregator both obtain aggregate results for
the query. Because of the noise, neither of them obtains an exact result: the publisher’s
result contains the noise the aggregator added, whereas the aggregator’s result contains
the noise the publisher added.
If the publisher or the data aggregator wishes to release a result to the public, then
they release the “double-noisy” result that was passed to the publisher in step 7. This
precaution prevents the publisher and the aggregator from computing the noise-free
result by subtracting their own noise, should the other publish its “single-noisy” result.
3.6.1 Audits
Clients occasionally audit publishers to detect if a publisher is dropping client answers
(Figure 3.3). To audit a publisher, the client generates and encrypts a nonce (Step 2), and
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Figure 3.3: Auditing mechanism of our system.
transmits it to the publisher instead of the answer the client otherwise would have sent
(Step 3). The client also encrypts the nonce and the publisher to create a nonce report. This
nonce report is then transmitted to another, randomly selected publisher (Step 4), which
forwards it to the data aggregator (Step 5). If the data aggregator often receives nonce
reports without the corresponding nonce answer, it suspects the publisher of dropping
client answers.
3.7 Design
In this section, we describe how queries are generated and distributed, how the client
generates a response and helps in auditing publishers, and how differentially-private
noise is added by the publisher and the data aggregator.
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3.7.1 Differential Privacy Background
A computation, C, provides (, δ)-differential privacy [104] if it satisfies the following
inequality for all datasets D1 and D2 differing on one record and for all outputs S ⊆
Range(C):
Pr[C(D1) ∈ S ] ≤ exp() × Pr[C(D2) ∈ S ] + δ (3.1)
In other words, the probability that a computation C produces a given output is almost
independent of the existence of any individual record in the dataset. In our setting, this
dataset consists of the values of clients for a given attribute.
Differential privacy is achieved by adding noise to the output of the computation.
This noise is independently generated for each component in the dataset. There are two
privacy parameters:  and δ. The trade-off between the accuracy of a computation and
the strength of its privacy property is mainly controlled by : a smaller  provides higher
privacy, but lower accuracy.
The parameter δ relaxes the strict relative shift of probability. If δ = 0, then the
(, δ)-differential privacy falls back to the classical -differential privacy, which can be
achieved by adding the Laplace distribution noise with a standard deviation
√
2∆C/,
where ∆C is the sensitivity of the computation, and is 1 for a computation counting set
elements [103].
A non-zero δ is required in some scenarios where the inequality (3.1) cannot be
satisfied [104]. Such (, δ)-differential privacy can be achieved in our system by adding
the aforementioned Laplace distribution noise with a complementary resampling mech-
anism (Section 3.7.5.1).
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Table 3.1: Query fields
QId Query ID
ps Query selection probability
pa Audit probability
Te Query end time
B Set of answer values (buckets) each with ID bi. (‘null’
and ‘Not Applicable’ (N/A) are well-known IDs)
A Required number of answers
P differentially-private noise parameter for the publisher’s result
(used by the data aggregator)
DA, δ differentially-private noise parameters for the data aggregator’s result
(used by the publisher)
SQL Database query
3.7.2 Queries
Publishers are required to list all their queries at a well-known URL on their website.
This query list is signed by the data aggregator, even if there are no queries (i.e., an
empty list). The aggregator may periodically check to ensure that the list is posted at the
well-known URL (e.g., via fake clients it has deployed) to detect malicious publishers
isolating clients by controlling the distribution of queries to clients. When a client visits
a website, it retrieves the query list if the previous list has expired. Table 3.1 shows the
fields contained in each query in the list.
QId is unique among all queries across all publishers working with this data aggrega-
tor. For each query in the list, the client decides whether to answer or ignore the query.
This decision is made with the selection probability ps assigned by the publisher, such that
the publisher can obtain enough answers from its user base given the expected number
of client visits. δ could be computed based on the expected number of answers. If the
client decides to answer the query, then it separately decides whether to audit the query
with audit probability pa assigned by the data aggregator, by replacing the answer with a
nonce. The query end time is the deadline for answering queries.
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The buckets B are the potential answer values that are pre-defined. They may
be downloaded separately and cached, if |B| is large. The aggregator sets the noise
parameter DA, and checks each query’s P to ensure it generates adequate noise before
signing the query list.
The SQL query may produce zero or more numerical values or strings. Each bucket
is defined as a numerical range or a string regular expression, such as salary ranges
(numerical), or websites visited (string). A bucket is labeled as ‘yes’ if a row in the
SQL output falls within the numerical range, or matches the regular expression. In
addition, buckets have instructions to be followed when the same SQL output labels
multiple buckets as ‘yes’ (e.g., select one or all), and the number of ‘yes’ labeled buckets
exceeds the allowed number of answers A (e.g., select most frequently occurring or
random buckets). If the client does not have A number of ‘yes’ labeled buckets, it uses a
well-known bucket ID ‘null’.
As an example, suppose a publisher wants to learn the age distribution of its female
users. The SQL can be “SELECT age FROM LOCAL DB WHERE gender = female”.
The buckets can be B = {< 18, 18 − 34, 35 − 50, > 50}, and A = 1.
An SQL query often has predicates, such as “WHERE gender = female” in the
above example. These predicates enable the publisher to query different segments of its
user base. Too specific predicates, however, may produce results that are not useful in
aggregate. To enable the publisher to notice that the predicates are too narrow, we define
another well-known bucket ID ‘Not Applicable’ (‘N/A’), used by the client when the
query predicates fail. This well-known bucket ID is also useful for the data aggregator to
detect malicious publishers who may set very specific predicates to isolate a client and
repeat the query to overcome the noise (e.g., few answers with bucket IDs other than
‘N/A’).
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3.7.3 Query Response
If the client software decides to answer a query according to a coin toss with bias ps,
it executes the SQL on its local database (step 2 in Figure 3.2) and produces the set of
buckets labeled ‘yes’ (i.e.,M). If no predicates match, the client generates A answers
with the well-known bucket ID ‘N/A’. Each answer is individually encrypted with the
public key of the data aggregator:
Response = EncDA pub{QId,N/A} (A times)
If the predicates match and |M| ≤ A, the client produces A individually encrypted
answers, where |M| answers contain the matching bucket ID bi ∈ M, and A−|M| answers
contain the well-known bucket ID ‘null’ :
Response =

EncDA pub{QId, bi} ∀bi ∈ M
EncDA pub{QId, null} (A − |M| times)
If |M| > A, the client selects A buckets according to the instructions and produces A
individually encrypted answers as its response.
To illustrate, assume a query asks the 20 most visited sites. If a client visited only 14
sites, it generates 14 answers with bucket IDs representing these sites and six answers
with bucket ID ‘null’. In contrast, if the client visited 25 sites, it generates only 20 answers
for the 20 most visited sites.
Note that the combination of answer values (e.g., websites visited) may uniquely
identify a client and allow the aggregator to track the user across different publishers
asking this query. By individually encrypting each answer value, our system prevents
the data aggregator from exploiting this information for tracking.
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In certain cases, such combination of answers may be useful for web analytics. In
these cases, the publisher and the aggregator can enumerate the combinations and use
these combinations as answer values. Note that the number of clients with each unique
combination may be low, such that the noise (Section 3.7.5) may dominate in the final
result. As a result, the utility of the results may be reduced.
After generating the response, the client transmits it to the publisher along with the
query ID (step 3 in Figure 3.2):
C → P : QId,Response
The client then records that it answered the query so as not to answer it again before
the query end time Te. It also records the  values to track the user’s privacy exposure to
the publisher and the aggregator. Note that the publisher may store client IP addresses
answering this query to prevent a malicious client from skewing the aggregate result by
sending many responses for the same query.
3.7.4 Audit Response
The audit serves two purposes. First, it can detect when a publisher is dropping client
answers. Second, it can detect when a publisher is adding a substantial number of fake
answers (beyond the noise).
The clients periodically generate nonces and obtain blind signatures from the data
aggregator [95]. If a client decides to audit the publisher, it picks a nonce, encrypts the
nonce and the QId with the aggregator’s public key as well as A − 1 ‘null’ answers, and
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transmits the response to the publisher as if it was a real response:
Response =

EncDA pub{QId, nonce} once
EncDA pub{QId, null} (A − 1 times)
The client also randomly selects a different publisher, which is a customer of the aggre-
gator. The client then transmits a separate, encrypted copy of the nonce and the nonce’s
blind signature blind sig to that publisher:
NR = (EncDA{QId, nonce}, blind sig)
This nonce report cannot be directly submitted to the data aggregator, because the
aggregator would learn which publisher a client has visited and decided to audit.
Obtaining nonces in advance of the audit prevents the aggregator from correlating blind
signature requests to nonce responses or reports. If the client has depleted its nonces
with blind signatures, it generates a nonce, requests a new blind signature from the
aggregator and delays its nonce response for a random amount of time until the query
end time, Te.
Each publisher periodically forwards received nonce reports to the aggregator. The
client learns the set of other publishers by periodically downloading a list from the aggre-
gator. This list associates a probability with each publisher that is roughly proportional
to the number of answers each publisher handles. The client selects the different pub-
lisher according to this probability. As a result, each publisher handles a fair proportion
of nonce reports.
If the aggregator consistently receives nonce reports via different publishers without
a corresponding nonce message from the audited publisher, the aggregator suspects
the audited publisher of dropping messages, possibly in an attempt to isolate a client.
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In this case, the aggregator can validate this suspicion by masquerading as real clients
from browsers it controls, and sending audits from these clients. This check is necessary
because a malicious client may have sent nonce reports via different publishers, without
the corresponding nonce via the audited publisher to cast suspicion on it.
The aggregator knows the probability of sending an audit response instead of a query
response. As a result, it can estimate the number of clients answering this query by
dividing the number of audit responses received by the audit probability pa . It can also
calculate the proportion of audit responses to query responses that should be received.
If this proportion is consistently too low, then the aggregator suspects the publisher of
adding additional fake answers.
The purpose of the blind signatures is to limit the rate a client can generate audits,
which is helpful for two reasons. First, it drastically reduces the amount of suspicion
a malicious client can cast on publishers by just sending the nonce reports, but not the
nonces, as described above.
Second, by ensuring that these blind signatures are only assigned to clients and not
publishers, the data aggregator prevents a malicious publisher from trivially generating
many fake audits. Using these fake audits, the publisher could either drop client
answers for an isolation attack without considering the possibility that they may be
audit responses, or generate many fake answers by maintaining the right proportion of
audits to answers. This use of blind signatures ultimately raises the bar for the publisher
by forcing it to use botnet clients.
The blind signatures are timestamped to prevent an attacker from hoarding them for
later use [75, 91, 110]. These timestamps are coarse-grained (e.g., end of the week) to
prevent the aggregator from linking signatures to clients.
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3.7.5 Noise Generation
3.7.5.1 Noise at the Publisher
The publisher generates differentially-private noise, rounded to the nearest integer, for all
buckets using the data aggregator’s noise parameters (i.e., DA, δ),NP = {nP,1, nP,2, ..., nP,b},
where b is the number of buckets (shown as Noise P in step 4 in Figure 3.2). Remember
that the publisher will forward the client answers to the data aggregator after adding
noise. The client answers without noise would result in non-negative bucket counts
when the aggregator decrypts and counts them. As a result, the mechanism for generat-
ing noise is to create additional answers. However, the amount of noise to add may be
positive or negative.
If the noise is positive for a bucket, the publisher can generate that many additional
answers with that bucket value, such that the data aggregator will obtain a count
including the noise.
On the other hand, if the noise is negative for a bucket, the publisher cannot simply
pick encrypted answers belonging to that bucket and drop them: the answers are
encrypted with the aggregator’s key, such that the publisher cannot know which bucket
value an answer has. Furthermore, if there are no client answers with that bucket value,
the count the aggregator should get should have a negative value (i.e., just the noise).
This negative bucket count, however, cannot be achieved because there are no client
answers with that bucket value for the publisher to drop.
To be able to generate also negative noise, we define an offset value o, which the
aggregator will subtract from each per-bucket count. The number of additional answers
supplied will be greater or less than this offset to create positive or negative noise,
respectively.
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To give an example, if the offset is 20, and the noise is +4, the publisher creates 24
answers for the given bucket, and the aggregator later subtracts 20 from the bucket’s
count. On the other hand, if the noise is -5, the publisher creates 15 answers. Stated
precisely, the publisher calculates the number of per-bucket answers to create as:
N ′P = {nP,1 + o, nP,2 + o, ..., nP,b + o}
= {n′P,1, n
′
P,2, ..., n
′
P,b}
These noise answers are encrypted with the aggregator’s public key; hence, indistin-
guishable from client answers. After the query end time Te, the combined set of client
answers and noise answers RDA are randomly mixed and sent to the aggregator along
with the query ID and offset value:
P→ DA : QId,RDA, o
The aggregator decrypts the answers, counts them, and subtracts the offset to obtain
the noisy result:
R′DA = {r1 + n′P,1 − o, r2 + n
′
P,2 − o,
..., rb + n
′
P,b − o}
= {r1 + nP,1, r2 + nP,2, ..., rb + nP,b}
where ri is the count of client answers belonging to bucket bi, and nP,i is the publisher’s
noise value for bucket bi.
At this point, the data aggregator can make two checks to detect potential malicious
publisher behavior. First, the aggregator can estimate the number of expected answers
based on the number of audits received for this query and the audit probability pa. After
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accounting for the expected noise answers (i.e., b × o), if the received number of answers
is significantly higher or lower than the expected number of answers, the aggregator
suspects the publisher of adding or removing answers, respectively.
Second, after obtaining the bucket counts, the data aggregator can check for anomalies
in this publisher’s results. For instance, if the results for the same query consistently
show low-value buckets along with high-value buckets (e.g., ‘female<3’, ‘N/A>1K’), the
publisher may be trying to isolate a client’s answer and overcome the noise. In this case,
the aggregator may suspect the publisher, check the query predicates manually, and/or
may not return the result.
There remains the question of how to set the value of o. The noise value cannot
exceed the offset, and must be resampled when nP,i < −o. Even with this resampling, our
procedure still provides (, δ)-differential privacy. The proof is elsewhere [81]. According
to the theorem provided in [81], the offset o is set as:
o ≥ λ ln
((
e
A
λ − 1 + δ/(2A)
)
A/δ
)
(3.2)
where λ ≥ 2A/DA. [125] argues that, for differential privacy guarantees to be met, δ < 1/c,
where c represents the number of clients answering this query. Since in our setting a
client may answer the same query multiple times, we require δ < 1/(m × c), where m
represents the maximum number of times a client can answer the same query. For our
purposes, we assume a conservative setting of m = 1000: if the same query is posed
multiple times to adjust for changing user data and the query frequency is once per
week, a value of 1000 for m corresponds roughly to 20 years. Recall that, as stated in our
goals (Section 3.4.2), we do not aim to enforce a budget and provide strict differential
privacy guarantees.
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3.7.5.2 Noise at the Data Aggregator
After aggregating the answers and obtaining the noisy results, R′DA, the data aggregator
generates Laplace noise using the  value specified by the publisher (i.e., P), NDA =
{nDA,1, nDA,2, ..., nDA,b} (shown as Noise DA in step 6 in Figure 3.2) for each bucket. The
data aggregator then computes the double-noisy results RP:
RP = R′DA + {nDA,1, nDA,2, ..., nDA,b}
= {r1 + nP,1 + nDA,1, r2 + nP,2 + nDA,2,
..., rb + nP,b + nDA,b}
Then, this result is signed by the data aggregator and sent to the publisher (step 7 in
Figure 3.2):
DA→ P : QId,RP
When the publisher gets RP, it removes its own noise and obtains its own noisy
results, R′P, (step 8 in Figure 3.2):
R′P = RP − {nP,1, nP,2, ..., nP,b}
= {r1 + nDA,1, r2 + nDA,2, ..., rb + nDA,b}
where ri is the count of client answers belonging to bucket bi, and nDA,i is the aggregator’s
noise value for bucket bi. In the end, the aggregator’s result contains the differentially-
private noise added by the publisher (i.e., R
′
DA), whereas the publisher’s result contains
the differentially-private noise added by the aggregator (i.e., R
′
P).
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3.8 Analysis
3.8.1 Data Aggregator
Although the data aggregator follows the prescribed operation and does not collude
with publishers, it may still be motivated to track clients across publishers and may try
to exploit any information it learns. This information can include identifiers associated
with clients, allowing the aggregator to track them. In the absence of a proxy, one such
identifier is the client IP address. By using the publisher as an anonymizing proxy, our
system hides IP addresses from the aggregator during the collection of answers.
The aggregator may try to obtain other identifiers by manipulating query parameters
(i.e., DA, P, and pa), and the audit activities (i.e., assignment of blind signatures and
publisher probabilities for nonce reports). For example, an answer to a common query
(e.g., a rare occupation) can be distinguishing among clients. The DP noise added by the
publisher solves this problem (Section 3.7.5.1). To minimize this noise, the aggregator
may set a large DA value, but it would be easily detected by clients and industry
regulators.
Besides rare answers, the combination of answers can also act as an identifier for a client.
For example, a client’s response to a query about most visited sites may be unique. Our
system solves this problem by separately encrypting each answer at the client (Section
3.7.3) and mixing client answers with noise answers at the publisher (Section 3.7.5.1).
The aggregator has no incentive to use a large P, which would only serve to reduce
noise for the publisher.
In the auditing mechanism, the nature of the blind signatures and coarse-grained
timestamps prevents the aggregator from connecting nonce reports back to clients. The
aggregator may set a large audit probability for one publisher, and small probabilities
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for other publishers. This high probability would cause the clients of the first publisher
to obtain blind signatures more often than others; hence, enabling the aggregator to infer
the publisher these clients visit. However, unusually high audit probabilities will raise
suspicion among clients and regulators. Furthermore, the utility of the first publisher
will suffer, triggering suspicion.
3.8.2 Publisher
A potentially malicious publisher may want to exploit its position in the middle to learn
an individual client’s information, and falsify the results the data aggregator gets. The
publisher can control the query parameters (i.e., SQL, A, B, P, ps), the distribution of
queries, the collection and forwarding of responses and nonce reports, the noise process,
and the publishing of final results. We analyze how a publisher can try to exploit these
parameters, and discuss how our system raises the bar for these attempts to succeed.
3.8.2.1 Publisher Attacking Clients
A client’s response is encrypted with the aggregator’s public key. The client also sends
a fixed number of answers (i.e., A), preventing the publisher from learning how many
buckets were matched for a query. Absent collusion, the publisher cannot learn an
individual client’s answer from the aggregator, and obtains only noisy aggregate results.
To minimize the noise the aggregator adds, the publisher may set a large P value. By
enforcing a maximum P value, the aggregator can ensure that it will add enough noise
to protect users’ privacy (Section 3.7.5.2). Nevertheless, a publisher may try to learn a
client’s answer, by isolating it and repeating the same query to overcome the noise. We
discuss how our system raises the bar for such a publisher.
Isolation via selectively dropping other clients’ answers. To isolate a client’s answer,
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a malicious publisher may drop answers from other clients and replace them with fake
answers it generates. If the publisher drops some clients’ answers, then it cannot be
certain what the remaining answers are and cannot deduce what the isolated client’s
answer value is. If the publisher drops all the answers from all other clients, then these
answers will contain nonces. When the aggregator consistently receives reports via other
publishers, but not the nonces from the audited publisher, it suspects the publisher of
dropping answers and can confirm this suspicion by masquerading as real clients and
sending nonces through the publisher (Section 3.7.4).
To allow the malicious publisher to drop answers, other colluding publishers may
drop nonce reports. However, they cannot selectively do so to help their partners,
because they do not know about which publisher a given nonce report is. The aggregator
also knows approximately how many reports a publisher should forward (i.e., via the
publisher’s probability to be randomly selected), and if it does not receive enough reports,
it suspects the publisher of dropping them. For these reasons, a malicious publisher
cannot easily help another malicious publisher to drop answers without detection.
Isolation via dropping target client’s answer. A difficult, but theoretically possible
attack is for the publisher to repeat a query and obtain results, half of which contain
the target client’s answer, and half of which do not. By comparing the average result
of these two sets of queries, the publisher can determine if the target client’s answer is
positive or ‘null’. The auditing mechanism may not detect this attack, because the audit
is relatively rare, and thus, the target client may generate zero or very few audits. This
attack is hard to carry out, because the client population may change over time, and
because if the selection probabilty ps is less than 1, different clients will answer different
queries. In both of these cases, the non-noisy value would change a bit with successive
queries; thus, requiring even more queries to eliminate the effect of noise.
Nevertheless, we simulated this attack, assuming a fixed set of 100 clients, one of
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whom is the target client. We execute the same query Q times, varying Q from 30 to
2000. We also vary the selection probability ps to be 1.0, 0.5, and 0.05. When ps = 1.0,
we drop the target’s answer half the time. For ps = 0.5 and ps = 0.05, there is no need
to intentionally drop the target answer, because it is often naturally not provided. We
average the counts for queries with and without the target. If the difference in the
average is greater than 0.5, we guess that the target’s answer is 1 (i.e., ‘yes’). If it is less
than 0.5, we guess that the target’s answer is ‘null’. We vary the number of queries Q,
run 10000 trials for each Q, and calculate the percentage of times the guess is correct.
This percentage is the publisher’s confidence after Q queries.
Figure 3.4 shows the results of our simulation for the cases where the selection
probability ps is 1.0, 0.5, and 0.05 using  = 0.5. When ps = 1.0, it takes over 350 queries
to reach 95% confidence. Assuming one query per week, this attack would take roughly
seven years. In the cases of ps = 0.5 and ps = 0.05, the attacker requires about 1000 and
2000 queries, respectively, for the same level of confidence.
Isolation via buckets or SQL. The publisher can also isolate a client by manipulating the
query such that only the target client provides a positive answer (or, conversely, all clients
except the target client provide positive answers). This attack can be accomplished either
by manipulating the SQL predicate, or the bucket definitions (i.e., to include PII or a rare
combination of attributes). Our general approach to both of these methods is to monitor
answers for clues signaling that this attack may be happening, and to manually inspect
SQL queries when these clues appear. While manual inspection is not ideal, we think
that it will not be needed very frequently: Most publishers will probably ask the same
types of queries. As a result, most of the queries will come from an already approved
library, reducing the effort by the aggregator to monitor the queries and the buckets.
To start such a manual inspection when needed, the clue we are searching is any
bucket whose count is consistently very low (roughly 0) or consistently very high
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Figure 3.4: Confidence level for the isolation attack via dropping target’s answer using
the noise parameter  = 0.5.
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(roughly the number of answering clients) for the same repeated query. For instance,
if the predicate isolates the user (i.e., the user’s name), then we expect to see very
low bucket counts, except for the ‘N/A’ bucket, whose value will be very high. If the
predicate does the reverse (i.e., includes all clients but the target), then the count of the
‘N/A’ bucket will be very low, and the other buckets will be very high. A very low ‘N/A’
bucket is suspicious, because in this case the predicate is apparently not needed and
should be dropped. Likewise, if the target user is isolated by a rare bucket definition,
then certain buckets will have very low counts. In this case, we can expect an honest
publisher to modify its bucket definitions to prevent such consistently low counts.
Recall that a malicious publisher cannot just create an arbitrary number of fake
answers to inflate the counts of these buckets: The aggregator would expect a certain
number of nonces according to the audit probability of the query. To generate the right
amount of nonce responses and reports, the publisher would require blind signatures
(i.e., tokens) from the aggregator, who only assigns these tokens to clients and not the
publishers. As a result, the publisher would be forced to use more clients (i.e., a botnet).
In some cases, however, examining the SQL may not be adequate. One such example
is a predicate like “WHERE page-visited = example.com/UniqueURL”, where
UniqueURL is provided only to the isolated client. In this case, the aggregator must
check that the URL is provided to multiple clients by operating fake clients. Nevertheless,
such queries would generate high ‘N/A’ counts. Similar to the above case, we can expect
an honest publisher to modify its bucket definitions to obtain more useful information
and reduce such consistently high counts for the answer ‘N/A’.
Isolation via query distribution. A malicious publisher may send a query to only one
client. The aggregator, however, can ensure that the queries are available at well-known
URLs at the publisher site via its own fake clients. Our auditing mechanism can also be
extended to send reports when the query list or any queries are not accessible by clients.
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Other attacks. By enforcing a maximum A value, the aggregator can ensure that clients
do not spend unnecessary resources (e.g., CPU, bandwidth) while answering queries, to
prevent denial of service attacks by the publisher.
There is no clear incentive for a selfishly malicious publisher not to add DP noise.
Even so, the aggregator can still detect suspicious behavior: The aggregator can estimate
the number of clients ce as the number of audit reports received divided by the audit
probability pa. The approximate total number of expected answers is therefore (ce × A) +
(b × o), where b is the number of buckets, o is the offset, and A is the number of answers
per client. If answers are substantially lower than this value, the publisher is suspected.
A malicious publisher can publish its own single-noisy results that include only the
aggregator’s noise. However, these results will not have the aggregator’s signature; thus,
exposing the publisher. Furthermore, the aggregator can detect this behavior because it
knows the double-noisy results.
3.8.2.2 Publisher Falsifying Results
To appear more popular or more attractive to advertisers, a publisher may want to
falsify results by generating many fake answers. If the publisher exceeds the number
of answers expected by the aggregator (i.e., ce × A + b × o), it will be suspected. Thus, it
can only generate answers that belong to certain buckets and is limited by the number
of buckets and the offset (i.e., b × o). This number may not be significant for queries
with few buckets, depending on the total number of answers. For instance, it is 100 for a
query about gender distribution with 5000 answers and an offset of 50.
On the other hand, b × o can be large for queries with many buckets. If all fake
answers are used in few buckets, all other buckets would have values close to −o after
the offset subtraction. The probability of simultaneously generating these noise values
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is extremely low, signaling a manipulation. To prevent detection, the publisher would
distribute the fake answers more evenly, limiting its distortion in a bucket.
3.8.3 Client
A client may act maliciously towards the publisher, the aggregator and to other honest
clients. A client can lie in its response to distort the aggregate result; however, this
distortion is limited by A set by the publisher. By keeping a record of client IP addresses,
the publisher can also ensure that a client sends only one response for a query.
By sending fake nonce reports without the corresponding nonces, a malicious client
can incriminate a publisher, and cause the aggregator to manually check this publisher. A
client may also collude with a malicious publisher and generate nonce reports to help the
publisher maintain the right proportion of audits to answers, either in an isolation attack,
or in generation of fake answers to falsify results. By controlling the blind signature
assignment to clients, the aggregator can limit this behavior, and force the publisher to
get a bigger botnet, increasing chances of detection.
3.9 Implementation & Evaluation
3.9.1 Implementation
We implemented the client as a Firefox add-on. Our client keeps user information in a
local database, looks for queries at a well-known URL (e.g., publishersite.com/queries/),
and returns an encrypted response. The client is about 1000 lines of JavaScript code,
excluding the 3000 lines of code for cryptography libraries for RSA.
The publisher software consists of a simple server-side script that stores the en-
crypted responses at the publisher’s website, and a plugin for the opensource web
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analytics software Piwik [41]. Piwik already allows publishers to record various infor-
mation about visitors, such as their browsers, operating systems and page views as well
as the frequency of returning visitors. Our plugin extends Piwik’s user interface to allow
the publisher to view the queries, number of answers and results as well as enables the
addition of the noise and forwarding of answers. In total, the publisher software is about
450 lines of PHP code.
The data aggregator software is a simple program that enables the publisher to up-
load the encrypted answers. The aggregator then decrypts and aggregates the answers,
adds noise and returns the signed results to the publisher. Our implementation is about
275 lines of Java and PHP code.
3.9.2 Example Scenario
We analyze the computational and bandwidth overhead we impose on the components
via some micro benchmarks. Lacking information about current aggregators’ infrastruc-
ture makes a comparison difficult. Nevertheless, to analyze our system’s overhead, we
use the following scenario. Each week, a publisher poses queries shown in Table 3.2
to 50K clients. The first eight queries collect the same information current aggregators
provide to publishers. The last three are additional queries our system enables the pub-
lisher to pose that are not available in today’s systems: a 10-bucket histogram of the total
number of pages visited by users across all sites, a 3-bucket histogram of visit frequency
to each of 1000 websites selected by the publisher, and how many users use each of the
top 5 search engines. We assume the aggregator uses a 2048-bit key.
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Table 3.2: Queries and associated parameters. The buckets include our two well-known
bucket IDs.
Property # buckets A o
Age 7 + 2 1 66
Gender 2 + 2 1 66
Income 6 + 2 1 66
Education 5 + 2 1 66
Has children? 2 + 2 1 66
Location 5000 + 2 1 66
Ethnicity 5 + 2 1 66
Other sites visited 3000 + 2 10 751
Total # pages visited 10 + 2 1 66
Visit frequency (1000 × 3) + 2 10 751
Search engines used 5 + 2 3 211
Table 3.3: Per week bandwidth usage of the publisher and the data aggregator.
Publisher Data Aggregator
Collecting answers 0.37GB -
Forwarding noise answers 1.20GB 1.20GB
Forwarding all answers 1.57GB 1.57GB
3.9.2.1 Computational Overhead
To measure the computational overhead, we ran our client on a laptop running Mac OS
X 10.6.8 on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.66 GHz as well as on a smartphone running Android
2.3.5 with a 1 GHz processor. Our JavaScript client can achieve about 380, 20, and 16
encryptions per second on Google Chrome, Firefox, and on the smartphone, respectively.
Note that JavaScript can be slower than native code.
We ran the publisher and the aggregator software on a machine with 2GB of memory
running Linux 2.6.38 kernel on an Intel Xeon two cores 2.4GHz. The publisher software
can generate and encrypt around 7980 answers per second. In our scenario, the expected
total number of additional answers (i.e., b × o) for all 11 queries is around 4.9M, taking
the publisher less than 11 minutes per week to generate.
The data aggregator software can decrypt and aggregate about 270 messages per
second. In our scenario, the aggregation takes about 3.6 hours per week for the first 8
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Table 3.4: Number of clients having used search engines on a given day in our deploy-
ment. Actual/Publisher/Data Aggregator
Day Google Yahoo Bing None/Other
01/18 72/73/73 20/20/19 1/-1/10 44/42/49
01/19 63/57/59 20/21/20 2/4/2 29/29/29
01/20 54/57/52 17/18/17 0/-1/-3 29/30/30
01/21 59/62/59 16/15/15 0/5/4 30/29/34
queries whose aggregate information current aggregators provide with tracking. The
remaining three queries whose aggregate information is only available through our
system take about 3.6 hours per week. Most of this overhead is due to the additional
answers used as noise.
Note that all these numbers are obtained using a single CPU for the encryption and
decryption operations. These operations can be easily executed in parallel.
3.9.2.2 Bandwidth Overhead
The compressed size of the biggest query (i.e., 5002 buckets) is about 35KB. In compari-
son, nytimes.com’s homepage is about 500KB, excluding advertisements. Furthermore,
buckets may not change very often, and can be cached.
The client’s bandwidth overhead is in the order of a few kilobytes for sending
responses. In our example, a client would consume about 8KB/week for all 11 queries.
Table 3.3 shows the publisher’s and the data aggregator’s total bandwidth consumption
per week. Most bandwidth consumption is related to the noise answers; however,
the overhead is still acceptable: distributing nytimes.com’s homepage to the 50K user
sample just once would consume about 23.8GB whereas the collection of client answers
and forwarding them with noise answers consumes about 1.57GB.
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3.9.3 Deployment
To test our system’s feasibility, we deployed our client via our friends and mturk.com for
15 days with 236 unique clients. We report on their browsing activities. On average, there
were 118 active clients daily. Each day, we queried clients about how many pages they
browsed, which sites they visited, their visit frequency to these sites, and which search
engines they used. We used 3K most popular sites from Alexa and set P = DA = 0.5.
Note that our goal was to gain experience rather than gather meaningful data.
The clients in our deployment were fairly active; almost half of them having visited
at least 100 pages. Major sites, such as google.com, youtube.com and facebook.com,
were (as expected) reported more than many other sites. We also gathered some data
on the usage frequency of these sites. Many users have visited google.co.in much more
frequently than facebook.com or youtube.com.
Table 3.4 shows the number of clients having used a search engine. One can see that
the noisy counts of the users do not deviate much from the actual values, meaning that
the relative error is not very significant (e.g., Google or Yahoo values). On the other hand,
for low actual counts, the noise can dominate the results the aggregator and publisher
obtain (e.g., Bing values). Our client covered only three search engines and might have
missed searches on other sites with search functionality (e.g., Wikipedia).
Figure 3.5 shows the probability of generating a given noise value with the given
epsilon values. We generated 1M noise values with each given  value, counted the
number of occurrences of each noise value and computed the probability of a noise
value being generated. As one can see, the lower the  value, the wider the range of the
noise values. In other words, lower  values increase the amount of noise added, which
in turn gives more privacy.
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Figure 3.5: Probability density function of Laplace noise values with given  values.
3.10 Conclusion & Future Work
We presented what is to our knowledge the first system for collecting accurate, extended
web analytics without tracking users. Our system directly queries such data, while
protecting user privacy by providing them with anonymity and unlinkability via the
addition of Laplace noise. Our system utilizes the already-existing publisher as the
anonymizing proxy, avoiding to require a new organizational component. It may
be possible to apply our technique to other analytics problems, such as application
analytics (e.g., mobile) and surveys about sensitive topics (e.g., elections, drug use).
These scenarios, however, present additional constraints and challenges (e.g., developers
without a website). We plan to examine them in more detail.
We envision that our system would be used in conjunction with first-party analytics
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software tools such as Piwik. These first-party tools can already provide the publishers
with information about visitors on their sites (e.g., page views, browsers, operating
systems, plugins, frequency of returning visitors). However, such systems do not provide
important but potentially sensitive analytics information such as user demographics.
Our system is designed to address this shortcoming by providing users with anonymity
and unlinkability during the collection of this information. As a result, it complements
the first-party analytics tools and provides the publishers with user demographics
without having to track the users across the web.
While our design avoids the need for a new HbC organizational component (e.g., a
proxy), it does so at the cost of certain new threats (e.g., publisher dropping responses)
and additional mechanisms to make these threats more difficult. Even with an HbC
proxy instead of a malicious publisher, however, the threat of isolation attacks through
SQL or bucket manipulations remains. One avenue of future work is to explore new
designs addressing these issues while maintaining the scalability properties of the
current system, and to understand the trade-off points better.
One approach to mitigating the isolation attacks through SQL or buckets might be to
simply withhold results for buckets with low values [83]. Another approach might be to
have clients simply not answer repeat queries; however, this approach clearly results
in a utility loss that needs to be better understood. Malicious publishers may also try
to bypass such a mechanism via small variations in queries, essentially querying the
same information with slightly different queries. Potential defenses may borrow ideas
from information flow, each client tracking which piece of information it has exposed
previously [87, 133, 145]. Other sophisticated approaches applied in centralized settings
may help the aggregator and the publisher achieve better accuracy [85,118]. One avenue
of future work is to understand whether we can extend their usability to our distributed
setting.
81
An obvious limitation of our system is that the potential answer values (i.e., buckets)
need to be enumerated and pre-defined before the publisher queries are distributed to
clients, such that the clients can pick the most appropriate answer values after executing
the queries. For queries about user demographics (e.g., age, gender, education level),
this enumeration is not very difficult. On the other hand, for other queries (e.g., websites
visited, search phrases, products viewed), it can become difficult. Other systems utilizing
the same principle of ‘queries with potential answer values’ [97, 98] also suffer from this
limitation. We address this limitation in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving String Discovery
In this chapter, we propose a system that enables the publishers to discover previously
unknown string values that are present in client databases, but are difficult to enumerate.
The system we presented in Chapter 3 as well as several others [97, 98] are effective in
eliminating third-party tracking while still allowing publishers to query for extended
analytics data. However, the queries need to have a list of pre-defined answer values,
such that the client software can pick the most appropriate answer after executing a
query. For many queries (e.g., visited websites, search phrases), this task of enumerating
potential answer values can be difficult or impossible. The system we describe in this
chapter addresses this shortcoming and complements the above systems. We describe
our system’s design, analyze its privacy properties and evaluate its feasibility using
real-world data. A preliminary version of this work, including the design and evaluation,
was published as a technical report at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems [80].
The formal analysis of this work was also published as a separate technical report at the
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems [79].
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section motivates the need for a
privacy-preserving string discovery system for web and mobile analytics. Section 4.2
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presents the challenges we face in designing such a system and our contributions to
overcome these challenges. Section 4.3 introduces our definitions and the components
in our system. In Section 4.4, we present our privacy and functionality goals. We list
our assumptions in Section 4.5. An overview of our system and the building blocks we
use are described in Sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. We present our system’s design
details, optimizations and duplicate detection mechanism in Sections 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10,
respectively. A formal model and analysis of our system is given in Section 4.11. Section
4.12 describes our evaluation with real-world data. We conclude in Section 4.13.
4.1 Introduction
While statistics about user demographics (e.g., age, gender, income) are important, a
new class of statistics is emerging: arbitrary text values or strings. Imagine a website
publisher who wants to learn which (previously unknown) search phrases (e.g., ‘pizza
nearby’) are used by how many of its visitors, or the developer of a photo application
who wants to learn about the free-text tag values its users assign to their photos (e.g.,
‘dad and the cats’). Other examples include sites visited, installed applications and
names of products viewed.
Some systems [83,90] try to tackle this problem via general-purpose secure multiparty
computation (SMC) protocols [90], or expensive cryptographic operations [83], such as
oblivious transfers (OT) [141]. Although eliminating potential privacy concerns about
fully trusting a central entity such as a data aggregator, these operations put a significant
load on the clients, whose resources may be limited in large-scale, distributed environ-
ments such as the web. In fact, users increasingly access the web via mobile devices
with limited capabilities compared to personal computers [71–73]. Not supporting such
clients will hinder the use of these systems for privacy-preserving analytics on the web
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and mobile settings. Furthermore, the main goal of the above systems is to aggregate and
correlate network events among big organizations (e.g., ASes). This specialization limits
the length of the strings these systems can handle due to the underlying cryptographic
primitives. For instance, Sepia [90] and Applebaum et al. [83] assume a string length of
32 bits (i.e., the length of an IPv4 address). For longer strings as in our examples, these
systems would require substantial changes.
4.1.1 Background: Privacy-preserving Analytics Systems
Our system described in Chapter 3 as well as other recent proposals for privacy-
preserving analytics for web and mobile environments avoid the trade-off between
privacy and scalability: With the help of a client software, they store user data at users’
devices and release it in a protected fashion. These systems utilize less sophisticated but
faster crypto operations than SMC or OT and can support a variety of client devices.
Here, we describe the most relevant ones of these systems. We then explain their com-
mon limitation and how our privacy-preserving discovery system complements these
systems.
piBox. piBox [128] uses a trusted platform to restrict the interface for obtaining statistics
from a mobile application: Application developers define a set of counter names. The
platform enforces how much and how often a mobile application instance (i.e., client)
can update these counters. The trusted platform also adds noise to counter values
before reporting them to the developers. The system assumes that the counter names
are well-known and pre-defined.
Hardt et al.’s system. Hardt et al. [117] propose a system to personalize mobile ad-
vertisements in a privacy-preserving way. To collect statistics, Hardt et al. use two
honest-but-curious servers. The clients locally update a counter value for advertisement
impressions (or clicks) and add noise to the values before sending the values for aggre-
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gation. The servers then aggregate the counter values. Again, the system assumes that
the counter names are pre-defined.
PDDP. Chen et al. proposed a proxy-based system (PDDP) for querying user data. Simi-
lar to our system described in Chapter 3, user data is kept on user devices with the help
of a client software. A separate entity, an honest-but-curious proxy, distributes queries
from analysts to clients and collects responses that are encrypted by the aggregator’s
key. Chen et al. utilize a homomorphic encryption scheme, which allows the proxy to
add noise to the responses blindly (i.e., it does not know how much noise is added). The
queries, however, are distributed to clients with a list of potential answer values (i.e.,
buckets) like our system in Chapter 3.
SplitX. After our non-tracking web analytics system described in Chapter 3, a new
system, SplitX, was developed in collaboration with others [97]; thus, its detailed archi-
tecture is not included in this thesis. SplitX utilizes the same idea of a client keeping user
data on the user device and querying it as PDDP [98] and our non-tracking web analytics
system. The biggest difference is that SplitX utilizes a more efficient encryption scheme
instead of public key cryptography: XOR-encryption. After receiving the queries from
the aggregator, the clients execute them over their local data and encrypt their answers
with a fresh, randomly generated key. Both the XOR-encrypted answer and the key are
then sent for aggregation to two non-colluding proxies, each proxy receiving one value
(see details in Section 4.7.1). The proxies manipulate the XOR-encrypted answers to add
differentially-private noise and forward the answers to the aggregator. The aggregator
then simply decrypts and counts the answers.
The XOR-encryption improves the scalability of the entire system, including the
aggregator. Although the addition of proxies may hinder the adoption of the system, it
can also be considered a second improvement: besides contributing to the scalability,
independently-run proxies also help the system to be more general. As a result, the
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system can be utilized not just for the web, but also for mobile applications. However,
the queries still need to have a list of pre-defined answer values attached, like PDDP
and our non-tracking web analytics system.
Common limitation. These systems are effective at eliminating third-party tracking
while still providing useful statistics to analysts (i.e., web publishers, application de-
velopers). However, there is a common limitation in all of them: they require a list of
pre-defined string values that are relevant to the user data in question. These string
values represent the counter names in piBox [128] and in Hardt et al.’s system [117],
such that the client software can update the correct counter value when necessary. In
PDDP [98] and SplitX [97] as well as in our system described in the previous chapter,
these string values correspond to the potential answer values (i.e., buckets) that accom-
pany the queries when they are distributed to the clients, such that the clients can pick
the most appropriate answer value after executing the queries.
Unfortunately, for many analytics scenarios (e.g., visited websites, search phrases,
photo tags), this task of enumerating potential string values can be difficult or impossible.
As a result, the applicability of these systems will be limited. The goal of the system
presented in this chapter is to address this limitation and complement these systems.
While we utilize a similar architecture like SplitX, our system does not require pre-
defined string values for its operation.
4.2 Contributions
Our system described in Chapter 3 was designed specifically for web analytics purposes
and used only existing entities. Other systems such as PDDP or SplitX, however, use
independent proxies. These proxies make them more general, such that other analysts,
such as mobile application developers, can also use the system.
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In this chapter, we present the design and evaluation of a system that allows these
analysts (e.g., web publishers, application developers) to discover previously unknown
string values that are present in client databases, but are difficult to enumerate. The
string values can be of arbitrary size without requiring any system or protocol changes.
Similar to our system in Chapter 3 as well as previous approaches [97, 98], the user
data in our system resides at each user’s own device running a client program. The client
periodically participates in string discovery procedures by submitting its encrypted
strings for aggregation. These strings, while still encrypted, are then counted by the
entity providing the discovery service (i.e., the aggregator) and the two proxies. Strings
with a (noisy) count above a discovery threshold t are then decrypted and provided to
the analysts.
The aggregator and the proxies follow the protocol and do not collude with each other
while running their operation. In this regard, they can be considered honest-but-curious.
However, in our system, we allow these server components to run fake clients, because
such actions may not be easily detected. We name this stronger adversary model as
‘honest-but-curious with Sybils’ (HbCwS). Our system has mechanisms to raise the bar
for such adversaries and make their attempts at violating user privacy difficult.
The first challenge we face in designing such a system is to support a diverse set of
client devices present in large-scale distributed environments like the web. To support
even the client devices with limited computation and bandwidth resources, we employ
a low-cost form of encryption (XOR), similar to SplitX [97]. Unlike SplitX, however, we
do not rely on pre-defined string values.
To decide if a string value should be discovered, we need to count the number of
clients with that value. The key challenge here is to count the clients without revealing
their strings. In other words, we need to count the instances of a string value while the
strings are still XOR-encrypted. To achieve this goal, we design a blind comparison
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method to distinguish encrypted strings, and count them without learning their values.
We again avoid expensive operations at the clients and servers using low-cost XOR and
hash operations.
Although this technique forces us to use pairwise comparisons resulting in O(n2)
complexity, where n is the number of encrypted strings, our system utilizes two op-
timization heuristics to lower this cost in practice without sacrificing privacy. These
optimizations take advantage of the assumed properties of the environment: the string
distributions are likely to follow a power law (i.e., a couple of string values dominate n)
and the number of possible string values is big.
Another challenge is to preserve the privacy of honest clients in the presence of
Sybil clients. Such clients can be operated by an adversary, including the aggregator
and the proxies, to artificially inflate string counts without being detected. As a result,
low-cost options, such as clients sharing a secret with one server component to obfuscate
their strings while another server component counts obfuscated strings [99], cannot be
employed: the second component can learn the secret using fake clients and deduce
the existence of clients with rare strings by pre-computing obfuscated values. Our
design incorporates a noisy threshold technique to increase the difficulty of launching
such attempts with Sybil clients on violating privacy.
We also need to prevent clients from manipulating encrypted string counts arbitrarily
by sending the same string multiple times. Such malicious clients may want to reduce
the utility of the results or act as Sybil clients to violate the privacy of honest clients. An
environment such as the web contains millions of clients, which cannot be generally
trusted to provide correct data and may have limited resources so that more sophisticated
techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs [114] cannot be employed. As a result,
effectively addressing the issue of manipulated counts becomes critical to the benefits of
the analytics data. We describe the design of a duplicate detection mechanism that deals
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with this issue without increasing the computational and bandwidth load on honest
clients.
To increase our confidence in our system’s privacy properties, we formally model
and analyze many aspects of our system using ProVerif [48]. In the situations where
ProVerif cannot be used, we informally reason about our system’s privacy properties. We
demonstrate our system’s feasibility using real-world datasets: website popularity from
Quantcast [51] and search phrases from a large search engine. Our system causes several
orders of magnitude less client computation overhead and reduces server computation
overhead by at least two times compared to the closest system [83].
4.3 Definitions & Components
Before we describe our goals and assumptions, we define the following terms: A string is
a text value present at the user’s device. Some examples are ‘google.com’, ‘pizza nearby’
and ‘spring in Paris’. A string type is the class of the string. The string ‘google.com’
may have type ‘visited websites’. Similarly, ‘pizza nearby’ may be a ‘search phrase’
and ‘spring in Paris’ may be a ‘photo tag’. A generic string type may be useful to
many analysts (e.g., ‘visited websites’, ‘search phrases’). An analyst-specific string type
may be useful to one or a few analysts (e.g., ‘photo tags in Instagram’). The discovery
threshold t is the value that the noisy count of the number of clients with a given string
must pass for the string value to be discovered.
There are three types of components in our system: client, aggregator, and proxies.
Clients and the aggregator already exist in today’s aggregation infrastructure. Proxies
have been widely proposed for privacy purposes [83, 97, 98, 116, 117], and we also adopt
this approach.
The client is a piece of software that stores user data (i.e., strings, string types) locally,
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similar to our system described in Chapter 3 and other systems [97, 98]. The client
participates in discovery procedures by sending its encrypted strings. Note that the
browser or mobile OS already sees user data.
The aggregator provides the string discovery service, which reports previously un-
known strings and their noisy counts. Analysts may express their interest in learning
strings of a string type. For example, an analyst may be interested in learning the search
phrases users are using or websites users are visiting. These string values can then
be used by the analysts to query distributed user data with other systems [97, 98] as
well as with our system described in Chapter 3. The aggregator handles all interactions
with the analysts, and controls access to the discovered strings (e.g., shares strings of an
analyst-specific type only with that analyst).
The proxies provide clients with network anonymity, and enable the aggregation of
encrypted user data and discovery of strings. They also help the aggregator limit the
effect of malicious clients can have on string counts.
4.4 Goals
4.4.1 Privacy Goals
Our main privacy goal is to only learn string values that are reported by a sufficient
number of clients, such that the count passes a threshold t supplied by the analyst while
the aggregator enforces a minimum value for t. The discovery threshold t is defined as
the value that the noisy count of the number of clients with a given string must pass, so
that .
Our reasoning for this goal is two-fold: From a client’s perspective, rare strings
shared by few clients may leak privacy, and thus, should not be discovered. For instance,
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the tag ‘Alec Finmeier getting drunk’ is rarer than ‘my birthday’, and can leak a client’s
identity. From an analyst’s perspective, the discovered strings may be more useful if
shared by a relatively large client population. In our photo app example, the analyst
(i.e., the developer) may only be interested in tags used by many clients. Thus, our goal
is to count client strings without revealing them: any string value with fewer clients than a
discovery threshold (t) should not be revealed to any component with high probability.
A fixed threshold, however, is not enough: to expose a rare string, an adversary (e.g.,
a component) can artificially inflate the count by creating t-1 Sybil clients. To prevent
such attempts, our system should operate with noisy counts, and ensure that a string’s
noise-free count cannot be learned by a single component. In other words, the total noise
value should be unknown to a single component.1
Additionally, the participation of the clients should be anonymous, such that given a
string value or type, no component should be able to associate it with a client. It should
also be unlinkable to prevent anonymous profiling of clients, such that given two string
values or types, no component should be able to tell if they are from the same client. In
addition, a discovered string should not reveal any information about any other string.
For example, guessing a common string value should not leak any information about
any other string.
Privacy Non-goals. Our non-tracking analytics system as well as many previous privacy-
preserving analytics systems [97, 98, 117, 128] use differential privacy (DP) [102, 103]
mechanisms to add noise to results. These systems provide users with some levels of
formal DP guarantees. Unfortunately, using DP in environments like the web requires
some relaxation for practicality [81, 97, 98]: there is no hard limit on how many times a
client participates in the system (i.e., no budget). Like these systems, we do not enforce a
budget, but use DP mechanisms (i.e., Laplace noise) to add noise to string counts. While
1Absent collusion among components (see Section 4.5 for details).
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the clients in our system still record the  values to track the theoretical privacy loss, we
do not aim to provide users with DP guarantees. Although we wish to provide such
formal guarantees, we think our goals and assumptions about the environment (i.e., the
string distributions are likely to follow power law and the number of possible string
values is big) align well for privacy-preserving discovery of unknown strings in practice.
4.4.2 Functionality Goals
Our main functionality goal is to help analysts by discovering unknown strings and
reporting their noisy counts. Our system should scale well, both on the client and server
sides. The client operations should not incur much overhead to support even the most
resource-constrained devices (e.g., smartphones). To scale to potentially millions of
clients with hundreds of millions of strings, server operations should also be fast. Finally,
our system should limit a malicious client’s effect on counts: a manipulated count can
reduce the utility analysts obtain from the discovery and cause the discovery threshold
to be ineffective.
4.5 Assumptions
In this section, we describe our assumptions for our system. Next, we describe similar-
ities and differences between our system and SplitX [97], a high-performance private
analytics system. Afterwards, we summarize our assumptions about the components in
our system. These assumptions are not much different from SplitX. Finally, we list the
assumptions about the string values that we want to discover.
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4.5.1 SplitX
Our system is complementary to SplitX, but operates in a similar setting. In our design,
we take advantage of the proxies that were introduced by SplitX and are required for its
operation. We utilize the same XOR-encryption technique to support the client devices
even with limited computation and bandwidth resources. However, unlike SplitX, our
system does not rely on pre-defined string values for its operation and complements it
by discovering unknown strings as potential answer values.
4.5.2 Client
The client typically runs on a user device, but may also run on another trusted platform.
As we did previously and similar to previous systems [97, 98], we assume that the user
trusts the client to protect the data it stores and regarding its operation, just as users
trust their browsers for certificate handling and TLS connections.2 A client can, however,
be malicious and send the same string multiple times to try skewing its count.
4.5.3 Aggregator & Proxies
We assume that the proxies and the aggregator are honest-but-curious with Sybils
(HbCwS): they follow the protocol, and do not collude with each other. However, each
component may run fake clients to try to link/deanonymize other client strings.
Although our model is weaker than a more general model (i.e., arbitrarily malicious
aggregator and proxies), we think that it reflects the reality on the Internet: The aggrega-
tor operates a business by providing string discovery service for analysts. The proxies can
be operated by independent companies and/or privacy watchdogs. All of these entities
would put their non-collusion statement in their privacy policies, making them legally
2We do not protect against malware infections on user devices.
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liable. Moreover, any entity not following the protocol would risk losing reputation and
customers. Previous systems make similar assumptions [81, 83, 97, 98, 101, 116, 117].
Finally, we assume the aggregator and proxies are not impersonated, and all end-to-
end connections use TLS (i.e., no eavesdropping and no in-flight modifications).
4.5.4 String Values
We make the following two assumptions about the string values present at the client
databases. First, we assume that the number of possible string values is big, such that an
exhaustive enumeration of these values is very difficult. In fact, the main purpose of
our discovery system is to handle analytics scenarios in which such an enumeration is
difficult or impossible.
Second, we assume that the string distributions follow power law like many natural
phenomena. As a result, we assume that a relatively small number of different string
values will be present at a large portion of clients. As we show in Section 4.12.2, our
real-world data about website popularity and search phrases support this assumption.
4.6 System Overview
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of our system. The aggregator periodically runs string
discovery procedures. Clients periodically poll the aggregator with their string types
(step 1 in Figure 4.1). These polls are XOR-encrypted and sent via the proxies to provide
clients with anonymity and unlinkability: The aggregator cannot associate clients with
string types, and cannot tell if any two requests are from the same client. Meanwhile,
the encryption prevents proxies from learning clients’ string types.
After receiving a poll request for a string type, the aggregator sends the associated
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Figure 4.1: Overview of our system’s operation.
(XOR-encrypted) string discovery parameters to the client via the proxies (step 2).
The parameters include the  value for Laplace noise and the discovery epoch that is
used to synchronize the start and end times of discovery procedures for many string
types. This synchronization serves as a checkpoint for the duplicate detection to limit
malicious clients and helps the aggregator to group multiple string types together during
aggregation, such that an adversary cannot deduce a client’s string type just from the
participation.
After getting the parameters, the client retrieves the strings belonging to the string
type from its local database. The client then XOR-encrypts each distinct string with a
separate, one-time key before sending it for aggregation (step 3).
During the aggregation step, our system utilizes a low-cost comparison method
that only reveals if any two XOR-encrypted strings are equal. With this method, our
system counts distinct strings, adds noise to their counts, and applies the discovery
threshold—all without learning the actual string values. Strings whose noisy counts
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pass the threshold are then decrypted (step 4), and the aggregator reports them with
their noisy counts to the analysts.
We employ two proxies, such that each proxy concurrently compares and counts
the distinct strings of roughly half the clients, and independently adds noise to their
counts. Consequently, the total noise added to a string count is unknown to any single
component.
If implemented naı¨vely, the above protocol requires O(n2) comparisons to count n
client strings. Each individual comparison is low-cost (i.e., XOR and hash), but the
total can be prohibitive. We use two optimizations to lower this cost without violating
our privacy goals in practice. Our optimizations exploit the properties of the assumed
environment: First, the number of possible string values is big, such that an exhaustive
enumeration of these values is very difficult. Second, the string distributions are likely
to follow a power law like many natural phenomena.
With these optimizations, our system reduces the server computation overhead
compared to the closest system [83], but increases bandwidth usage between the server
components. Although the load for servers can be distributed, clients may be running
on mobile, resource-constrained devices and become the bottleneck. With the increasing
prevalence of these devices, supporting them becomes vital for scalability. We achieve
this goal using low-cost primitives, which provide several orders of magnitude less
computation overhead at the clients as well as support limited client bandwidth. By
contrast, server bandwidth is less critical. For instance, data outgoing from EC2 is about
$0.09/GB up to 40TB, and even free when incoming [5]. Our system essentially trades
off cheap server bandwidth for low client computation and bandwidth overhead.
A malicious client can try to exploit our system’s anonymity and unlinkability prop-
erties to skew a string’s count by sending it multiple times. Our system checks for such
duplicates, potentially reported by any client, before counting strings. We utilize the
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Figure 4.2: Splitting and joining. S is split to X and R. They are sent with the same sid
via two relays.
same low-cost, blind comparison method mentioned above, and detect malicious clients
without violating the privacy of honest clients.
4.7 Building Blocks
Here, we describe the low-cost XOR-encryption, our blind comparison method to deter-
mine the equality of two XOR-encrypted strings without revealing their values, and our
noisy threshold mechanism to deal with Sybil clients. Section 4.8 presents our design
details.
4.7.1 XOR-Encryption: Split & Join
Our system uses XOR as its crypto primitive like SplitX [97]. Splitting is equivalent to
encryption, and joining is equivalent to decryption. These operations enable a source
to anonymously send a string to a destination via two different, non-colluding relays.
The relays do not learn the string value due to the encryption. Meanwhile, the crypto
operations for the source and destination are low-cost (Figure 4.2).
To send a string S to a destination, the source splits S to obtain two split messages, X
and R. Let L be the length of S . The source first generates a random, one-time key R of
length L using a secure, one-time seed and a secure hash function H (e.g., SHA-2). Let hi
and || denote the output of the hash operation at the ith iteration and the concatenation
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operator, respectively. The source starts hashing the seed and then applies the hash
function to the output of the previous iteration until the desired length L is reached:
h1 = H(seed)
h2 = H(h1)
h3 = H(h2)
...
R = h1||h2||h3||...
The source then encrypts S with R:
X = S ⊕ R
The source also generates a split identifier sid, a large random number (e.g., 128 bits)
to ensure the two split messages will be uniquely paired by the destination with high
probability. The source then sends X and R to the relays, who forward them to the
destination:
S ource→ Relay1 → Destination : sid, X
Source→ Relay2 → Destination : sid,R
Borrowing notation from [97], we denote the split message pair {X,R} as S (underlined
S ), and write:
S ource
Relay1−−−−→
Relay2
Destination : S
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The destination joins the split messages to obtain S :
S = X ⊕ R
For efficiency, the source can send the 〈seed, L〉 tuple instead of R, and let the destination
generate R.
4.7.2 Blind Comparison via pairwise-XOR and hash (PXH)
To count distinct string values without revealing them, our system uses a blind compari-
son method to determine the equality of any two XOR-encrypted strings. Consider two
strings S i and S j with split message pairs {Xi,Ri} and {X j,R j}, and split identifiers sidi
and sid j, respectively. Recall that the split messages are held by two relays (i.e., Xi and
X j by Relay1, and Ri and R j by Relay2). Let H be a secure hash function (e.g., SHA-2).
For each relay, we define the pairwise-XOR hash (PXH) operation as:
PXHRelay1(sidi, sid j) = H(Xi ⊕ X j)
PXHRelay2(sidi, sid j) = H(Ri ⊕ R j)
Recall that Xi = S i ⊕ Ri and X j = S j ⊕ R j. Therefore:
PXHRelay1(sidi, sid j) = H((S i ⊕ Ri) ⊕ (S j ⊕ R j))
PXHRelay2(sidi, sid j) = H(Ri ⊕ R j)
If S i = S j, then PXHRelay1 = PXHRelay2 = H(Ri⊕R j). By comparing PXHRelay1 and PXHRelay2 ,
our system can blindly determine if the original strings S i and S j are equal. Compared
to just using the pairwise-XOR value, the secure hash ensures that one string cannot be
reverse-engineered, even when strings are unequal and the other string is easily guessed
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(e.g., a common string).
Note that the X values of different strings must be held by the same relay (i.e., either
Relay1 or Relay2). Otherwise, equal strings will not cancel out when the PXH operation
is applied.
4.7.3 Noisy Threshold
Our system only decrypts strings whose noisy counts pass the discovery threshold t.
We use Laplace noise, which is also used by differential privacy [102, 103, 105]. Adding
Laplace noise to the output of a computation achieves the property that the probability
of the computation producing a given output is almost independent of the existence of
any individual record in the dataset the computation uses. In our setting, this property
suggests the following: If there is a string with t-1 Sybils, the probability of the string
being discovered (and decrypted) is almost independent of any honest client with that
string value. In other words, whether a real client with that string value exists does not
significantly affect its discovery.
4.8 Design
This section presents our protocol’s details. First, the client receives the string discovery
parameters (Section 4.8.1). Encrypted strings are then collected from the clients (Section
4.8.2). Afterwards, encrypted strings are blindly compared and counted (Section 4.8.3).
Finally, noise is added to the counts (Section 4.8.4).
During these phases, there are three separate roles each component can perform:
relaying, collecting, and comparing (separated by the vertical, dashed lines in Figure
4.3). The aggregator assumes only the collecting role, whereas the proxies assume all
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Figure 4.3: Mirror operation 1 in our privacy-preserving string discovery system. The
vertical, dashed lines separate the three roles. The arrows labeled with section numbers
show the direction of information flow.
three roles (but not on the same data at the same time). Both proxies assume the relaying
role between the clients and the aggregator.
To ensure no single component knows the total noise added to a string count, our
system employs two proxies: each proxy compares and counts encrypted strings of about
half the clients, and independently adds noise, which we refer as “mirror operations”.
For clarity, we present mirror operation 1 where Proxy2 makes the comparison (Figure
4.3). We then describe how mirror operations enable us to obliviously add noise to counts
(Section 4.8.4).
4.8.1 Initializing String Discovery
The client periodically polls the aggregator and receives string discovery parameters (SDP)
for string types (ST ) present in its local database (Figure 4.4). The polling mechanism
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Figure 4.4: Initializing string discovery.
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Figure 4.5: Collecting encrypted strings.
is similar to SplitX [97]. For each ST , the client creates a separate request, splits it, and
sends it to the aggregator using the proxies as relays:
C
P1−−→
P2
A : ST
The aggregator splits the string discovery parameters associated with ST and sends
them back via the proxies:
A
P1−−→
P2
C : SDP
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Figure 4.6: Counting and revealing strings.
The client joins the split messages to obtain the SDP, which contains  and DTEnd. 
is the privacy parameter to add noise to string counts. DTEnd is the discovery end time
(i.e., when no more strings are accepted). Discovery procedures are run in epochs: their
start and end times are synchronized. A discovery spans only one epoch, but can be
repeated. The aggregator can optionally add a list of hashes of previously discovered
strings, such that clients only send undiscovered strings. If there is no discovery for a
string type in the current epoch, SDP will be empty.
4.8.2 Collecting Encrypted Strings
To track the theoretical privacy loss (i.e., not enforcing the privacy budget), the client
records the  value from the aggregator. It then retrieves all strings of type ST from its
local database. For each distinct string S , the client creates a split message pair {X,R}
and a split identifier sid. These values will be sent to the collecting components: the
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aggregator will receive sid, R and ST while Proxy1 will receive sid and X. The aggregator
will use the ST value to group encrypted client strings into comparison lists (Section
4.8.3). In an epoch, the client participates only in one randomly selected mirror operation
(i.e., it uses the same collecting components).
Figure 4.5 shows the collection process. To prevent the aggregator from linking a
client with a particular ST value, the client concatenates, splits, and sends the sid, R and
ST values to the aggregator via both proxies:
C
P1−→
P2
A : sid||R||ST (4.1)
The aggregator joins the split messages to obtain the sid, R and ST . To anonymously
send sid and X to Proxy1, the client uses Proxy2 as a relay: Proxy2 assigns each client a
temporary pseudo IP address pIP (i.e., valid only for the current epoch), and forwards sid,
X and pIP to Proxy1:
C → P2 : sid, X (4.2)
P2 → P1 : sid, X, pIP (4.3)
The pIP values mark (encrypted) strings from the same client for duplicate detection
(Section 4.10).
4.8.3 Blindly Comparing & Counting Strings
At this point, each collecting component in Figure 4.3 (Proxy1 and the aggregator)
has one split message of the XOR-encrypted strings and associated sid values. They
exchange sid sets and discard unpaired split messages before proceeding with the blind
comparison and counting.
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Blind Comparison. As explained in Section 4.7.2, the blind comparison involves the
computation and comparison of pairwise-XOR hash values (PXHP1 and PXHA) for each
possible 〈sidi, sid j〉 tuple. The strings are not revealed during the comparison; however,
if they are equal, knowledge about one string can be used to infer the other.
Neither collecting component is suited to make the blind comparison, because they
are assumed to operate fake clients sending known strings. These strings can be identi-
fied (e.g., via their sid values), and the comparison result with an unknown string can be
exploited. For this reason, the comparison is performed by Proxy2.
Proxy1 and the aggregator share a random, temporary secret Rs (i.e., valid for one
epoch). They overwrite the sid values as sid′i = H(sidi||Rs), where H is a secure hash
function (e.g., SHA-2),3 and compute the PXH values as:
P1 : PXH′P1(sid
′
i , sid
′
j) = H((Xi ⊕ X j) ⊕ Rs)
A : PXH′A(sid
′
i , sid
′
j) = H((Ri ⊕ R j) ⊕ Rs)
This modification of PXH values does not affect the comparison result, but ensures that
Proxy2 cannot reverse-engineer the sid values by using the fixed PXH value of any two
known R or X values sent by its fake clients.
Blind Counting. Figure 4.6 shows the process to count the encrypted strings. The aggre-
gator first groups the sid′ values into comparison lists (CLs). A comparison list consists of
either a generic string type (e.g., ‘websites’), or multiple different analyst-specific string
types (e.g., ‘photo tags’ and ‘health app tags’). This mixing of multiple analyst-specific
string types provides clients with additional privacy properties regarding their string
3Alternatively, they can agree on a shuffled mapping of sid values to location pointers, and use them (lp′i
instead of sid′i ).
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types. Each list is then sent to Proxy1 (step 1):
A→ P1 : CL1, · · · ,CLm
As described above, Proxy1 and the aggregator compute PXH′ values for each possi-
ble 〈sid′i , sid′j〉 tuple in each comparison list CLk, with 〈sid′i , sid′j〉 tuples as identifiers.4 Let
PXHL′P1,k and PXHL
′
A,k represent the list of PXH
′
P1
and PXH′A values for CLk computed
at Proxy1 and the aggregator, respectively. These lists are sent to Proxy2. The aggregator
also sends the k values (step 2):
P1 → P2 : PXHL′P1,1, · · · , PXHL′P1,m
A→ P2 : PXHL′A,1, · · · , PXHL′A,m, 1, · · · , m
For each PXHL′, Proxy2 determines the equality of the encrypted strings for each
tuple by comparing PXH′P1 and PXH
′
A values, and creates equality lists: if strings with
sid′i and sid
′
j are equal, they are put in the same list. From each equality list ELi, Proxy2
randomly selects a sid′ value as a representative string, and records it with the count of
equal strings in the list.
Proxy2 then adds Laplace noise to each count using the  value of the corresponding
PXHL′, and discards the representative sid′ values whose noisy counts are below the
discovery threshold (step 3). Let ci be the noisy count of the representative sid′i of ELi.
Proxy2 sends each sid′i and ci to the aggregator, but only sid
′
i to Proxy1 (step 4):
P2 → A : {〈sid′1, c1〉, · · · , 〈sid′i , ci〉, · · · , 〈sid′n, cn〉}
P2 → P1 : {sid′1, · · · , sid′i , · · · , sid′n}
4Or they can use the 〈lp′i , lp′j〉 tuples as identifiers.
107
Proxy1 then sends the split messages (i.e., X values) of the corresponding strings to the
aggregator (step 5):
P1 → A : {sid′1, X1, · · · , sid′i , Xi, · · · , sid′n, Xn}
The aggregator joins the locally held Ri and matching Xi for each sid′i to obtain the
discovered string values.
4.8.4 Mirror Operation & Oblivious Noise
We described the mirror operation 1 in Figure 4.7, in which Proxy2 performs the com-
parison task. For roughly half the clients, Proxy1 makes the comparison (i.e., mirror
operation 2). Both proxies independently count, add noise to the count, filter strings
lower than the discovery threshold t, and send them to the aggregator.
The mirror operations are mostly concurrent, except for two times requiring inter-
action: First, the duplicate detection (Section 4.10) requires synchronization between
the proxies that relay X values (i.e., Proxy2 in mirror operation 1 and Proxy1 in mirror
operation 2). Second, the comparing proxies send independently discovered strings to
the aggregator at the end of the counting phase (Section 4.8.3).
It is possible that the aggregator receives a particular string value and its count only
from one proxy (e.g., Proxy2). If this count is published, Proxy2 can associate the count
with the string, and subtract the noise it added to get the string’s noise-free count. If the
aggregator adds its own noise and publishes the total, the total count can still indicate
that the threshold was passed at only one proxy (i.e., if the total is less than twice the
threshold). Proxy2 could then use the ranking of the counts it reported, associate them
with the strings (or eliminate most), and obtain the noise-free counts by removing its
noise.
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Figure 4.7: Complete system for privacy-preserving string discovery. The horizontal,
dashed line separates the mirror operations. Components in duplicate detection are
shown within the rectangular shape.
For this reason, the aggregator only publishes a string value if it is received from both
proxies. That means, that the string value has passed the discovery threshold on both
proxies. The aggregator then publishes the sum of both noisy counts (i.e., double-noisy
count). The double-noisy count prevents the proxies from obtaining a string’s noise-free
count: even if a proxy somehow removes its own noise, the count will still contain the
other proxy’s noise.
Note that even the aggregator cannot learn a string value that did not pass the
discovery threshold: if the aggregator received the string value, the string’s noisy count
must have passed the discovery threshold on at least one proxy.
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4.8.5 Other Details
To prevent timing correlations, the proxies randomly order and delay split messages
before relaying. The string length and the number of strings a client sends are selected
from a well-known list (e.g., 50, 100) and can be parameters in the initialization based
on the string type. Short strings are padded deterministically (e.g., with hash of string)
before splitting. If a client has more strings, it randomly selects which strings to send. If
not, it sends random filler strings with a modified string type (e.g., “tags FS”), which are
filtered by the aggregator. The client prepends the type to the string, distinguishing two
analyst-specific strings even when the actual string values are the same.
4.9 Optimizations
Here, we present ways to reduce the total computation cost of comparisons without
compromising our privacy goals in practice.
4.9.1 Sample-Identify-Count-Filter (SICF)
One heuristic is to use random samples to find strings with large counts and filter them.
The high-level intuition is that, like many natural phenomena, the string distributions
will show power law characteristics, and a few common strings will dominate in the
comparison list. These strings can be identified with a small random sample, and strings
equal to them can be filtered to shorten the list.
Figure 4.8 shows one iteration in mirror operation 1: The collecting components
(Proxy1 and the aggregator) first send the comparison list (CL′) with modified sid values
to the comparing component (Proxy2) (step 1). Proxy2 selects a random sample (S ) (step
2), and sends it to Proxy1 and the aggregator (step 3), who compute and send back PXH′
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values for the strings in S (step 4). Proxy2 then identifies the distinct (encrypted) strings
in S , and selects one representative sid′ value from each of the longest p equality lists in
the sample (i.e., most common p distinct strings) (step 5). These sid′ values are sent to
Proxy1 and the aggregator (step 6), who compute PXH′ values for these p strings with
all other strings in the CL′ and send them to Proxy2 (step 7). Proxy2 counts and stores
sid′ values of all strings equal to each of these p strings (step 8), and sends the entire list
of equal sid′ values to Proxy1 and the aggregator (step 9), who then filter them from the
CL′ (step 10).
This process can continue iteratively until 1) enough strings are discovered, or 2)
Proxy2 does not discover any new strings in step 8. When stopped, most common
strings will have already been discovered. Some strings above the threshold may go
undiscovered, but the probability of this event should decrease with bigger samples.
4.9.2 Short Hashes
Another heuristic is to distinguish strings before collection. The high-level idea is that
the strings deemed different will not need to be pairwise compared. To achieve this task
without compromising privacy, we let the clients map each of their strings into a bucket
(B), using a hash function mapping to a small number of buckets (e.g., SHA-1 (mod 128)).
The clients send each string’s B value with its string type ST to the aggregator, who
compiles the comparison lists with the distinct 〈ST, B〉 tuples: each list will be shorter,
requiring fewer PXH operations in total.
The aggregator starts with one bucket and samples the encrypted strings. After the
sampled strings are pairwise compared, the number of distinct strings will give the
aggregator an idea on how many distinct strings to expect. The sample size can be
increased for confidence. The aggregator then starts a new discovery with the decided
number of buckets, and clients send their strings with their B values. Clients and
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Figure 4.8: Overview of our SICF heuristic.
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watchdogs can set a maximum value for the number of buckets allowed (e.g., ≤128).
4.10 Detecting Duplicates
Our system detects malicious clients before counting the encrypted strings. Figure 4.7
shows a rectangular shape around the components involved in this phase. The high-
level idea is to run the blind comparison protocol described in Section 4.8.3, but this
time among all strings from a given client: equal strings will be duplicates, indicating a
malicious client without revealing any strings.
We again describe mirror operation 1 for clarity. Recall that the client uses Proxy2 as
a relay for sending X values to Proxy1 (Figure 4.5). Proxy2 attaches a pseudo IP address
(pIP) for each client IP address. Our protocol leverages these pIP values, and works in
two stages.
Stage 1: The relaying Proxy2 in mirror operation 1 and the relaying Proxy1 in mirror
operation 2 exchange real client IP addresses (left ‘Sync’ in Figure 4.7). If each client
followed the protocol and participated in only one mirror operation in the current
discovery epoch, the intersection of the lists will be empty. If not, the clients with IP
addresses present in both lists might have sent a string multiple times. These clients’
strings are invalidated by sending their pIP values to the respective collecting component
(e.g., Proxy1 in mirror operation 1), who then discards the associated X values.
Stage 2: After the invalidation, the collecting components (Proxy1 and the aggregator)
share another temporary, random secret Rsdd (upper-right ‘Sync’ in Figure 4.7). Using
this secret, they overwrite the sid values (e.g., sid′i = H(sidi||Rsdd)).5
Proxy1 then independently modifies the pIP values and gets a pIP↔ pIP′ mapping
to prevent Proxy2 from linking the strings to the pIP values it assigned while relaying
5Or a different shuffled mapping for location pointers.
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client strings. For each pIP′, Proxy1 sends the list of sid′ values, sidL′, to Proxy2:
P1 → P2 : pIP′1, sidL′1, ..., pIP′v, sidL′v
The aggregator also independently modifies the actual string types to obtain an
ST ↔ ST ′ mapping. Multiple analyst-specific string types are mixed into one list for
better privacy (i.e., multiple STs corresponding to the same ST ′). Analyst-specific
strings can still be compared safely, because the ST is prepended to the string (Section
4.8.5). For each ST ′, the aggregator sends the list of sid′ values to Proxy2:
A→ P2 : ST ′1, sidL′1, ..., ST ′t , sidL′t
Using both pIP′ → sidL′ and ST ′ → sidL′ mappings, Proxy2 divides the sid′ values
into groups. For Proxy1, each group GP1,i corresponds to a unique 〈pIP′, ST ′〉 tuple. For
the aggregator, each group GA,i corresponds to multiple (e.g., 20) pIP′ values with the
same ST ′.
These groups are then sent to Proxy1 and the aggregator:
P2 → P1 : GP1,1,GP1,2, ...,GP1,n
P2 → A : GA,1,GA,2, ...,GA,n
Note that, even though Proxy2 knows which unique tuples correspond to which groups,
these tuple identifiers are not sent.
Proxy1 and the aggregator compute the PXH′ values using Rsdd for every possible
〈sid′i , sid′j〉 tuple in their respective groups, and send them to Proxy2. Proxy2 checks for
equal strings belonging to the same pIP′ value using the pIP′ → sidL′ lists. Recall that
multiple pIP′ values with the same ST ′ value are grouped together for the aggregator.
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Using the pIP′ → sidL′ lists, Proxy2 can identify the PXH′ values that are redundantly
computed by the aggregator and discard them, without affecting the duplicate detection.
This redundancy ensures that the aggregator cannot anonymously profile a client with
these string values, even if they are selected as representative strings by Proxy2 at the
end of the counting phase (Section 4.8.3), who cannot tell if they are from the same client
or not.
Proxy2 then sends the sid′ values of these equal strings to the aggregator. In the
counting phase, the aggregator independently modifies the PXH′A values involving the
duplicates with a random value rather than Rs, such that the blind comparison of the
duplicates with other strings will yield ‘not equal’ and does not affect any counts.
NATs. Many clients may operate behind the same IP address (e.g., home/business
gateways), making some duplicates legitimate. To decrease the bias caused by removing
these duplicates, some randomly selected duplicates can be included based on the
aggregator’s policy.
4.11 Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis of our system. Our goal is to increase our
confidence in our system’s privacy properties. To this end, we formally modeled our
protocol in applied-pi calculus [74] and verified our model using ProVerif [48]. We state
our model’s limitations and how these limitations might affect our verification results.
For the parts we cannot model, we present an informal analysis and reason about why
our system still achieves its privacy goals.
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Table 4.1: Process grammar in applied pi calculus.
P,Q := processes
0 null process
P|Q parallel composition
!P replication
new n : t; P name restriction
if M then P else Q conditional
let x = M in P else Q term evaluation
in(M,x:t); P message input
out(M,N); P message output
R(M1, ...,Mk) macro usage
4.11.1 Tools
Before we present the primitives used in our system and their equivalents in our formal
model, we describe the formal tools we use to model our system.
4.11.1.1 Applied Pi Calculus
The pi calculus [134] is a language that is used to formally model distributed systems and
reason about their interactions. The applied pi calculus [74] is an extension of pi calculus
that is used to model and reason about cryptographic protocols. These distributed
systems are modeled as a collection of parallel processes that exchange messages using
channels.
Here, we describe some basics of the language (in conjunction with ProVerif) and how
it is used to model interactions among concurrently running components of a system.
The details of the language and how it is used in ProVerif can be found in the ProVerif
manual [48].
Processes. A process is used to model the logical actions of a component in the system.
The grammar to build processes is given in Table 4.1.
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type hash.
fun H(bitstring): hash.
Figure 4.9: An example of a constructor without a destructor: one-way hash function.
type key.
fun senc(bitstring, key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, k: key; sdec(senc(m,k),k) = m.
Figure 4.10: An example of a constructor with a destructor: symmetric encryption
Messages. Processes interact using messages. A message can be a name, a variable or
the output of a constructor, or a combination (i.e., tuples). A name (e.g., ‘string1’) is used
for atomic data. A variable (e.g., x) can be bound to a name or a message. Equivalence
of two messages can be learned by applying an equation of the form x = y.
Constructors/Destructors. A constructor is a function that can be applied to names,
variables and other messages. The corresponding destructor of a constructor ensures that
a message can only be reversed into its original content (i.e., name, variable, message), if
and only if the correct conditions are present. For example, one can model a secure, one-
way hash function as a constructor without a destructor. Because there is no destructor,
the output of this constructor cannot be reversed (Figure 4.9).
On the other hand, we can model the symmetric encryption senc with a destructor
sdec, such that it will only output m when the key used to decrypt (i.e., k) is the same
key used in the constructor senc (Figure 4.10).
Another way to model certain cryptographic primitives is to use equations. For
example, one can model the symmetric encryption/decryption above as equations that
capture the relationship between the constructors for all variables (Figure 4.11). Equa-
tions are less efficient than destructors, but are necessary to model certain cryptographic
primitives that require algebraic relations between terms. One example is the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement. Details of when to use constructors/destructors or equations
can be found in the ProVerif manual [48].
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type key.
fun senc(bitstring, key): bitstring.
fun sdec(bitstring, key): bitstring.
equation forall m: bitstring, k: key; sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m.
equation forall m: bitstring, k: key; senc(sdec(m, k), k) = m.
Figure 4.11: An example of a constructor with equations: symmetric encryption
Channels. Messages can be output and input on channels. Channels are asynchronized,
such that the messages sent on a channel can be received out of order. A message m
can be sent on a channel c using out(c,m). Similarly, it can be input from the channel
in(c, r), such that the variable r will be bound to the message received from channel c. If
the message m is a tuple of form (x, y), then the input action can be performed with a
conditional, such that the variable y will be bound to variable z in in(c, (= x2, z)) if and
only if x = x2.
ProVerif. ProVerif [48] is a tool for automated analysis of cryptographic protocols.
Distributed systems modeled in applied pi calculus can be automatically analyzed to
prove secrecy properties of these systems. ProVerif has been widely used in the literature
to analyze properties of various cryptographic protocols (see the ProVerif manual [48]
for a complete list).
ProVerif can perform reachability analysis of properties on an unbounded number
of instances of the protocol. To do so, ProVerif overapproximates the state space of the
protocol and explores it. As a result, when ProVerif claims that a property is true (i.e.,
no attack is possible), then it is true. In other words, ProVerif is sound. If ProVerif can
prove a property is false, it generates an attack trace on why the property is not true.
ProVerif provides use of private channels. These channels are especially useful for
modeling end-to-end encrypted channels between components, where the adversary is
assumed not to have access to the messages.
ProVerif Limitations. Although ProVerif is sound, it is not complete. That means,
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ProVerif may not be able prove that a property holds. If ProVerif cannot prove that the
property is neither true nor false, ProVerif states so.
Due to the overapproximation of the state space, it is possible that ProVerif finds
an attack, although there is no attack possibility. In these cases, the attack trace can be
investigated to confirm whether the attack is true or false.
As stated above, ProVerif performs the analysis with an unbounded number of
sessions of the protocol. However, the repetition of actions cannot be supported, because
repeated actions are translated into the same internal representation in ProVerif as non-
repeated actions. As a result, there is no method for counting how many instances of the
protocol ran until a point. This limitation prevents modeling of an adversary that might
delay its attack until only after a certain number of messages have been received.
ProVerif cannot model traffic analysis. Additionally, privacy properties based on the
‘hiding in the crowd’ principle cannot be modeled. Although a piece of information
may not be useful for a practical attack in a probabilistic sense, the mere fact that the
adversary has access to it will trigger ProVerif to generate an attack trace.
4.11.2 Modeling Primitives
In this section, we describe the primitives we use throughout our model. We also
state the limitations in the modeling of these primitives and how that might affect our
verification results.
4.11.2.1 XOR-encryption
Our system uses XOR as its crypto primitive like SplitX [97]. Splitting is equivalent to
encryption, and joining is equivalent to decryption. Recall that, in order to send a string
S to a destination, the source splits S to obtain two split messages, X and R. Let L be
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(* XOR-encryption and decryption *)
(* same as symmetric encryption/decryption *)
fun split(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
fun join(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
equation forall s: bitstring, r: bitstring; join(split(s, r), r) = s.
equation forall s: bitstring, r: bitstring; split(join(s, r), r) = s.
Figure 4.12: Formal definition of splitting and joining.
the length of S . The source first generates a one-time, random key R of length L and
encrypts S with R:
X = S ⊕ R
After receiving both split messages, the destination joins them to obtain S :
S = X ⊕ R
We model our split and join operations simply as symmetric encryption and decryp-
tion (Figure 4.12).
Limitations of our XOR modeling. The exclusive-OR (XOR) operation is commutative
and associative. In addition, equal strings cancel each other out when XORed together.
These properties cannot be modeled in ProVerif explicitly. As a result, certain attacks
making use of these properties cannot be explored by ProVerif.
Although the use of special channels (see Section 4.11.2.2 for details) allow us to work
around the lack of cancellation property of XOR, it also weakens the ProVerif attacker:
the attacker cannot arbitrarily XOR any two split messages it has access to and discover
potential secrets.
We acknowledge these weaknesses in our model, but also point out that our protocol
does not trust any one component to have both split messages before and during the
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(* special type for the PXH result *)
type PXH.
(* comparison operations are irreversible because of the secure hash *)
(* therefore, they have no destructors *)
(* PXH operations for aggregator and proxy1 *)
fun computePXH(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring): PXH.
(* PXH operations with no secret *)
(* the following operation is only used to demonstrate the *)
(* ’known R values’ attack by the adversary at proxy2 *)
fun computeKnownPXH (bitstring, bitstring): PXH.
Figure 4.13: Formal definition of the PXH operation. The third parameter is the secret
shared between the collecting components (i.e., in our description, Proxy1 and the
aggregator).
discovery (i.e., X values are held by Proxy1 and R values are held by the aggregator). As
a result, one component cannot obtain the original string values or string types before
the counts of the string values pass the noisy threshold. When there is no collusion
among these components, which we assume, the adversary cannot access both values at
the same time.
Furthermore, the R values are generated independently for each encrypted string:
XORing just any two split messages will not yield anything meaningful. This case is
similar to one component holding the random keys for symmetrically encrypted strings
and the other holding the encrypted strings.
4.11.2.2 Pairwise-XOR and Hash (PXH)
To count distinct string values without revealing them, our system uses the pairwise-
XOR and hash method to blindly determine the equality of any two XOR-encrypted
strings. The pairwise-XOR and hash (PXH) operation works by comparing the
PXHRelay1(sidi, sid j) and PXHRelay2(sidi, sid j) values for two strings, S i and S j, with sidi
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and sid j, respectively. Recall that:
PXHRelay1(sidi, sid j) = H(Xi ⊕ X j)
= H((S i ⊕ Ri) ⊕ (S j ⊕ R j))
PXHRelay2(sidi, sid j) = H(Ri ⊕ R j)
= H(Ri ⊕ R j)
If S i = S j, then PXHRelay1 = PXHRelay2 = H(Ri ⊕ R j), because equal strings will cancel out
during the XOR operation (i.e., before the secure hash).6 The formal definition of the
PXH operation can be found in Figure 4.13.
While our PXH operation is straightforward, modeling it using ProVerif is not: Equal
strings are supposed to cancel each other out; however, this functionality of XOR is not
supported in ProVerif. Although there has been work on how to reduce protocols that
use XOR semantics to a non-XOR version, such that ProVerif can be utilized [127], our
approach is much simpler.
To overcome this lack of functionality, we utilize two special channels (Figure 4.14).
We ensure that these channels are private (denoted as ‘[private]’ after the declaration in
Figure 4.14), and thus, not accessible to the adversary. These channels help us emulate
the ideal functionality of the PXH operation, in which equal strings cancel each other out.
These channels work as follows (Figure 4.15): Clients output their string values and split
identifiers (i.e., sid) to a channel (i.e., csid str map). The aggregator outputs the PXH
value of two encrypted strings along with the {sid, sid} tuple to another channel (i.e.,
cpxh sid sid map). The comparing proxy (in our model, Proxy2), uses the PXH value
to retrieve the original sid values of the strings from channel cpxh sid sid map. It then
uses the sid values to retrieve the original strings from csid str map and then compares
6In our description of mirror operation 1, these relays correspond to Proxy1 and the aggregator. Here,
we model the general PXH operation.
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(* private channels used to determine equality of strings *)
(* no XOR support for equal strings canceling each other out *)
free csid_str_map: channel [private].
free cpxh_sid_sid_map: channel [private].
Figure 4.14: Special channels to emulate the PXH comparison due to incomplete XOR-
functionality support in ProVerif. These channels are private (denoted as ‘[private]’ after
the declaration) and are inaccessible to the adversary.
(* client: process clientCollection *)
out(csid_str_map, (sidstr, str));
(* aggregator: process aggregatorComparison *)
out(cpxh_sid_sid_map, (pxhA, (sid1, sid2)));
(* comparing proxy (in this model, proxy2): process proxy2Counting *)
in(cpxh_sid_sid_map, (=pxhA, (sid1c: bitstring, sid2c: bitstring)));
in(csid_str_map, (=sid1c, str1c: bitstring));
in(csid_str_map, (=sid2c, str2c: bitstring));
Figure 4.15: Use of the special channels in each process.
their values. This way, we can emulate the cancellation property of XOR and determine
whether any two strings are equal.7.
Note that these channels are only used for the PXH comparison to determine the
equality of encrypted strings. Even if we place the adversary at Proxy2, our model
ensures that the adversary does not have access to these channels or to the variable
values obtained from these channels.
4.11.2.3 Noisy Threshold
Our model does not consider the threshold t and the noise that is added to the counts of
encrypted strings. This noise is essential to ensure that an adversary cannot make the
system reveal a string value whose count is artificially inflated (i.e., via fake clients) to
be above the threshold. For example, the adversary may run t − 1 fake clients and send
the string value in a discovery procedure in an attempt to make its count go above the
7The other collecting component (i.e., Proxy1) could also output the PXH values and the corresponding
(sid, sid) tuples, but outputting these values once is sufficient because they are only used as lookup keys.
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threshold to deduce the existence of a real client with that string value.
Unfortunately, we cannot use counts in ProVerif, such that we cannot model the
threshold nor the noise. Our protocol depends on the Laplace noise that is used by
differential privacy [102] to prevent this attack. According to Laplace noise as described
in Section 4.7.3, the existence of a real client with a string value does not significantly
affect the discovery of the string: The client may exist (i.e., the noise-free count is t) and
the noise may be negative, and thus, the string may not be discovered. On the other
hand, the client may not exist (i.e., the noise-free count is t-1) and the noise may be
positive, and thus, the string may be discovered. These two cases are indistinguishable.
For a pattern to emerge, the discovery procedure needs to be repeated multiple times.
The number of repetitions depends on the  value, with lower  values needing more
repetitions. The aggregator also can ask the clients not send already discovered strings
(Section 4.8.1), making the attack more difficult: the rare string from the real client will
not be sent again after the first discovery, increasing the time required for this attack
to succeed and making it impractical. High  values for low noise can be detected by
clients, watchdogs and proxies.
In our model, we abstract away the threshold and model the adversary’s end goal of
deducing the existence of a string by exploiting the comparison result. In our system,
this goal is only achievable by Proxy2, in which it may exploit the comparison result
between an unknown string and a known string sent by one of its fake clients. Our
ProVerif model then covers the cases, in which Proxy2 can identify these strings and
ensures that our protocol prevents this identification. We then reason about a case that
cannot be modeled in ProVerif and reason why it is not a problem in practice according
to our assumptions. As a result, the comparison result cannot be exploited by Proxy2
(Section 4.11.3.5).
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fun LINK(bitstring, bitstring): bool [private].
reduc forall a: bitstring, b: bitstring;
INFER_SYMMETRY(LINK(a, b)) = LINK(b, a).
reduc forall a: bitstring, b: bitstring, c: bitstring;
INFER_TRANSITIVITY(LINK(a,b), LINK(b,c)) = LINK(a,c).
Figure 4.16: Formal definition of linkability. The LINK function is private (denoted as
‘[private]’ after the declaration) and is inaccessible to the adversary. After receiving
the result of the explicit LINK function, the adversary can use the INFER SYMMETRY
and INFER TRANSITIVITY functions to link variables that may not have been linked
explicitly.
4.11.2.4 Datastores
We model a component’s datastores as private channels. These datastores enable us to
store the state of a component. We encode state information using messages and use the
channel as a key-value store. Similar to Koi [116], our lookup operation consists of two
parts. We first retrieve the message using the conditional lookup, which removes the
message from the private channel (cds) and binds the variable v to the value of key k with
the statement in(cds, (= k, v));. We then add the same message to the channel with the
statement out(cds, (k, v));. As a result, we can keep the state information of a component
in the channel, but can also perform operations according to the stored values.
4.11.2.5 Unlinkability
We model unlinkability in our system similar to Koi [116] (Figure 4.16). Any two vari-
ables that an adversarial component has access to at a single protocol step are explicitly
linked using the private LINK function (denoted as ‘[private]’ after the declaration
in Figure 4.16). The result of this function is made available to the adversary via the
spyAtt channel in the model (§4.11.3.1). We use the query functionality of ProVerif to see
whether the adversary has access to the explicit linking information about two variables.
The adversary can also use two public functions to infer the linkability of two
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fun EXISTS(bitstring): bool [private].
Figure 4.17: Formal definition of existence. This function is private (denoted as ‘[private]’
after the declaration) and is inaccessible to the adversary.
variables. The INFER SYMMETRY function models the symmetry property of the
LINK function: if the variable a is linked to b, then b is also linked to a. The IN-
FER TRANSITIVITY function models the transitivity property of the LINK function: if
a and b are linked to each other, and b and c are linked to each other, then a and c are
also linked. Note that a and c may not have been accessible by the adversary at a single
protocol step (e.g., collection of encrypted strings). The INFER TRANSITIVITY function
enables the adversary to infer linkability of such variables: a and b may be available at
the collection of encrypted strings, and b and c may be available at the comparison and
counting, and the adversary will still be able to link a and c together.
Alternative to this explicit LINK function, one can also make the LINK function
public. This approach essentially would allow the adversary to link any two variables
it has access to, without needing the INFER SYMMETRY and INFER TRANSITIVITY
functions to achieve the same linking information. However, this approach leads to the
adversary being able to link any two variables at any time of the protocol steps, leading
to many false attacks. For example, assume the adversary is Proxy1 and it runs its own
clients. These clients’ string types are naturally available to the adversary at Proxy1.
Proxy1 also interfaces with honest clients, such that their network address is available.
A public LINK function causes ProVerif to think that the adversary can link the honest
client’s address to the string type it knows from its own clients. As a result, many false
attacks are reported by ProVerif.
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4.11.2.6 Existence of a String
It is not possible to model counts in ProVerif. As a result, it is not straightforward to
model an attack, in which the adversary creates enough Sybil clients and uses them to
artificially inflate a string’s count. This inflated count can then be used in an attack, such
as deducing the existence of a string value at a real client. To overcome this limitation,
we consider the end goal of the adversary, and model a specific function that denotes
the existence of a string value (Figure 4.17).
This function is private (denoted as ‘[private]’ after the declaration in Figure 4.17).
In our model, whenever the adversary can deduce that a string value str exists (i.e., by
knowing the comparison result is equal and knowing one of the compared strings), an
EXISTS(str) message is emitted on the public channel the adversary has access to (i.e.,
spyAtt).
As a result, we can emulate the attacks where the adversary can exploit the compari-
son result and deduce that a string value exists at a real client.
4.11.3 Protocol Model & Verification Results
Here, we present the formal model of our system. For clarity, we describe the mirror
operation 1, in which Proxy2 is responsible for the comparison (Figure 4.3). We again
consider our protocol without the optimizations. Later, we describe our model’s limita-
tions (due to limitations of ProVerif) and explain why our optimizations do not conflict
with our privacy goals in practice.
In our model, we place the adversary separately at each component along our as-
sumption that they are not going to collude. We then describe which variables are of
interest to the adversary, which attacks are modeled, and any potential attacks ProVerif
finds. We then reason about why some of these potential attacks are false attacks.
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Table 4.2: Attacks found by ProVerif by various adversaries. The attack in the last row is
known, but cannot be modeled in ProVerif.
Found by
Adversary Attack ProVerif? Validity (Reasoning)
Aggregator with LINK(strtype1, strtype2) Yes False (Section 4.11.3.3)
fake clients LINK(str1, str2) Yes False (Section 4.11.3.4)
Proxy1 access to client IP Yes False (Section 4.11.3.3)
LINK(pipC, ipC) Yes False (Section 4.11.3.4)
Proxy2 access to client IP Yes False (Section 4.11.3.3)
EXISTS(str1) Yes True with incomplete
Proxy2 (known sid values) protocol (Section 4.11.3.5)
with fake EXISTS(str1) Yes True with incomplete
clients (known PXH values) protocol (Section 4.11.3.5)
EXISTS(str1) No True with very low
(count-as-a-signature) probability (Section 4.11.3.5)
We divide our description along the lines of our protocol’s phases. Each protocol
phase builds on top of the previous one, such that the adversary can utilize the infor-
mation it might have obtained during an earlier phase. For example, in the collection
phase, the adversary still has access to the information that might have been exposed
to the adversary during the initialization phase. All model files along with documenta-
tion can be found at the following address: https://www.mpi-sws.org/˜iakkus/
private/verif/
4.11.3.1 Adversary Model
The standard adversary in ProVerif has access to public channels and can observe only
messages that are sent on those channels. In our system, components interact with
each other using end-to-end encrypted channels that are modeled as private channels
in ProVerif, preventing the adversary access to these variables. Other variables in
compoents’ internal states would not also be visible to the adversary. As a result,
the standard adversary would not have access to any of the secret information in our
protocol.
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(* adversary can learn the client IP address? *)
(* (anonymity) *)
query attacker(ipC).
(* adversary can link the client IP to a string type? *)
(* (unlinkability) *)
query attacker(LINK(ipC, strtype1)).
query attacker(LINK(ipC, strtype2)).
(* adversary can link an anonymous client to two string types? *)
(* (anonymous profiling) *)
query attacker(LINK(strtype1, strtype2)).
(* adversary can link a client IP with a string? *)
(* (unlinkability) *)
query attacker(LINK(ipC, str1)).
query attacker(LINK(ipC, str2)).
query attacker(LINK(ipC, str3)).
(* adversary can link an anonymous client to two strings? *)
(* (anonymous profiling) *)
query attacker(LINK(str1, str2)).
query attacker(LINK(str1, str3)).
(* adversary can deduce that there exists a client with a string? *)
(* (existence of a string) *)
query attacker(EXISTS(str1)).
(* adversary can correlate a pseudo IP address to a real IP address? *)
(* (anonymity) *)
query attacker(LINK(pipC, ipC)).
Figure 4.18: Adversary queries in our ProVerif model. These items are queried through-
out our model to see whether the adversary has access to the respective piece of infor-
mation.
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Our protocol, however, assumes that the components are honest-but-curious, mean-
ing that they will try to learn as much information about clients as possible from the
variables they obtain. As a result, we need a way to let the ProVerif adversary have
access to the internal state of the component, where the adversary is modeled to be.
To do so, we use a public channel (i.e., spyAtt) similar to Koi [116]. Depending on the
component we model as the adversary (e.g., adversarial aggregator), we emit messages
that contain the internal state of that component on the public channel.
4.11.3.2 Adversary Goals
Figure 4.18 shows the list of queried items throughout our model. Depending on which
entity is the adversary, some queries will be trivial cases leading to false attacks. For
example, querying whether the adversary at a proxy has access to the client IP does not
make sense: one of the tasks of the proxy is to provide clients with network anonymity.
Table 4.2 gives a summary of the attacks ProVerif finds and cannot find as well as
whether the attacks it finds are false along with the section numbers explaining the
reasoning.
4.11.3.3 Discovery Initialization
Adversary at the Aggregator. To distribute the string discovery parameters to the clients,
the aggregator needs to learn the string type. However, this information by itself is
not useful to the aggregator, because it already organizes all discovery procedures and
knows the string types from all analysts. Rather, the linkage between a client and its
string types is of interest to the adversary. Additionally, the adversary at the aggregator
may want to learn the string types a given client has, such that it can anonymously
profile the client. At this phase, the clients do not send their strings yet.
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ProVerif cannot find any attacks in the protocol as expected, because the proxies
forward the client requests to the aggregator without exposing the client IP address.
The aggregator may run its own clients, whose string types it knows. When ProVerif
is run, it finds an attack in which the aggregator can anonymously profile a client:
the adversary can obtain the linkage between two string types (e.g., LINK(strtype1,
strtype2)). When we investigate the attack trace generated by ProVerif, we find that
the adversary accesses this information from the clients it runs. In other words, the
aggregator anonymously profiles its own clients! When the adversary’s clients are not
used, ProVerif cannot find any other attacks.
Adversary at Proxy1 or Proxy2. The proxies provide the clients with network anonymity,
and thus, see the client address. However, the requests containing the string types of the
client are XOR-encrypted, such that the proxies do not see them. Generic string types
(e.g., ‘visited websites’) are available at each client, such that the adversary does not gain
any new information. For analyst-specific strings, the XOR-encryption prevents each
proxy from learning the string type assuming there is no collusion between the proxies.
Similarly, when the proxies forward the string discovery parameters back to the clients,
they cannot obtain any information about the string types, because the parameters are
also XOR-encrypted.
When the adversary runs its own clients, it naturally knows their string types.
ProVerif finds the same false attacks as above. Besides these false attacks, ProVerif
cannot find any other attacks.
4.11.3.4 Collection of Encrypted Strings
Adversary at the Aggregator. During the collection of encrypted strings, the aggregator
receives the string type. This string type is used to compile the comparison lists. For
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example, multiple analyst-specific string types are put into the same comparison list.
An adversary at the aggregator may want to obtain the client IP and link it to the string
type it receives. However, the client sends its string type over the proxies in a split form.
Therefore, it is similar to the discovery initialization and the aggregator cannot obtain
the linking between the clients and their string types. At this point, the client strings
are still XOR-encrypted, the aggregator holding the R value and the other collecting
component (e.g., Proxy1) holding the matching X value.
The aggregator may run its own clients, whose string types and string values it
knows. Again, ProVerif finds an attack, in which the adversary can obtain the linkage
between two string types similar to the initialization phase, but also with two strings (e.g.,
LINK(str1, str2)). The investigation of the attack trace again shows that the adversary
accesses this information from the clients it runs. Without the adversary’s clients,
ProVerif cannot find any other attack.
Adversary at Proxy1. Similar to the above description, ProVerif finds false attacks about
anonymous profiling when the adversary runs its own clients to participate in string
discovery procedures.
Proxy1 forwards the double-split messages that carry the string type to the aggregator,
and therefore, interacts with the client directly. However, it does not see the client IP
for the collection of the X values and only receives a pseudo IP pIP assigned by Proxy2.
ProVerif finds an attack in which the adversary can correlate the client IP with the pseudo
IP address, because it has access to both variables. This attack is a false attack, because
the system assumes that there will be many clients participating in a string discovery
procedure. Any such linking will be equally likely for any client and thus, not meaningful.
The probability of correlating the pIP value to the client IP will be inversely proportional
to the number of cients.
The adversary sees the client IP address, because it is the proxy’s task to provide the
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clients with network anonymity. Besides this trivial case, ProVerif cannot find any other
attacks.
Adversary at Proxy2. Proxy2 assigns a pseudo IP address to each client and forwards
the X values to Proxy1. Besides the false attacks about anonymous profiling and a trivial
case of Proxy2 accessing the client IP address, ProVerif cannot find any other attacks.
4.11.3.5 Blind Comparison and Counting
Adversary at Proxy1 or the Aggregator. The comparison and counting of the encrypted
strings is done blindly using the comparison of PXH values. This comparison does
not leak any information about the strings being compared, except for their equality
or inequality. This comparison result is not learned by the collecting components (i.e.,
Proxy1 and the aggregator), and they do not receive any new piece of information
regarding string values and string types (besides the information they obtained in the
previous stages of the protocol). ProVerif finds the same (false) attacks described above
when the adversary is considered to be one of these components. Therefore, we do not
discuss these cases explicitly.
Adversary at Proxy2. On the other hand, Proxy2 compares the PXH values and deter-
mines the equality of the strings. It puts equal strings into equality lists, such that if two
strings are found to be equal, they are put into the same list. At the end of the counting
process, Proxy2 adds noise to each list’s length length and filters the lists that are below
the threshold. It then selects a representative string from each list and reports the count
to the aggregator.
To perform these tasks, Proxy2 learns the comparison result. Proxy2’s role to make
the comparison enables it to deduce the existence of a string (besides the other pieces
of information it may want to learn) if the necessary conditions arise. In the rest of
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this section, we describe more specific attacks involving the adversary at Proxy2. We
introduce bugs to the original protocol and let ProVerif find the attacks, and explain how
the original protocol prevents these attacks. We finally describe another attack, which
ProVerif cannot find due to its limitation to model counts and how this attack is not of
concern because of the system’s underlying assumptions.
Known sid Values Attack. Proxy2 may run clients and send known strings. It can
determine that one of these strings is being compared with another string by utilizing
the sid values the clients send and the collecting components (i.e., Proxy1 and the
aggregator) use as identifiers for the compared strings. We model this attack and verify
that Proxy2 indeed can use this approach to determine the existence of a string: ProVerif
finds the attack and generates the attack trace.
Our original protocol prevents this attack by modifying the original sid values by
overwriting them with a shared secret Rs between the collecting components, such that
sid′i = H(sidi ⊕Rs). When the original protocol is modeled, ProVerif cannot find any other
attacks.
Known R Values Attack. Another method Proxy2 can utilize to determine that it is
comparing a known string value with another unknown string value is to use the
R values.8 When the PXH operation is applied without the secret shared between
the collecting components, it is possible for Proxy2 to identify PXHAggregator(sid′i , sid
′
j)
= H(R1 ⊕ R2). 9 Consequently, when a known PXH value is received by Proxy2, it
can deduce that sid′i corresponds to sidi and sid
′
j corresponds to sid j (or vice versa).
Afterwards, when an unknown string is compared with one of these identified strings,
Proxy2 will be able to deduce the existence of a string.
Indeed, if the PXH values are computed without the secret between the collecting
8Or X values.
9Or PXHProxy1 (sid
′
i , sid
′
j) = H(X1 ⊕ X2).
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components, ProVerif finds the attack trace in which the adversary at Proxy2 can launch
this attack. The original protocol modifies the PXH values with the secret, such that
PXHAggregator(sid′i , sid
′
j) = H(R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ Rs) and PXHProxy1(sid′i , sid′j) = H(X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ Rs). With
the original protocol, ProVerif cannot find any additional attacks.
Count-as-a-Signature Attack. Although we can model the above attacks and ProVerif
is able to find them, there is another theoretical method for Proxy2 to identify strings its
clients sent: by using the count of strings as a signature. Proxy2 can run clients to send a
particular string. When the equality lists are formed, Proxy2 can identify these strings
from the list’s length and identify their sid′ values. Afterwards, Proxy2 can utilize the
comparison results of these strings with other unknown strings to deduce a string’s
existence.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of count support, this attack cannot be modeled in
ProVerif. Although one can manually create a certain number of string instances, one
cannot check the number of instances against a constant value.
This attack, however, is not a concern for the system in practice for the following
reasons. The system assumes that the string distributions most probably follow a power
law. This assumption means that there will be a long tail in the distribution, leading
to a situation in which there are many strings with small counts. As a result, to create
a unique signature for the string value injected via fake clients, Proxy2 would have
to create many clients. Additionally, the duplicate detection mechanism would force
Proxy2 to use one client for one string instance, increasing the difficulty of this attack
even more. Finally, Proxy2 would have to guess the number of actual clients with
that string value that will choose Proxy2 for the comparison, such that it can correctly
estimate and identify the count as the signature. Even if it could do that, it still would not
know how many clients with that string value have picked Proxy1 for the comparison.
We think that in practice, this attack will not be feasible with very high probability.
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4.11.3.6 Duplicate Detection
To prevent a malicious client from arbitrarily manipulating string counts by sending
the same string multiple times, our system performs a duplicate detection before it
counts the encrypted distinct strings. The high-level idea is to run the same blind
comparison protocol, but this time among all strings from a given client: equal strings
will be duplicates, indicating a malicious client without revealing any strings. This phase
is similar to the comparison and counting phase, in which Proxy1 and the aggregator
perform the PXH operations and Proxy2 compares the PXH values.
Similar to the comparison and counting phase, ProVerif finds the same (false) attacks
when the adversary is considered to be either the aggregator or Proxy1. We do not
discuss these cases any further.
As for the adversary at Proxy2, it still learns the comparison result. However, this
result is not exploitable by the adversary, because the comparison is performed only
among the strings from the same client. That means, if Proxy2 were to use fake clients
and send strings, they would be compared with each other (and not with other honest
clients’ strings). As a result, Proxy2 cannot exploit the comparison result to deduce the
existence of a rare string value at an honest client.
Additionally, Proxy1 and the aggregator use different secrets in the duplicate de-
tection and comparison phases to modify the sid and PXH values. As a result, Proxy2
cannot correlate the strings it compares in both of these phases.
4.11.4 Informal Analysis of the Remaining Protocol
Here we describe some parts of our protocol that were not modeled using ProVerif. We
informally reason about why these parts do not affect our privacy goals in practice.
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4.11.4.1 Mixing of Analyst-specific String Types for Comparison Lists
Our model does not consider the synchronization that takes place between the aggre-
gator and the other collecting component (i.e., Proxy1 in our description). During this
synchronization, the aggregator mixes multiple analyst-specific string types into a single
comparison list. While we could model this action in ProVerif, it would cause a number
of false attacks due to the limitation of modeling ‘hiding in the crowd’ principle in
ProVerif. Here, we reason about why this mixing helps us achieve our privacy goals in
practice.
Recall that before the blind counting step, Proxy1 receives each comparison list (CL)
from the aggregator, such that it can compute the PXH values. However, it does not
receive the associated string type ST for each list. Proxy1 has access to the sid values
used by its fake clients. It can use them to send strings with certain ST values and use
these strings as a signal for the ST value of a CL. Any such information is uncertain,
short-lived and anonymous: Multiple analyst-specific STs are mixed into the same CL,
making Proxy1’s guess uncertain (Section 4.8.3). Knowledge about a generic ST is not
valuable, because every client has it. Proxy2 anonymizes clients with a temporary pIP
valid only for one epoch (Eqn. 4.3).
In ProVerif, the adversary at Proxy1 would have access to its clients’ string types.
This knowledge would cause ProVerif to think that an honest client’s string type is the
same, just because they belong into the same comparison list. In a probabilistic sense,
this deduction depends on the total number of string types being mixed into a single
comparison list. Unfortunately, this probability cannot be modeled in ProVerif.
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4.11.4.2 Mixing of String Types and PseudoIP Values in Duplicate Detection
Our system relies also on mixing the string types and pseudo IP values during the
duplicate detection phase of our protocol. Similar to the previous case above, we have
not modeled this part.
In Stage 2 of our duplicate detection mechanism, Proxy1 sends the pIP′ → sidL′ to
Proxy2. The aggregator sends the ST ′ → sidL′ mappings, where ST ′ corresponds to
multiple analyst-specific string types. Proxy2 in turn uses both mappings to send back
groups of sid′ values, such that a group for Proxy1 corresponds to a 〈ST ′, pIP′〉 tuple
and a group for the aggregator corresponds to multiple pIP′ values with the same ST ′.
During this procedure, Proxy1 does not learn the ST ′ values in each group; only
that they may be different. Furthermore, each ST ′ consists of multiple analyst-specific
string types, preventing Proxy1 from deducing the string type of a client. Similarly, the
aggregator does not learn the pIP′ values; a pIP′ value may be in multiple groups and a
group has multiple pIP′ values.
4.11.4.3 Sample-Identify-Count-Filter Optimization
Our Sample-Identify-Filter-Count (SICF) optimization requires the model of counting
support: the strings in each sample need to be counted, and the most popular strings are
requested to compared with the rest of the strings to obtain a full count. For this reason,
we did not consider this optimization in our model.
The reasoning about the privacy of this optimization is the following: To filter equal
strings from the comparison list, Proxy1 and the aggregator learn comparison results
between some strings. If they identify one of these strings (e.g., their fake clients sent it),
they can expose honest clients’ strings that are equal to the identified string. However,
they learn many sid′ values of strings equal to any one of the p common strings, and thus,
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cannot be certain which strings are actually equal. In addition, these results belong to
the p most common strings in the random sample, which reflects the string counts in the
original comparison list. As a result, to expose a rare string, an adversary would need to
send it so many times to make it one of the p most common strings in the sample. Our
duplicate detection mechanism raises the bar for the adversary, forcing it to use more
Sybils.
4.11.4.4 Short Hashes Optimization
It is straightforward to model our optimization that uses a small number of hash values.
The hash value of the string only needs to be transmitted during the collection of
the encrypted strings to the aggregator, similar to the string type. One can simply
imagine that the string type already encodes the hash value. For example, one string
type could be ‘websites with hash 0’, while another could be ‘websites with hash 1’,
‘websites with hash 2’ and so on.
The reasoning about the privacy of this optimization is the following: With a small
number of hash buckets, many distinct string values will map to the same bucket (i.e.,
many hash collisions). Thus, the information gained about a string by knowing its
bucket value will be small. For example, with 128 buckets, the average numbers of
distinct string values per bucket in our datasets are about 7.8K for websites and 101K
for search phrases. Clients and watchdogs can set a maximum value for the number of
buckets allowed (e.g., ≤128).
4.12 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our system with real-world data. We first describe our
datasets. We then evaluate our optimizations individually to show the benefits each
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optimization offers. We report on microbenchmark results, which we use to evaluate our
system’s overall feasibility. We compare our system with Applebaum et al.’s system [83]
rather than [90] or [99], because it is the most similar system from previous work: it
has centralized components that can run fake clients, offers some protection against
malicious clients, and aims to provide aggregation in large-scale environments.
Applebaum et al.’s system has three components: client, proxy, and database. The
client runs an encrypted, batched oblivious transfer (OT) protocol with the proxy to
obtain encrypted and obliviously-blinded strings. During this process, these blinded
strings are encrypted with the database’s public key. The client then doubly-encrypts
its strings as well as their values (i.e., ‘0’ or ‘1’), first with the proxy’s and then with the
database’s public key. It also generates a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) [114] per string to
prove that the values used were ‘0’ or ‘1’. All ZKPs and encrypted strings are sent to the
proxy, who forwards them to the database. The database verifies the proofs, decrypts
the blinded strings and their values, and records them. If a blinded string’s sum of
values from all clients passes a threshold, the corresponding doubly-encrypted string is
decrypted. Note that no noise is added to the counts of strings in this scheme.
4.12.1 Datasets
The strings in the first dataset are website names in a snapshot of Quantcast’s top 1M
sites in April 2013 [51], ranked by their visitor counts. The strings in the second dataset
are about 13 million unique, anonymized search phrases from a large search engine10,
covering 3 months between 2011 and 2013. We assume each occurrence of a phrase
is from a unique client. We label data based on the distributions of these datasets as
“quantcast” and “search”, respectively.
10We cannot disclose the name for confidentiality.
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4.12.2 Benefits of Optimizations
4.12.2.1 Sample-Identify-Count-Filter
To gauge this heuristic’s potential, we ran a test with 10M strings distributed based
on our real-world datasets. The discovery threshold is 100, and the number of most
common strings identified (p) is 20. We used samples with 99% confidence level and 3%
margin of error, and stopped after 10 successive rounds of no newly discovered strings.
This test validated our assumptions about string distributions and power law: 10% of
the discoverable string values correspond to about 36% of all quantcast and 31% of all
search strings. Our heuristic discovered most discoverable string values (97.5% and
93.3%) with effective speedups of 335.5 and 219.6.
4.12.2.2 Short Hashes
To show this heuristic’s efficacy, we compute its speedup. The speedup S is the ratio
of the number of PXH operations performed, without and with buckets. Let N be the
total number of strings, ni be the number of strings in bucket i, and B be the number of
buckets.
S =
N × (N − 1)
2
B∑
i=1
ni × (ni − 1)
2
Figure 4.19 shows the speedup increases with the number of hash buckets: Strings
in separate buckets need not be pairwise compared, reducing the number of PXH
operations. Due to the power law, some strings have large counts, increasing their
respective buckets’ counts. After 256 buckets, these buckets start dominating in the sum
of PXH operations, reducing the speedup. By contrast, with a uniform distribution, the
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Figure 4.19: Speedup vs. number of hash buckets with 20M strings. Speedup values
were similar with more strings.
speedup is not affected.
4.12.3 Microbenchmarks
We tested all operations on a Linux PC (3.1GHz CPU, 8GB RAM) and an Android smart-
phone (1GHz CPU, 768MB RAM). We used a string length of 100 bytes, including the
padding. This length can be adjusted based on the string type and is not a fundamen-
tal limit, unlike previous work assuming 32-bit strings [83, 90]. Applebaum et al. use
1024-bit keys for encryption and ZKPs.
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Table 4.3: Client microbenchmarks. OT assumes 32-bit strings. Other operations assume
100-byte strings.
Device
(language) Operation Ops/sec
PC Encryption (El Gamal) 21.54
Apple- (JavaScript) ZKP generation (GM [114]) 3.22
baum Smartphone Encryption (El Gamal) 0.52
et al. (JavaScript) ZKP gen. (GM [114]) 0.08
[83] OT (primitive, single) 0.34
PC OT (batch size=25) 0.14
(C) OT (batch size=50) 0.14
OT (batch size=100) 0.13
PC Split 361,627
(JavaScript) Join 1,181,512
Our SHA-1 118,959
system Smartphone Split 2,922
(JavaScript) Join 22,695
SHA-1 1,761
4.12.3.1 Computation Overhead
Our client overhead is several orders of magnitude less than Applebaum et al.’s (Table
4.3). Multiple strings can be sent in one batched OT, but heavy crypto operations hinder
better performance. Our server operations are also much faster: our PXH operation with
SHA-2 can be executed about 0.8M times/second (Table 4.4).
4.12.3.2 Memory Overhead
Assuming that the batched OT in Applebaum et al.’s system can handle 100-byte strings,
the overhead depends on the batch size (Table 4.5). Even if the clients can handle the
load, the proxy becomes the bottleneck: a batch size of 50 requires about 9.5GB of RAM
for 1K concurrent clients. Note that a smaller batch greatly reduces the batched OT’s
efficiency. Our overhead is significantly lower for both the client and proxy.
143
Table 4.4: Server microbenchmarks. OT assumes 32-bit strings. Other operations assume
100-byte strings.
Component
(language) Operation Ops/sec
Apple- Database Decryption (El Gamal) 270.20
baum (Java) ZKP verification (GM [114]) 19.23
et al. Proxy OT (batch size=25) 1.27
[83] (C) OT (batch size=50) 1.21
OT (batch size=100) 1.00
Proxy XOR 8,300,335
Our (Java) SHA-2 817,003
system Aggregator Split 1,819,459
(Java) Join/XOR 8,300,335
SHA-2 817,003
Proxy
Operation Client (1K clients)
Apple- OT (batch size=25) 4.88 MB 4.77 GB
baum OT (batch size=50) 9.77 MB 9.54 GB
et al. [83] OT (batch size=100) 19.53 MB 19.07 GB
Split (25 strings) 0.005 MB 4.86 MB
Our Split (50 strings) 0.01 MB 9.73 MB
system Split (100 strings) 0.02 MB 19.45 MB
Table 4.5: Memory overheads for privacy-preserving string discovery. We optimistically
assume OT can support 100-byte strings.
4.12.4 Experiments with Real-world Data
This section shows the computational and bandwidth overheads with real-world data.
generated from the distributions of two real-world datasets.
4.12.4.1 Setup
For our experiments, we vary the number of strings from 10M to 100M. The discovery
threshold is set to 100. We assume each client sends 50 100-byte long strings, except
for Applebaum et al.’s batched OT operation at the proxy, which uses 32-bit strings.
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Applebaum et al. use a ZKP per string for count accuracy. It is unclear how such ZKPs
would detect malicious clients sending the same string multiple times, but we optimistically
assume each client would send only one ZKP for all its strings. In our system, the split
id and seed are 16 bytes each. The string type, epoch end time and  are 8 bytes each.
We use both our heuristics: For the SICF optimization, we use sample sizes determined
with 99% confidence level and 3% margin of error as well as a p value of 20. For the
short hashes optimization, we evaluate two values for the number of buckets used by
the clients (64 and 128). We set the discovery threshold to be 250.
4.12.4.2 Computation Overhead
Figure 4.20 shows the results. For Applebaum et al., we plot the CPU times for the proxy
to handle the batched OT of client strings, and for the database to decrypt the OTed
strings and verify the ZKPs. For our system, we plot the total CPU time for all PXH
operations (counting and duplicate detection) for the aggregator, because it is used in
both mirror operations.
In Applebaum et al.’s system, the proxy is clearly the bottleneck compared to the
database. Our system requires at most half the CPU time of the database, and even
one order of magnitude less than the proxy, while discovering almost all (99.995%)
discoverable strings.
4.12.4.3 Bandwidth Overhead
In Applebaum et al.’s system, a client runs batched OT with the proxy, and sends blinded
(encrypted) strings, their values, double-encrypted strings, and one ZKP. Excluding OT,
the total cost is about 19KB for 50 strings. A client in our system uses about 10KB, and
0.12KB per poll per string type for initialization.
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Figure 4.20: CPU time vs. number of strings.
In Applebaum et al.’s system, the costs for the proxy and database to handle 50M
strings are about 36GB and 18GB, respectively, again excluding the batched OT opera-
tions for the proxy. Our system’s biggest bandwidth cost is due to the PXH operations
for counting: For 50M strings and 128 hash buckets, the aggregator’s cost is about 625GB
and 850GB for Quantcast and search datasets, respectively, with an average bandwidth
of about 196Mbps (each proxy’s cost is half). The cost of all roles in all other phases for
each dataset is 43.7GB for the aggregator and 71.7GB for each proxy. The aggregator’s
monetary cost for bandwidth would be less than $110 in EC2 [5], and even less if the
servers were in the same datacenter (run by different entities).
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4.13 Conclusion & Future Work
We presented a privacy-preserving string discovery system that provides analysts with
previously unknown strings of many types and their noisy counts. These strings can
then be used as potential answer values for queries used in our analytics system as well
as other analytics systems. Our system also detects and limits malicious clients that send
duplicate strings and try to manipulate string counts.
We analyzed our system’s privacy properties and evaluated its feasibility with real
world data. Compared to the closest previous private aggregation system, our system
reduces computation overhead several orders of magnitude for the clients, and by at
least two times for the servers. Using XOR as its crypto primitive along with a low-cost
blind comparison method, our system trades off cheap server bandwidth to support
resource-constrained client devices and to count client strings without revealing them.
We think this trade-off will be more important as the prevalence of mobile devices keeps
increasing on the web.
In the future, we plan to better understand the trade-off between privacy and compu-
tation overhead in our optimizations. In particular, we will investigate the possibility of
using differential privacy mechanisms within them.
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Chapter 5
Literature Survey
This chapter presents the related work most relevant to the approaches presented in this
thesis.
5.1 Third-party Tracking
The existing cookie policies in major browsers have been discussed in Section 2.1. None
of these policies incorporate user interaction. The most similar policy to our policy is
to only accept cookies from visited (i.e., as first-party) sites. However, this policy does
not make a distinction at an element level. As a result, a visited site (e.g., OSN provider)
can track the user activity via social widgets. On the other hand, in our policy, the third
party is not allowed to learn about the user’s activity unless the user chooses so and
only on the pages she activates such widgets.
Of course, these third parties could try to bypass the cookie policy by not utilizing
cookies at all. Browser fingerprinting is such a technique in which a signature of
the browser environment is created. The browser environment includes, but is not
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limited to the operating system, plugins, fonts and screen resolution. The signature
can then be used to identify browsers uniquely without ever storing cookies on the
user’s browser [106, 131]. Recent studies show that this practice is gaining popularity
for third party tracking [76, 77, 137]; however, they are still not as prevalent as third
party cookies are [107]. Other researchers have been working on potential defense
mechanisms [111, 136]. These mechanisms are orthogonal to our cookie policy.
Ghostery [23] and Disconnect [14] are two popular browser extensions. These ex-
tensions use a blacklist of known trackers. Whenever a known tracker is found in a
page, that element is not loaded. These blacklists need to be maintained periodically.
Ghostery updates its blacklist every few weeks with regular extension updates whereas
Disconnect checks once a day for new trackers. The disadvantages of these blacklists
have been discussed in Section 2.1.
Other browser extensions such as adblockers [2–4] also utilize a blacklist of known
advertisements. The default filters usually hide advertisements only after they are
loaded and the user’s cookie values have been sent to third party trackers. Some custom
filters may specifically prevent known trackers; however, these tools still suffer from the
disadvantages of a blacklist.
The most relevant browser extensions to our policy are ShareMeNot [53, 144] and
Priv3 [43,100]. These extensions have the single, specific goal of preventing online social
network (OSN) providers from tracking users via social widgets. ShareMeNot reloads
the entire page when the user decides to interact with a social widget. Priv3, on the other
hand, utilizes a selective reload mechanism for interacted social widgets, which we also
use in our implementation. In addition, we inherit Priv3’s functionality of preventing
third-party scripts from accessing cookie values until the user interacts with the third-
party content (Section 2.5.6). Both of these extensions use a blacklist that consists of a
handful of OSN widgets, whereas our policy is general and prevents tracking not only
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by OSN providers, but also data aggregators and advertisement networks.
Firefox’s tracking protection [61, 123] is a fairly recent mechanism that has been
implemented in Mozilla Firefox 35 and newer versions. Rather than relying on browser
add-ons like Ghostery and Disconnect, Firefox has a built-in system for blocking known
trackers. However, this mechanism still uses a subset (about 1500) of blacklisted domains
obtained from Disconnect [123]. To minimize the effects of an incomplete and incorrect
blacklist, Firefox updates this list every 45 minutes. Unfortunately, this blocking of
blacklisted third parties also breaks the functionality of social widgets, if OSN providers
are in the list.
Lightbeam from Firefox [34] dynamically tracks the third parties the browser is
contacting and visualizes them for the user. These third parties then can be blocked by
the user manually. Similar to the tracking protection by Firefox discussed above, such
blocking breaks the functionality of social widgets.
Privacy Badger from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) [46] also dynamically
tracks the third parties the browser is contacting. Privacy Badger aims to enforce that the
aggregators honor the Do-Not-Track header set by browsers. To achieve this goal, Privacy
Badger uses heuristics to detect and then block third parties that appear to be tracking
the user without her consent. If the content is deemed necessary for the page, cookies
are removed from these requests. More recently, Privacy Badger started also preventing
tracking by social widgets. However, it uses the same blacklist as ShareMeNot [53] for a
few OSN sites (i.e., AddThis, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Stumbleupon and
Twitter), and the interaction with the widget is blocked if not manually overridden.
Pan et al. [138] propose a browser, TrackingFree, in which the client data is partitioned
into isolated profiles that are generated on the fly and assigned a new principal for each
site the user visits. The third party content in each site, including set cookies, would be
present in different profiles. As a result, the third parties will not be able to receive the
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same identifiers (i.e., cookies) to track the user across different sites. To achieve its goal,
TrackingFree has to maintain a complex state of principals governed by a sophisticated
algorithm. Furthermore, it creates user experience problems. For example, if the user
wants to share three different links from three different sites on her Facebook account,
she would need to login to Facebook three times [138]. Although synchronization among
principals can be enabled by the user to avoid this ‘multiple login’ situation, it also opens
the possibility for the third party (in this case, Facebook) to track the user after the
synchronization.
Kontaxis et al. [124] propose a technique for preserving personalization functionality
of social widgets while preserving user privacy. In this technique, the browser keeps
a local copy of the personalized content, such that a social widget can be rendered
without ever contacting the OSN provider. This private information is gathered when
the user naturally visits the OSN. For example, to enable Facebook Like buttons with
personalized content, the client gathers information about a user’s friends and their
“likes” and stores them locally. When a social widget is encountered, this information is
used to render the widget with the personalized content that would have been available
if the client were to contact the OSN. Any other information is gathered from publicly
available information from the OSN. The authors also present a functional prototype
specialized to Facebook.
This approach can preserve more personalized content compared with our cookie
policy: our two-click control renders the personalized content only after the user decides
to interact with the widget. Otherwise, it shows publicly available information (e.g., the
total number of “likes”). This seamless personalization by the above technique, however,
has the following shortcomings. First, the client software needs to recognize all OSN
providers, such that it can gather the required information for personalization. This
need essentially means that the developers have to create a custom scraper for each OSN
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and maintain them to adapt any changes the OSN provider makes to its pages. Second,
to efficiently gather the personalized information, this scraping process requires some
API support from the OSN provider, which may not provide full functionality or not
exist at all.
5.2 Web Analytics
Although web analytics, as far as we know, has never been considered in a privacy
context, there have been a number of approaches for providing users with privacy
guarantees in distributed settings. These approaches differ from our system in terms of
assumptions, requirements and goals. Here, we review past work most related to our
system, in the areas of anonymous communication, privacy-preserving aggregation and
differential privacy.
Users can use a VPN proxy or an anonymizing network like TOR [59] for anonymous
communication. While providing privacy benefits for anonymous browsing, these
systems are not suitable for non-tracking web analytics: they may violate our non-
tracking goal (e.g., a VPN proxy observing the source and the destination of a session),
mislead the publisher to collect incorrect information (e.g., the proxy’s or TOR exit
node’s address misleading a publisher using IP geolocation), or most importantly, do
not add any noise to the results (e.g., if sensitive data is collected).
For these reasons, researchers have proposed systems that both preserve users’ pri-
vacy and enable accurate collection and aggregation of private information [135, 140].
Anonygator [140] privately aggregates pre-defined histograms (i.e., ranges) from dis-
tributed user devices, but assumes the shared data will not leak privacy. P3 [135] is a
privacy-preserving, distributed personalization system, but requires a method to deter-
mine which data is safe to supply for personalization. These systems, however, either
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make assumptions about the collected information (i.e., that it will not to leak the source
identity) [140], or require an algorithm to decide which data are safe to contribute, which
may not be easy to devise [135]. In contrast, our system combines differentially-private
noise and separate encryption of answer messages to protect against identity leakage
through the aggregated data, without any assumptions or prerequisites. Furthermore,
these systems rely on an anonymity network, such as TOR, to hide the source iden-
tity (i.e., IP address), whereas our system utilizes an already existing entity (i.e., the
publisher) as an anonymizing proxy.
Applebaum et al.’s system [83] described in Section 4.12 utilizes a proxy and a
database for privacy-preserving aggregation of participants’ private data in the form
of {key, value} pairs. The system’s main goal is to achieve this aggregation without
exposing participants’ keys to each other, which makes it more relevant to our string
discovery system. Nevertheless, the strong cryptographic model the system is using
causes each participant higher overhead than in our system, such that applying it in our
web analytics setting would not be very efficient. Therefore, this system is perhaps more
suitable for publishers wanting to share their own, already aggregated analytics data
rather than for users.
While these systems provide users with some privacy guarantees, they do not utilize
any differential privacy mechanisms, which are considered to give stronger and more
formal guarantees than existing techniques [102, 103, 105]. Many original uses of dif-
ferential privacy, however, assume the existence of a central database controlling the
disclosure of results [85, 118]. Although attempts have been made to provide differential
privacy in a distributed environment, these attempts either incur high overhead [104] or
suffer from client churn [142,147], making them impractical in a large-scale environment.
To tackle this practicality problem, recent proposals employ different approaches for
generating differentially-private noise. Duan et al. propose a system called P4P that
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utilizes two honest-but-curious (HbC) servers to add noise [101]. They employ relatively
efficient, but still costly zero-knowledge proofs to ensure accuracy of the aggregated
result. Hardt and Nath also use two HbC servers, but propose that users add noise,
such that honest users compensate for the noise that unavailable or malicious users
did not generate [117]. While preserving honest users’ privacy, this system allows a
malicious user to distort the result arbitrarily. Neither of these systems is suitable for
web analytics, assuming that these two servers would correspond to the publisher and
the data aggregator: letting a server know about the other server for a given client
violates our non-tracking goal.
More recently, Chen et al. proposed a proxy-based system (PDDP) for achieving
differential privacy in a distributed environment [98]. PDDP utilizes only one HbC proxy
that distributes an analyst’s queries to clients, collects responses, and adds noise in a
blind fashion, such that it does not know how much noise it added. PDDP does not scale
for web analytics purposes for two reasons. First, PDDP has no way of selecting different
groups of users to receive a given query. In our setting, these groups correspond to the
users that visit a given website. If the proxy knew these separate groups (i.e., knowing a
user is visiting a particular website), it would violate our non-tracking goal. Our system
exploits publishers for this purpose because publishers inherently know which users
visit their websites.
Second, PDDP encrypts every bucket answer, ‘yes’ and ‘no’ alike, making it very
costly for the large-bucket queries that are needed in web analytics. This encryption ap-
proach also prevents PDDP to overcome its first shortcoming of distinguishing different
user groups: to achieve the same non-tracking property as our system, PDDP would
need to distribute all queries to all users and collect all of their answers.
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5.3 Privacy-preserving String Discovery
XOR [94, 148, 152] and matrix multiplication [122] are used as lightweight primitives for
anonymous communication instead of relatively expensive public key cryptography
operations. These systems do not aggregate user data privately.
Most database privacy research assumes a trusted database [102, 129, 150]. We refer
the readers to a survey [113]. Perhaps, the most relevant systems are the following two.
Chen et al. [96] publish sequential data via variable-length n-grams with differential
privacy. McSherry et al. [132] discover common payloads in network traces by choosing
strings via their noisy counts and iteratively increasing their lengths. Like the previous
systems, these systems also assume a centralized database. Unlike these systems, we
assume a distributed setting, in which user data resides on user devices.
To reduce the trust in the database, some systems encrypt user data before storing
it [139, 146, 149]. Afterwards, such data can be searched and queried. In these systems,
however, the results (i.e., counts) are not noisy. As a result, they may allow a malicious
analyst to learn sensitive information.
Trust in the storage entity can also be decreased using multiple databases. For privacy-
preserving queries over multiple databases, Chow et al. [99] propose a two-entity model.
In this model, one entity shares a secret with the databases to obfuscate results, while
the other aggregates obfuscated data. This scheme is similar to the aggregator sharing
a secret with the clients, who then use the secret as a salt to hash their strings. The
hashes are then used to count client strings. However, if the secret is shared with the
aggregating entity, for example, if the aggregator in our setting runs fake clients, the
privacy properties are lost. In contrast, our threat model allows components to run fake
clients. Furthermore, Chow et al. assume that a database (i.e., a client in our setting)
supplies correct data, which may not be true in analytics scenarios. Our system utilizes
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a duplicate detection mechanism to limit the effect of these clients.
Sepia [90] is a secure multiparty computation (SMC) framework that specializes in
aggregation of network events without a centralized entity, and can be used for top-k
queries [89]. Via optimized comparison operations, it scales better than other SMC
frameworks, but is limited to short strings (i.e., length of an IP4 address) and fewer
participants (i.e., <100), and thus, cannot be directly applied to our scenarios. Proposals
to improve SMC performance for mobile devices [92,120,121] assume a two-party model.
It is unclear how these proposals can be extended to support millions of clients for our
purposes.
As described in Section 4.12 and mentioned in the previous section, Applebaum et
al. propose a system with a proxy and aggregator to privately aggregate participants’
private data. The main difference between our privacy-preserving string discovery
system and their system is that Applebaum et al. do not add noise to the aggregated
result. Lack of noise opens the possibility for an attacker to create Sybil nodes to
pollute the results and gain knowledge about the existence of a particular string value.
Additionally, Applebaum et al. utilize sophisticated cryptographic operations, which, as
shown in Section 4.12, add significant overheads to the clients. Finally, although they
utilize (expensive) zero-knowledge proofs to ensure that the participants only submit
a value of ‘0’ or ‘1’ for a particular key, there is no mention of a malicious participant
submitting the same key multiple times. Our system prevents this issue with our duplicate
detection mechanism.
Approaches to find frequent items over distributed streams [93,126,130,153,154] have
similar goals; however, we are not aware of any system that achieves all our goals at the
same time in a web-scale environment (i.e., discovering unknown strings, lightweight
client operations, privacy and anonymity for clients, handling malicious clients). Hsu et
al. [119] describe an algorithm to privately find heavy hitters in a distributed setting, but
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one item at a time. By contrast, our system discovers multiple strings of one type in one
run.
To address both issues about scalability and malicious clients, recent distributed DP
systems employ pre-defined string values and centralized entities. piBox [128] uses pre-
defined counter names. It uses a trusted platform to restrict the interface how much and
how often an mobile application instance (i.e., client) can update a counter. The trusted
platform also adds noise to counter values before reporting them to the developers.
Hardt et al. [117] also use a counter for advertisement impressions (or clicks), but utilize
the clients to add noise. Two honest-but-curious servers then aggregate the counter
values. These two systems assume that the counter names are well-known. Our privacy-
preserving string discovery system complements these systems if they were to require
additional counter names, such as user-defined counters for different applications.
Recently, Friedman et al. [112] proposed a system to monitor distributed stream
sources for frequent items with differential privacy. However, the observed items come
from a fixed list enumerated by the analysts beforehand.
RAPPOR [109] uses Bloom Filters [88] and a differentially-private, randomized
response scheme to obtain frequencies of client strings. However, it requires a list of
candidate strings to decode the filters. RAPPOR does not handle client strings changing
over time (e.g., ‘recently visited sites’) whereas our discovery procedures can be run
periodically to tolerate such changing user data. Furthermore, RAPPOR assumes that
the analyst and the aggregator are the same entities, and thus, the analyst knows all
the clients. This situation is less general than our system, in which the aggregator can
provide string discovery service to multiple analysts in a privacy-preserving manner.
As described previously, PDDP [98] enables aggregation of private user data by
distributing queries to clients and adding noise via a centralized proxy. However,
queries in PDDP also require a list of pre-defined string values as potential answers,
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similar to our non-tracking web analytics system described in Chapter 3 and SplitX [97].
Our string discovery system is complementary for all these systems, including PDDP in
this regard.
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Chapter 6
Summary & Final Remarks
Current architectures to provide essential web services for social widgets and analytics
utilize methods that enable third-party service providers to track users across the web.
This tracking leads to privacy concerns among users, who often block and prevent
tracking related elements with client-side tools, reducing the benefits and utility of these
services for the publishers. We think that solutions that favor one side in this struggle
are not viable, and user privacy and functionality should be considered together. In this
thesis, we presented approaches to relieve this tension between privacy for users and
functionality for publishers and other service providers.
We first proposed and explored a new third-party cookie policy that prevents tracking,
but also to enables social widgets on-demand. The power of this policy comes from its
generalization of the simple idea of withholding third-party cookies while loading third-
party resources on web pages until the user interaction. This generalization removes
the need for a blacklist of tracking elements as well as alleviates associated problems of
curation, maintenance and that the blacklist can be bypassed. We showed that our policy
is effective in giving the users more control for social widgets by distinguishing them
from advertisements with high accuracy, eliminates third-party tracking via cookies by
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online social network providers as well as data aggregators, and imposes low overhead.
We then presented a web analytics system that eliminated the need for third-party
tracking for the purposes of extended web analytics. The system can provide publishers
and aggregators with more accurate and more types of extended web analytics informa-
tion by keeping user data on the user device and directly querying it via the publishers.
At the same time, the system prevents the aggregator from tracking the users by utilizing
the publisher as an anonymizing proxy and adding differentially-private noise to the
results. We showed that this system is feasible, easy to deploy and imposes low overhead
on the clients as well as publishers and acceptable overhead for the aggregators.
The above system and other similar systems require a list of string values that will be
used as potential answer values for the queries they distribute. Our final contribution
is a system that helps the analysts (e.g., publishers) to discover previously unknown
string values for this purpose. Although the discovery system does not provide strict
guarantees of differential privacy, it still enables aggregation of user data under realistic
assumptions and in a privacy-preserving way , in which clients are given anonymity
and unlinkability properties, and attacks to deanonymize a client’s strings are made
difficult. Our system trades off cheap server bandwidth for low client overhead, such
that even the low-resource user devices such as mobile phones/tablets can participate.
As a result, analysts can take advantage of the rich user data accumulating on these
devices that are becoming more and more prevalent.
Although social widgets and web analytics play an integral role in today’s web, they
are certainly not the only essential services that make the web function. Advertisements
have always been a part of the web ecosystem allowing website publishers to monetize
their content and sustain their operations. Meanwhile, reaching the right audience and
increasing the effect of the advertisements have been the ultimate goal of advertisers.
Unfortunately, this goal has been in direct conflict with user privacy most of the time
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due to targeted advertisements that are determined via third-party tracking.
Recommendation systems are also an another important part of today’s web. These
systems utilize user preferences and previous consumption to provide users with sug-
gestions for new content. The sensitivity of the information that is used for these
recommendations naturally causes privacy concerns.
There have been alternative approaches considering user privacy while providing
targeted advertisements [84, 115, 117, 143, 151]. Similarly, there have been attempts to
provide privacy-preserving recommendations by utilizing cryptography alongside a
server that operates on encrypted data [78, 86, 108]. These systems showcase again that
it is possible to provide privacy and functionality at the same time for web services, and
are complementary to our approaches.
The adoption of these systems, however, does not depend solely on their technical
feasibility. A combination of other factors, such as the economic incentives for the
players, privacy awareness of the users as well as legal frameworks supporting privacy
rights, certainly play a significant role. The challenge in designing such systems then
becomes not only finding the technical solutions to achieve functionality and privacy
goals at the same time, but also finding the right combination of these factors to make
these systems adoptable. This task is certainly not easy; however, we think that the
approaches and systems presented in this thesis as well as others mentioned above are
steps in the right direction.
Going forward, future applications or systems that utilize the web or a web-like
medium should consider user privacy as one of their main goals; user privacy should not
be an afterthought. For example, the prevalence of devices in the form of cheap sensors
is increasing dramatically [1]. These devices are capable of connecting to each other
as well as to the Internet and the web. Found in various areas of our lives from home
automation [54, 58] to fitness applications [32] and toys [60], the Internet of Things [30]
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is certainly going to enable various new and exciting functionalities. However, one
should not forget that the accumulation of rich amounts of user data will have privacy
implications. Ideas and approaches utilized in this thesis, such as keeping user data on
user devices and under users’ own control as well as distributing functionality among
collaborating components, can be adapted for these new systems.
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